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 This thesis focuses on the changing relationship between state and local 
governments.  I explore state-level constitutional changes in the 19th and early 20th 
century with respect to the governance and organization of municipalities.  The rich 
heterogeneity across state constitutions gives us an opportunity to understand the 
underlying political and economic forces at work, using a fiscal federalism nd 
political economy framework.  There are parallels between state-level constitutional 
changes regarding private corporations and the less well understood changes 
instituted for public corporations such as municipalities.  The adoption of municipal 
general legislation stemmed from similar problems of special interests and political 
maneuvering under special legislation.  In some states, general legislation protected 
municipalities from unwanted abuse by state-level politics, and provided a uniform 
structure under which all local governments could operate and easily gain access to 
the corporate form.  However, as in the case of private corporations, the one-size-fits-
  
all rubric of general legislation was often not amenable to all municipalities. Some 
states implemented a Pareto-improving solution, which is to have general legislation 
available for those well served by it, and to give municipalities the flexibiity to self-
select and independently charter themselves.  The resolution to grant home rule to 
municipalities retained the political security afforded by general legislation and 
provided the freedom of organization to those who needed it most. 
 The thesis is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 documents the history of the 
relationship between states and their municipalities.  The chapter also discusses the 
various problems states had in maintaining the original setup of passing speciallaws 
for municipalities.  Chapter 3 evaluates the changing economic and political 
conditions which may influence a state’s choice of how to structure the state-
municipal relationship.  Chapter 4 looks at one institutional change, the adoption of 
home rule.  By using a unique municipal-level dataset, I empirically investigate why 
certain states may have adopted this institution.  Chapter 5 considers another form of 
local government, the school district.  The patterns seen in the state-municipal 
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 The system of local governments in a state is often taken for granted.  Many 
citizens pay taxes to their municipality, county, water district, and school district 
expecting that public goods and services will be provided.  However, few of us 
understand the process which resulted in this intricate web of local governments.  Our 
current system of government is the product of two hundred years of interaction 
between state and local governments, defined in the legal framework for local 
governance established by state constitutions.  In the 19th and early 20th century, a 
wide variety of constitutional changes were adopted to address the organization and 
governance of municipalities, changes that varied across geography and time.  The 
rich heterogeneity across state constitutions gives us an opportunity to understand the 
underlying political and economic forces at work, using a fiscal federalism nd 
political economy framework.     
 This thesis analyzes constitutional changes across states and across time to 
help answer several questions.  First, exactly what changes were actually made to 
constitutions?  Second, what were the spatial patterns of constitutional changes, both 
in terms of which states adopted these constitutional changes and when they did so?  
Third, why did these changes happen?  These institutional changes were not 
exogenously imposed on states, nor were they changes that all states adopted.  
Differences in the political, economic and social environments compelled constituet  
and politicians to change their constitutional constraints.   
 I examine these questions from a new perspective.  By exploiting the variation 
seen across states and across time, the mechanisms for why these constitutional 
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changes happened can be better understood.  I assume that the constitutional 
framework is driven both by what is economically efficient and by what is pol tically 
viable for state legislatures to adopt.  This novel approach enhances both the 
historical record and the way we think about the institutions which frame the stae-
local relationship.  The historic record often assumes institutional change is reflective 
of social movements like the reform movement of the Progressive Era. While 
political movements are significant, this thesis emphasizes that economic and 
political conditions are essential parts of the story.  For example, I show that the 
heterogeneity within a state is an important factor in determining the probability of 
decentralizing control to local governments.   
 Another important distinction this thesis makes is in recognizing the different 
options states have in framing the state-municipal relationship.  The potential 
relationship between a state and its local governments has often been reduced to 
either a centralized or decentralized form of governance.  This thesis highlig ts that 
there is an important distinction to make within the broad category of “centralized” 
control.  Under a centralized system where decisions about local governments are 
made by the state legislature, a legislature may utilize special legislation, general 
legislation, or both.  It is important to first understand the different options available 
to the state legislature before trying to examine why a state might choose to move to 
an alternate system which allowed for decentralized control by the local governments.   
 A third contribution of this thesis is a new view of the institution of home rule.  
Home rule provided for decentralized control by municipalities instead of municipal 
organization being determined centrally by the state legislature.  The current view of 
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home rule isolates the institution as a choice made by some states startingin the late 
nineteenth century.  This perspective is problematic because it fails to take into 
account the full history of the state-municipal relationship.  Instead of consideri g 
home rule as an isolated choice, this thesis shows home rule was one of the options 
states considered jointly when making choices about how to structure the state-
municipal framework.  
 The thesis is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 documents the history of the 
relationship between states and their municipalities.  The chapter also discusses the 
various problems states had in maintaining the original setup of passing special laws 
for municipalities.  Chapter 3 evaluates the changing economic and political 
conditions which may influence a state’s choice of how to structure the state-
municipal relationship.  Chapter 4 looks at one institutional change, the adoption of 
home rule.  By using a unique municipal-level dataset, I empirically investigate why 
certain states may have adopted this institution.  Chapter 5 considers another form of 
local government, the school district.  The patterns seen in the state-municipal 
relationship are mirrored in the state-school district relationship. 
 
1.1 The Creation of Local Governments 
 
 From the beginning, colonial governments had independent control over their 
own local governments.  The Tenth Amendment in the United States Constitution 
cements that responsibility for the newly formed state governments, stating that “The 
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to 
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”  Among the 
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powers each state may exercise is the freedom to determine how to structure its 
system of local governments.  Over the past two hundred years, the structure of the 
state-local relationship has been defined by state constitutions and legislation, as well 
as through court rulings.  Because each state possesses the authority to independetly 
determine how to govern, there is a great deal of variation in how states handled this 
same task of organizing local governments. 
 Despite a long history of significant differences across state constitutions, the 
methods by which states have structured local governments share similarities.  
Historically, states initially possessed complete authority over local governments.  In 
a certain sense they still do, as local governments are pure creatures of the state.  
States are free to incorporate local governments as they deem fit and to specify how 
each local government is to be organized and how it is to be run.  Local governments 
do not possess inherent powers of self-determination or control.   
 States can choose to devolve powers to the local level.  This decentralization 
of control is considered an “enabling” action.1  A state can create institutions which 
grant citizens some discretion over how their local governments operate.  The range 
of self-rule varies across states and time.  At the most liberal extreme, local 
governments gain control over the process of “chartering.”  With access to chartering 
powers, local governments can make decisions that determine the specific functions 
and operation of the local government.  There is wide variation in the degree to which 
a state delegates autonomous decision-making to local governments.   
 
                                                
1 ACIR (1987), p 39. 
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1.2 Local Governments in State Constitutions 
 
 State constitutions provide a means to contrast the different options states 
chose in organizing their system of local governments.  State constitutions usually
provide a general framework of what powers the state has over local governments and 
what powers local governments may exercise on their own.  Constitutions include 
details such as the method of incorporation, the election or appointment of officials, 
the issuance of debt, the available methods of taxation, the process of amending a 
charter, the organization of police, and the mandate to provide education.  General 
patterns of change in the states’ relationship to local governments can be seen by 
looking at constitutions across time and across states.   
 By focusing on state constitutions and abstracting from state laws and statutes, 
some of the operational details of the state-local relationship are lost.  However, th  
state constitution defines the fundamental legal structure for these creatures of the 
state.  As Bromage (1961) writes, “Without state constitutional requirements and 
restrictions as to local government, a state legislature might proceed to crea e, 
consolidate, or abolish local civil divisions…[the] history of constitution-making has 
favored constitutional status for specific types of local units with limitations on 
legislature intervention in local affairs.”2  State constitutions are more difficult to 
change than statutes and, thus, are more persistent over time.  Therefore, changes to 
state constitutions reflect defining moments in the history of the state-local 
relationship. 
 
                                                
2 Bromage (1961), p 1.   
 6 
 
1.3 Categorizing Constitutions: Dillon’s Rule versus the Cooley 
 Doctrine 
 
 The content of state constitutions may seem straightforward to compare, but 
every detail of constitutional text is subject to interpretation.  To simplify the analysis 
of the state-local relationship, legal scholars have categorized the states as either 
operating under Dillon’s Rule or the Cooley doctrine.  Under Dillon’s Rule, local 
governments are creatures of the state who can only exercise those powers which are 
expressly granted by states.  The Cooley doctrine reflects a much more liberal grant 
of power from the state to local governments by asserting that local governments 
have inherent rights of self-control.   The two perspectives are often contrasted 
because of the different degree of autonomy given to local governments.  However, 
the important similarity between the two views is that they both represented active 
definitions of the state-local relationship.  A state which invoked Dillon’s Rule tied 
the hands of local government officials.  No longer could local government officials 
assume that they had free reign over local affairs.  At the same time, state legislatures 
were now given the responsibility over the organization and governance of local 
governments.  While Dillon’s rule added accountability between the state and local 
governments, the Cooley doctrine recognized the separability of different levels of 
government. The two points of view were part of the process of determining the 
boundaries of the once undrawn state-local relationship, both of which were inspired 
by judgments in specific cases heard by Judge Dillon and Judge Cooley.   
 In 1868, Chief Justice John Dillon of the Iowa Supreme Court ruled on two 
cases which defined his perspective on the state-local relationship.  In City of Clinton 
v. Cedar Rapids and Missouri Railroad Company Dillon wrote that “municipal 
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corporations owe their origin to, and derive their power and rights wholly from the 
Legislature…As it creates, so may it destroy.”3   In Merriam v Moody’s Executors, 
Dillon said municipalities could only exercise the following powers: “First, those 
granted in express words; second those necessarily implied or necessarily incident to 
the powers expressly granted; third those absolutely essential to the declar objects 
and purposes of the corporation- not simply convenient, but indispensable; fourth, 
any fair doubt as to the existence of a power is resolved by the courts against the 
corporation - against the existence of the power.”4  Both limited the powers of local 
governments to those expressly granted by the state.  For his judgments in the 
courtroom and his resulting work Commentaries on the Law of Municipal 
Corporations, this interpretation of state-local relationship was coined Dillon’s Rule.  
However, this particular notion of the state-local relationship was not new; several 
states defined this structure earlier in the nineteenth century.5 
 The Cooley doctrine originated from the judgment of Michigan Supreme 
Court Judge Thomas Cooley in People v Hurlbut.  The statute at issue had created a 
board of public works for Detroit with members to be appointed by the state 
legislature.  In his concurring opinion, Cooley wrote that “local government is a 
matter of absolute right; and the state cannot take it away.  It would be boldest 
mockery to speak of a city as possessing municipal liberty where the state not only 
shaped its government, but at discretion sent its own agents to administer it; or to call 
                                                
3 Zimmerman (2008), p 165.  Originally from City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids and Missouri Railroad 
Company, 24 Iowa 455 (1868). 
4 Merriam v Moody’s Executor, 25 Iowa 164, 170 (1868). 
5 ACIR (1993), p31.  The work of Joan Williams uncovers evidence that shows royally chartered 
municipalities were subject to the will of the legislature in Maryland, Pennsylvania and Virginia.  
There were also cases in Massachusetts in the early 19th century which ruled that towns were 
corporations of limited powers and subordinate to the state. 
 8 
 
the system one of constitutional freedom under which it should be equally admissible 
to allow the people full control in their local affairs, or no control at all.”6 
 In the late 19th century, most states accepted that Dillon's Rule was the 
prevailing view of the relationship between state and local governments.7  The 
interpretation was that local governments, by definition creatures of the state, only 
possessed powers granted to them expressly by the state government.  As will be 
shown, Dillon’s Rule serves as a point of departure for some states.  In the late 
nineteenth and early 20th centuries, some states chose to rearrange the relationship 
between the state and municipal governments.  Instead of municipalities only havig
those powers which are expressly granted by states, municipalities in some states are 
given the opportunity to seek additional control over municipal affairs.   
 
1.4 Fiscal Federalism and Political Economy 
 
 The constitutional changes were not universally implemented across all states 
and were not enacted at the same time.  There is variation in how states organize locl 
governments and also in when states choose to make changes.  The heterogeneity 
seen across state constitutions is influenced by differences in political, economic, and 
cultural environments.  As Besley and Case (2000) point out, “state policy making is 
a purposeful action, responsive to economic and political conditions within the 
                                                
6 ACIR (1993), p 34.  Originally from 24 Michigan 108 (1871). 
7 The only states to practice the Cooley doctrine in some form were Indiana, Nebraska, Iowa, Kentucky 
and Texas.  ACIR (1993), p 34. 
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state."8  Theories of political economy may help identify forces that determine when 
and why we see constitutional change.   
 The concept of federalism describes a system of governments and how power 
is allocated across national and sub-national governments.  The work of William 
Riker is representative of the classic view of federalism.  His work attemp ed to 
identify the right balance between “centripetal and centrifugal forces, searching for 
institutional, cultural and political circumstances that allow for stable fed ralism.”9  
Classical approaches to federalism take the view of a social planner and made 
recommendations for the most efficient distribution of power across governments.  
For example, the Oates Decentralization Theorem states that when there are 
differences in demands or costs for local public goods, a uniform, centrally 
determined level of local public goods will result in a lower level of social welfare.10 
Thus, traditional views of fiscal federalism predict that decentralization is beneficial 
when there are heterogeneous preferences across local governments withi a state. 
 Traditional fiscal federalism models identify the circumstances under which 
centralization or decentralization is socially optimal.  However, recommendatio s 
generated from a simple fiscal federalism framework fail to take into account issues 
of the politics and incentives that actors within the different levels of government 
may face.  By supplementing the fundamentals of fiscal federalism with aspects of 
political economy, we can better address the probability that certain socially efficient 
outcomes will also be politically feasible outcomes. 
                                                
8 Besley and Case (2000), p 672. 
9 Rodden (2006), p 359. 
10 Oates, Fiscal Federalism (1972).  
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 With respect to issues of political economy, it is important to note the inherent 
tradeoffs between a state government and its local governments.  The state is 
governed by a governor, a legislature, and the court system.  The legislature i  formed 
by representatives elected by each individual local government.  These legislatures 
are elected to represent the interests of their constituencies.  As elected offi ials, they 
also have the role of deciding what policies the state should pursue.  This dual duty of 
legislators creates an interplay between what is best for the part (the local 
government) and what is best for the whole (the state).  The policies that are 
ultimately determined by the state will depend on the collective actions of legislators.   
 Any changes to the state-local relationship will be endogenously determined 
by the underlying dynamic in the state.  Acemoglu and Robinson say that the 
distribution of political power is important in determining institutional change.11  
Political power is determined by both de jure and de facto power.  De jure power 
depends on the given political institutions and constraints.  De facto power depends 
on the ability to solve the collective action problem and on the distribution of 
economic resources.  While d  jure power generally persists over time because it is 
hard to change the formal legal framework, de facto power can change with a 
different distribution of economic resources or a change in political opinions.  
Changes in the distribution of de facto power can motivate the evolution of the 
institutional structure through constitutional change.   
 While internal shifts in political power can affect the process of institutional 
change, external factors may also influence the decisions of states.  States may act 
independently, but they coexist and learn from each other.  In 1932, Justice Brandeis 
                                                
11 Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), p 673-692. 
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referred to the states as laboratories who could independently experiment with 
innovative social and economic programs without interfering with the larger federal 
government.12  Each state government can independently decide to try out different 
programs and methods of governance.  When a state designs a successful program or 
implements an efficient governance structure, other states see that example and can 
utilize it in their own state.  As a result, states learn not just from their own 
experiences, but from others’ experiences as well.   
 Ideas of laboratory federalism apply to the adoption of constitutional content.  
By observing when states incorporated certain elements in their constitutions, patterns 
of adoption can be traced. For example, a state may be the first one to revise its 
constitution to include a prohibition of special incorporation of municipalities.  After 
that prohibition is in effect, benefits may be seen by the state legislature.  Because of 
the positive experience seen in the initial state to pass such a change, others states 
seeking similar benefits may want to incorporate the same ban in their const tutions.  
                                                
12 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932). 
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2 The State-Municipal Relationship 
 
 Municipal governments are creatures of the state.  The power of 
municipalities is determined by the restrictions and freedoms put in place by state 
governments, parameters state governments often delineated in their constituti .  
The design of the state-municipal relationship in state constitutions has changed over 
the last two hundred years.  The first state constitutions institutionalized the routines 
of the colonial governments with respect to localities, often drawn from the English 
experience with the establishment of boroughs which tended to treat municipalities 
individually.  The routines usually involved passing special legislation for 
municipalities, which were unique laws passed individually for each municipality as 
needed.  Later, some states moved away from special legislation to handle standard 
municipal needs and toward general legislation.  General legislation provided a 
uniform set of laws for each set class of municipalities.  Other states optd t  give 
municipalities control over their own charters through home rule.  While state 
constitutions rarely contain the details of the exact special or general legislation that 
was enacted, the constitutions present a picture of the changing pattern of the state-
municipal relationship. 
2.1 Tradition of Incorporation and Special Legislation 
 
 In England, boroughs and cities were granted charters directly from the 
Crown.13  Charters were formal documents that recognized the borough or city as a 
corporation, “indistinguishable as a legal matter from any other commercial 
                                                
13 Griffith (1938). A few of the more ancient among them claimed rights and privileges by prescription 
but overwhelming majority of the cases were incorporated in a formal charter (p 17). 
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operation.”14  Like private corporations, public corporations were granted charters on 
an individual basis and were thus tailored to the specific interests at hand.  Griffith 
(1938) notes that the charters for boroughs varied both in the jurisdictions covered 
and in the internal structure that was established.   For example, some charters 
contained provisions for the form of land tenure or mercantile privileges exempting 
townsmen from tolls and fees, some recognized borough customs as a source of 
binding law, and some allowed for the formation of guilds within the borough.15  Any 
changes to these charters were made by commissions appointed by the king. 
 Colonial governments in the United States adopted a system of local 
governments that was organized in a similar way.  The king bestowed the power of 
incorporating municipal governments on the governors, proprietors and assemblies of 
his colonies.  The royal commissions given to colonies included the authority to 
regulate localities, one of the many powers given to settlers, all of which were subject 
to the laws and statues of Britain.  For example, in 1639, Sir Ferdinando Gorges was 
given a charter for Maine which specifically included the power to incorporate cities, 
borough and towns.  A similar grant was made in 1681 by Charles II, who granted 
William Penn a charter.16  By means of separate colonial grants, twenty cities were 
incorporated in the United States from 1641 to 1776.17  Incorporated municipalities 
could be found in Maine, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland and 
Virginia.  Other states had large cities, but, as Kimball (1922) notes, these citi  were 
                                                
14 Frug (1999), p 36. 
15 ACIR (1993), p27. 
16 Griffith (1938), p 36. In Maryland, Lord Baron of Baltimore was responsible for incorporating St. 
Mary’s in 1667. 
17 First charter was Agamenticus in Maine in 1641. In the South, Charles Town was the only major city 
but it was not a corporation.  Frug (1999), p 37. 
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not incorporated and instead governed based on the New England tradition of town 
meetings.  Incorporated municipalities could have their charters amended by the 
governor or proprietor, the same way that originally granted them corporate status.  
Colonial governments often responded to local needs by delegating greater 
discretionary powers to local officials, but the needs of localities were all evaluated 
and addressed separately.18 
 After the Revolution, the power over localities that the crown-appointed 
governor or proprietor had assumed was often deliberately bestowed upon the state 
legislature.  New York, Pennsylvania and Maryland incorporated this new 
designation in their initial constitutions.  New York’s constitution of 1777 said that 
“nothing in this constitution contained shall be construed…to annul any charters to 
bodies-politic by [the said King or his predecessors]…until otherwise directed by the 
legislature.”19  In Pennsylvania, the constitution gave the House of Representatives 
the power to constitute towns, boroughs, cities, and counties.20  Maryland’s 
constitution of 1776 noted that “the city of Annapolis ought to have all its rights, 
privileges and benefits, agreeable to its Charter, and the acts of Assembly confirming 
and regulating the same, subject nevertheless to such alteration as may be ade by 
this Convention, or any future Legislature.”21 Other states moved the power by “tacit 
implication”.22   
 The change in authority from an executive to a legislative body had 
implications for how charters could be granted.  A municipal charter was no longer an 
                                                
18 ACIR (1993), p 29. 
19 1777 Constitution of New York, Article 36. 
20 1776 Constitution of Pennsylvania, Article II, Section 9. 
21 1776 Constitution of Maryland, Declaration of Rights, Section 37. 
22 McBain (1916), p4.. 
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executive order, it was a “unique instrument granted by the legislative body” through 
a special act.23  Also, since charters were granted through a legislative process, they 
could only be changed through a legislative process.  As will be shown later, 
switching the responsibility of municipal chartering to the legislative body presented 
issues of political economy not seen when the responsibility was under the domain of 
the executive. 
 
2.2 Prohibition of Special Legislation 
 
 A new era of the state-municipal relationship began in the mid-nineteenth 
century, when constitutions began prohibiting state legislatures from enacting special 
legislation for municipalities.   There were new provisions in state constitutions were 
“viewed as aiding local self government” so that “whatever rights of governm nt or 
power of regulating its own affairs a community may have can be neither incr ased 
nor diminished without affecting in the same way the power or rights of all simi ar 
communities.”24  For example, some state constitutions stopped the legislature from 
granting special legislation for perpetual licenses for municipal franchises, while 
others stopped the legislature from extending municipal debt limits through special 
legislation.  In some states, the constitution required citizen consent to any special
legislation changing a municipal charter.  Additionally, there were prohibitions 
against general interference with the organization of municipal governments.  For 
example, the Illinois constitution of 1870 was the first constitution to prohibit local or 
                                                
23 Griffith (1976), p 34. 
24 ACIR (1993), p 35. 
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special laws for “incorporating cities, towns or villages, or changing or amending the 
charter of any town, city or village.”25   
 It is important to note that state legislatures did not use special legislation 
solely for municipalities.  Special legislation is a term used to describe any grant of 
privilege for an individual or an organization.  Special legislation for municipalities 
and other forms of local government was termed “local” legislation to distinguish it 
from other forms of special legislation. These special grants encompassed chart ring 
private corporations, changing the names of people, exempting individuals or 
corporations from taxation and granting non-judicial divorces.   
 Similar prohibitions of special legislation were implemented across states.  In 
fact, some of these constitutional provisions to prohibit special legislation were exact 
copies from another state’s constitution.  For example, the first constitutions of 
Arizona (1912), New Mexico (1911), North Dakota (1889), Oklahoma (1907), South 
Dakota (1889), and Washington (1889) all included the previously mentioned 
prohibition of municipal incorporation from the 1870 Illinois constitution, along with 
a laundry list of other limits on special legislation.26  McBain believes that provisions 
were copied with “more or less blindness” or “at least with no more specific design 
than to forestall in the particular state the rise of an evil which was well known to 
have encountered elsewhere.”27  While McBain may not have perceived a need for 
these constitutional prohibitions in certain states that adopted them, the process to 
include these measures in a state constitution is not without cost.  At the very least, 
                                                
25 1870 Constitution of Illinois, Article IV, Section 22. 
26 Arizona (1912) Article IV, Section 19. New Mexico (1911) Article IV, Section 24. North Dakota 
(1889) Article II, Section 69. Oklahoma (1907) Article V, Section 46. South Dakota (1889) Article III,
Section 23.  Washington (1889) Article II, Section 28.
27 McBain (1916), p 96. 
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the cost includes time to pass the constitutional revision through the state legislature 
and then have it brought to a vote at a statewide election.  In order for a state to adopt
prohibitions against special legislation, the benefits must exceed the costs. Sta es 
where the perceived benefit of prohibiting special laws is low might have passed 
them if the cost was also low.  The cost of adopting constitutional measures decreases 
if they are incorporated at the time of a constitutional convention along with other 
extensive changes.  After a convention draws up a revised constitution, all of the 
changes are presented and voted on by the residents of the state as a package.  What 
may not have been worth the independent hassle of a constitutional amendment may 
be worth debating along with other measures at a constitutional convention.   
 Constitutional conventions were often called to address the issue of special 
legislation.  Ireland (2004) says that the “evil of special legislation” was a specific 
reason for calling constitutional conventions in Indiana (1850-1851), Illinois (1869-
1870), Pennsylvania (1872-1873), and Kentucky (1890-1891).28  The Indiana 
constitution drafted and adopted in 1851 was the first state constitutional provision 
which contained a broad prohibition on local or special legislation.29  Other states also 
took extensive action on special legislation at their constitutional conventions.  After 
the constitutional conventions of Nebraska in 1871 and Missouri in 1875, delegates 
                                                
28 A delegate from Indiana said “the whole error- the whole incongruity- the whole oppression of our 
law, and almost the whole necessity of calling thisconvention, was to do away with this local 
legislation.” An Illinois delegate stated “if there was one reason, above all others, for the calling of this 
convention, for the formation of a new constitution, it was this curse of special legislation.”  A delegate 
to the convention in Pennsylvania said “if this body was authorized and required for any one purpose 
more than every other, it was to put an end, at once a d forever, to SL, which has worked more injury 
to the people of this Commonwealth than any other single legislative evil that has ever befallen them.” 
Ireland (2004), p 295. 
29 ACIR (1993), p 34. 
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from both conventions were proud of their achievements towards prohibiting special 
legislation.   
 To measure the range of special laws addressed by constitutions, Binney 
(1932) constructed thirteen categories of special legislation by subject.30   While each 
category of special legislation attracted different interest groups and required separate 
legislation, prohibition of categories of special legislation were often incorporated 
into constitutions at the same time.  Figure 1 highlights two points: (1) limits on 
special legislation across different categories were often incorporated into 
constitutions at the same time and (2) these bans on special legislation were usually 
incorporated during constitutional conventions.  However, a few states, such as 
Minnesota, adopted the prohibitions by constitutional amendment. 
 
2.3 General Legislation 
 
 When special legislation for municipalities was prohibited by state 
constitutions, an alternative means of addressing municipal governance was usually 
made available through general legislation.  When states incorporated prohibitions of 
special legislation in their constitutions, they often included a “general restriction” 
clause.  Unlike a call for general incorporation laws, which is narrowly defined to just 
cover private corporations, a general restriction clause covers all categories where 
general laws are appropriate.  In 1851, the constitution of Indiana was the first to
prohibit certain types of special legislation, and was also the first to say “that in all 
                                                
30 The categories are: persons; corporations; rights, privileges, duties and property; interest, liens ad
trade; eminent domain, railroads, bridges, ferries; l gal proceedings; municipal corporations and local 
government; public officers; highways and public grounds; schools; taxation, elections; and general 
restrictions.  Binney (1894), p 131-132. 
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cases enumerated in the preceding section [which prohibited special legislation], and 
in all other cases where a general law can be made applicable, all laws should be 
general and of uniform operation throughout the state.”31  Of the thirty-seven states 
that included prohibitions against special laws in their constitutions by 1916, twenty-
seven of them paired those prohibitions with a mandate for general legislation.   
 The constitutional appeal for laws to be general and of uniform operation 
within the state related to legislation with respect to people, corporations, and 
municipalities.  Reinsch defines as general act as applying “equally to a persons 
subject to the authority if the state, or to a whole class of persons, defined by some 
essential characteristic such as profession or age.”32  Binney (1894) provides a similar 
definition of a class, saying that it is a “group of individuals ranked together as 
possessing common characteristics.”33  Thus, a state could define different classes of 
municipalities based on population, and have separate legislation for each class.  
Appropriate general legislation for a class based on population requires that the 
legislation relate to the defining characteristic of the class.  For example, if there is 
legislation for a class of cities with fifty-thousand people or more, then the legislation 
must relate to the needs of a large city.  If the legislation is unrelated to the size, then 
the legislation should not be unique to the class, but be in effect for municipalities of 
all sizes.   
 Once state legislatures were given the task of passing general laws, general 
legislation for municipalities was most commonly used to provide an open system for 
municipal incorporation and access to a standard charter.  General incorporatin 
                                                
31 1851 Constitution of Indiana, Article IV, Section 23. 
32 Reinsch (1907), p 148. 
33 Binney (1894),  p 47-48. 
 20 
 
allowed any municipality to incorporate and govern under the established framework 
without appealing to the legislature.  This was especially important in western states 
where there were a lot of new settlements in a relatively short period of time. As 
Teaford describes, there was high demand to incorporate speculative towns, as “every 
speculator and pioneer store clerk hoped that his town site would be the future hub of 
western commerce, government and culture.”34  The power to incorporate as a 
municipality brought with it formal recognition by the state government and allowed 
localities to encourage development.  General incorporation was advantageous to 
localities in all states.  It gave people control over the decision to incorporate, rather 
than relying on the state legislature.  Most general incorporation measures included a 
minimum population requirement and the approval of either a majority or two thirds 
of the voters in the locality, either in an election or through a petition.35 
 Another use of general legislation was to provide a charter for municipalities 
which would be uniform for all municipalities in the class.  In 1858, Iowa adopted a 
municipal code for the incorporation and governance of municipalities. Two classes 
were created for cities and one class was created for towns.  Each class ad a separate 
set of statutes pertaining to the municipalities in it.36  There is no universal or required 
content that a state legislature must include in a general charter.  A general charter 
might specify if the municipality was to have a mayor-council, council-manager or 
commission form of government.  It may also outline elected and appointed offices of 
the municipalities, authorize the municipal government to perform certain functions, 
or mandate the provision of certain public services.   
                                                
34 Teaford (1979), p 6. 
35 Teaford (1979), p 7. 
36 Pollack (1917), p 29. 
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 Despite the fact that a general charter must be the governing document for all 
members of a given class, the structure of the charter could be quite restrictiv . As 
McBain points out, general laws could regulate municipal governance in minute 
detail and be just as restrictive as any special law could be.37 Even if general 
legislation did not imply autonomy or self-governance, it did avoid legislation from 
being targeted at a specific city.   
 The relative restrictiveness of general legislation is also dependent on the 
system of municipal classes within a state.  Some states may have a few broad classes 
of municipalities, while other states may have a lot of narrowly defined classed.  If 
there are a lot of classes, general legislation may appear fairly restrictive because it 
pertains to a small number of municipalities, most likely with similar needs and 
interests.  However, with only a few classes, the general legislation for each class 
may appear to have a wider scope in order to meet the needs of a more varied class.  
The choice of whether to have many or few municipal classes was determined by the 
state; as a result, there is a wide range of general legislation implemented by states to 
meet different needs.  
 
2.4 A Mix of General and Special Legislation  
  
 The advent of general legislation did not imply the dissolution of special 
legislation.  While general legislation gave all municipalities of a class access to the 
same organizational form, some state legislatures still passed legislation for 
individual municipalities.  The simplicity and universal nature of general legislation 
                                                
37 McBain (1916), p 97. 
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often fell short in meeting the needs of individual municipalities.  State legislatures 
found ways to continue the practice of special legislation in order to charter and 
organize municipalities in ways other than what the general legislation permitted.   
 In some states, general legislation and special legislation coexisted as ools of 
the state legislature.  Prohibitions of special legislation might only pertain to 
incorporation or certain aspects of municipal organization.  As an alternative to 
special legislation, McBain (1916) discusses states’ use of “optional statutes.”38  The 
statues were passed to address the needs of a particular city in the same way sp cial 
laws were.  However, the optional statute did not name a particular municipality like 
a special law did.  The optional statute was made available to all other cities.  Other 
municipalities then determined for themselves whether they wanted to utilizethe 
optional statute or if they wanted to remain under the general provisions. 
 When special legislation was expressly prohibited, some state legislature  
used general legislation in order to pass items which functioned as special laws.  St te 
legislatures got rid of special legislation in name only; they still had means to 
legislate for the needs of a single municipality.  Legislatures repackaged special 
purpose acts as general legislation by restricting a class to contain one municipality or 
a small number of municipalities.  General legislation could then act as special 
legislation for the municipality or municipalities in that particular class.  An alternate 
means of using general legislation for specific interests was to pass a law which 
would apply to all municipalities on a very specific subject matter.  Thus, while the 
law was generally applicable, because of the exclusive nature of the issue under 
question, the general law was relevant only to the city which it was intended.  
                                                
38 McBain (1916), p 99. 
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2.5 Home Rule 
 
 The last stage in the state-municipal relationship was marked by the 
introduction of home rule provisions in state constitution.  Home rule grants local 
governments the opportunity to frame, adopt and amend their own charter.  This grant 
of local autonomy releases them from the constraints of general laws for local 
governments and acts of special legislation.  Figure 2 shows the adoption of home 
rule across states and across time.  There are obvious differences in which regions 
were more likely to adopt home rule.  There are also differences in the institution of 
home rule over time.  The first wave of constitutional home rule provided self-rule fo  
large cities.  Missouri and California adopted home rule provisions to address the 
needs of the most populous cities, St. Louis and San Francisco, respectively.39  In 
1875, Missouri allowed cities with more than one hundred thousand residents the 
option to “frame a charter for its own government, consistent with and subject to the 
Constitution and laws or this State.”40  If the citizens of St. Louis desired a home rule 
charter, a board of thirteen freeholders could convene to draft a charter.  The 
proposed charter would be published in local newspapers for review prior to citizens 
voting on it.  If four-sevenths of the qualified voters approved, the home rule charter 
would supersede any existing charter.  Amendments could be made with the approval 
of three-fifths of the voters.  In 1879, California included a similar provision in its 
new constitution.41  The framework for adopting a home rule charter imitated that in 
Missouri, except California required 15 freeholders to draft a charter and a majority 
                                                
39 In both states, home rule was given to cities over ne hundred thousand residents.  Other cities 
became eligible for home rule chartering as their populations grew (such as Kansas City in 1889).  
California extended home rule privileges to cities of 3,500 or more in 1892. 
40 1875 Constitution of Missouri, Article IX, Section 16.   
41 1879 Constitution of California, Article XI, Section 8.   
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of voters to approve it.42  In addition, the home rule charter could not be amended in 
intervals of less than two years.  This initial attempt at including a home rule 
provision required refinement; California’s home rule provision was amended 8 times 
by 1914, and a total of 12 times by 1936. 
 The second wave of constitutional home rule did not arise out of concern for 
large cities.  Rather, states saw benefits of home rule reaped by cities like St. Louis 
and Los Angeles, and wanted to afford smaller municipalities those privileges.  In 
1889, Washington’s first constitution included home rule chartering privileges for 
cities with more than twenty thousand residents.  In 1896, Minnesota passed an 
amendment granting the home rule option to any city or village.  In the following 16 
years, another 8 states granted constitutional provisions for home rule authority.43  Six 
out of the 10 states in the second wave of constitutional home rule had a similar 
framework for the creation and adoption of a home rule charter.  These states 
followed the process laid out in the Missouri and California constitutions, calling for 
a board of freeholders to draft a charter, the publication of the proposed charter, and a 
vote by citizens.  If approved by a majority of electors, the charter became the organic 
law of the city.44  An important distinction from the California example was allowing 
amendments as frequently as proposed; states did not impose a minimum interval 
                                                
42 Oberholtzer (1893) notes that the Chairman of the City, Township and County Organization at 
California’s 1875 charter convention admitted that t e idea was copied almost exactly from the 
constitution of Missouri, p 85. 
43 Colorado (1902), Oregon (1906), Oklahoma (1907), Arizona (1910), Michigan (1912), Nebraska 
(1912), Ohio (1912), and Texas (1912).  The largest population requirement for home rule in these 
states was five thousand residents, imposed by Nebraska and Texas. 
44 Minnesota was the only state in this group that didn’t require a majority, instead four-sevenths was 
needed to pass. 
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between amendment proposals.45  The other 4 out of the 10 states (Colorado, Oregon, 
Michigan and Texas) had less detailed constitutional home sections.  In Michigan and 
Oregon, this was because constitutional home rule was non-self executing.  The 
constitution merely said there should be general laws to allow for home rule; further
legislature was required by the state legislature to actually imple ent home rule. 
 The third phase of home rule is defined by uncomplicated provisions and the 
scarcity of states that adopted the institution.46  The trend began when Pennsylvania 
approved home rule in 1922 for cities with more than ten thousand residents.  The 
simple provision in Pennsylvania’s constitution grants the “right and power to frame 
and adopt own charters and to exercise the powers and authority of local self 
government…restrictions…as may be imposed by the Legislature.”47  Other states 
with similar uncomplicated grants of home rule were West Virginia (1936) to 
municipalities of more than two thousand; Maryland (1954) to any municipal 
corporation; Alaska (1959) to all cities of the first class; and Hawaii (1959) to any 
political subdivision.48   
 In 1960, Kansas ushered in a new, substantially different period of home rule.  
The state offered clarity on the extent of home rule control, stating that “powers and 
authority granted cities pursuant to this section shall be liberally construed for the 
                                                
45 The exception was Texas which, like California, stted that amendments couldn’t be imposed more 
frequently than every two years. 
46 Rhode Island was an exception.  In 1951, the stategr nted home rule to any municipality.  The 
constitutional amendment retained the cumbersome structure of a board of freeholders, charter 
conventions, specific election procedures, etc.  1951 Constitution of Rhode Island, Article 9099, 
Section 9. 
47 1874 Constitution of Pennsylvania, 1922 Amendment, Article XV, Section 1.  While constitution 
was changed in 1922, legislature did not take action on home rule until 1949.  See CELDF website. 
48 Some scholars list New York as adopting home rule legislation in 1924.  It was home rule only in 
name.  While it did grant local control over several specific powers, it did not allow municipalities to 
adopt, enact and amend their own charter.  Municipal ties were still severely restricted in their 
operation.   
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purpose of giving to the cities the largest measure of self-government.”49  An 
illustrative change was the amendment in Iowa (1968), stating “the rule or 
proposition of law that a municipal corporation possessed and can only exercise those 
powers granted in express words is not a part of the law of this state.” 50 This was an 
explicit challenge to Judge Dillon’s ruling 100 years earlier.51   Illinois established 
constitutional home rule in 1970, generously decentralizing control so municipalities 
“may exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and 
affairs….powers and functions of home rule units shall be construed liberally.”52  
Four other states did not grant such broad freedom, but were explicit in defining what 
authority home rule municipalities did possess.53  In general, home rule municipalities 
were granted domain over everything that state legislatures could manage for non-
home rule municipalities, and had all legislative powers not expressly denied by 
general law. 
 
2.6 Difficulty in Maintaining Special Legislation 
 
 As state governments matured, the practice of special legislation began to 
show cracks.  The system had worked well for the young colonial governments and 
continued to work well for other countries, such as Britain.  However, the method of 
special legislation was not a sustainable practice for state legislatures in the long term 
for a variety of reasons.  Special legislation was no longer the most functional or 
                                                
49 1859 Constitution of Kansas, 1960 Amendment, Article XII, Section 5. 
50 1857 Constitution of Iowa, 1968 Amendment, Article III.2, Section 39a. 
51 Dillon’s Rule (1868) stated that municipalities only have those powers expressly granted by the state
government. 
52 1970 Constitution of Illinois, Article VII, Section 6. 
53 South Dakota (1963), North Dakota (1966), New Mexico (1970), Louisiana (1974). 
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efficient way of granting municipal incorporation and managing municipal charters, 
and political problems magnified the use and abuse of special legislation.  The 
following sections each identify a specific problem raised by special legis ation. 
 
2.6.1 Numbers Problem 
 
 The passage of a special law requires time and effort on the part of state 
legislators.  The proposed law must be individually drafted by legislators, debate  by 
the legislature in committee or on the floor, and then brought before the legislature 
for a vote independent of any other legislation.  When there are not many localities, 
the state legislature can accommodate the individual legislative needs of 
municipalities.  And, if localities do not require a great deal of new legislation passed 
each year, requests for special legislation can be sustained.  However, an important 
pattern developed in the nineteenth century.   As people chose to settle in 
incorporated places, the number of incorporated places increased.  These 
municipalities demanded the ability to provide public services such as water, gas and 
transportation.  When the growing needs of municipalities were combined with the 
increased number of municipalities, the amount of special legislation grew rapidly.   
 State legislators were overburdened with special legislation, and local laws for 
municipalities constituted a large portion of that work. Before any prohibition of 
special legislation, the ratio of special to general legislation in some states ranged 
from 3:1 to more than 10:1.54  As mentioned before, the overwhelming amount of 
special legislation was often one of the primary reasons for calling for constitutional 
                                                
54 Ireland (2004), p271-272. 
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conventions.  Indiana was one of the first states to adopt comprehensive prohibitions 
on special legislation in a new constitution in 1851.  Delegates to that constitutional 
convention decried that more than two-thirds of the laws enacted since statehood 
were special, not general, laws.55  In Iowa, from 1846-1857, a period before the state 
adopted prohibitions on special legislation, 1023 laws were passed of which 62% 
were local or special.  A quarter of the laws were from granting or amending city 
charters and for laying out and establishing State roads.56  A delegate to the Illinois 
constitutional convention of 1870 noted that his state enacted 3 volumes of special 
legislation and one slim volume of general legislation during the previous session.  
Similar to the case of Illinois, a delegate to the Pennsylvania constitutional 
convention of 1872-1873 noted that in the previous six years, the state legislature has 
passed 8,755 special laws and 475 general laws.  In 1873, New Jersey’s governor 
criticized the previous session for enacting more than 1,250 pages of special 
legislation and only 100 pages of general legislation.  In 1873, the New York Times
reported that in the previous four years, almost ninety percent of the New York laws 
were special statutes.57  The state appointed a special commission in 1877 to study the 
problem of special legislation.  The report of the Evarts Commission found that of the 
808 acts passed in the 1870 session, 212 were special acts relating to municipalities.58  
After learning about the large amount of special legislation, another committee was 
commissioned a decade later to again evaluate the use of special legislation.  The 
Fasset committee found that between 1884 and 1889, New York passed 1284 total 
                                                
55 Ireland (2004), p 271. 
56 Pollack (1917), p 14. 
57 Ireland (2003), p 272. 
58 McBain (1916), p 8.  
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acts, 390 of which were special acts for New York City.59  Even after recognizing the 
magnitude of special legislation, nothing had changed in New York.  The problem 
continued in Kentucky as well; in the 1883-1884 legislative session, ninety-four 
percent of the statutes concerned local or private matters.60 
 During Maryland’s constitutional convention of 1904, delegate Oscar Leser 
noted the progress other states had made with respect to controlling special legislation 
during the last half of the nineteenth century.  For the legislative period from October 
1902 to October 1903, Colorado, West Virginia, Missouri, Illinois, New Jersey, 
Oregon, and South Carolina all had less than 300 total acts passed.61  While the 
numbers do not reveal the breakdown between special and general legislation, the low 
total number of laws is most likely due to prohibitions and restrictions on special 
legislation that were in place in all of these states. 
 Maryland continued to have a large amount of special legislation.  Over half 
of the legislation passed by the 1904 Maryland legislature was local, with another 
thirty percent devoted to other forms of special legislation.  The amount of legislation 
was due to multiple acts needing to be passed for each locality and multiple acts 
passed to cover a universal issue.  One locality had over twenty-five local laws passed
to individually deal with roads, taxes, dogs, primary elections, and fish and game.  
While there was one act of legislation with respect to fish and game for this locality, 
thirty-three local laws were passed for other localities in Maryland during the same 
                                                
59 McBain (1916), p 10. 
60 Tarr (1998), p 120. 
61 Colorado passed 181 laws in 90 days; West Virginia had 80 laws in 45 days; Missouri had 207 laws 
in 76 days; Illinois had 210 laws in 121 days; New Jersey had 273 laws in 80 days; Oregon had 173 
laws in 40 days; South Carolina had 172 acts in 40 days.  Leser (1904), p 164. 
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session.  So, even for issues where general laws may be appropriate, the legislatur  
continued the tradition of special legislation. 
 The increase in special legislation is probably due to population growth and 
increased demand for governance because of new public goods, but the increase may 
also have been due to the fact that these new public goods and their associated 
contracts presented opportunities to take advantage of these spoils.  Not all legisltors 
were immune to the temptation.  As Tarr (1998) notes, “local laws, especially those 
awarding trolley, water, gas or other franchises, were widely recognized as a 
perennial fountain of corruption.”62 
 
2.6.2 Judicial Decision-Making in a Legislative Body 
 
 Another issue with special legislation was whether certain acts of special 
legislation were within the domain of the state legislature.  The state legislature is 
supposed to determine what the law should be.  The legislature was not granted the 
right to interpret laws by making judicial decisions through legislative acts.  Orth 
commented in 1906 that the “unfortunate habit of carrying all out local and private 
ailments to the state capitol, to have the virtuous adhesive of a special law applied, 
has transformed our law-making bodies into quack commissions with mongrel 
duties.”63  
 The most striking example is the use of special legislation for divorce.  
Divorces were available through the court system, but the judicial process nly 
granted divorce for certain causes.  However, the state legislature could grant a
                                                
62 Tarr (1998), p. 120.  
63 Orth (1906), p. 69. 
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divorce for marital problems that were not recognized by the courts through special
legislation.  For example, in 1842 in Indiana, Mary Ann Bruner was allowed to file a 
petition to the state legislature because of "her disability by reason of her husband not 
having absented himself from her for two years."64  Legislative divorces were often 
seen as unjust.  As the governor of Iowa pointed out, they gave the accused party no 
opportunity to be heard; a hearing could be obtained only in a judicial proceeding.  
Thus, by granting divorces, the state legislature was interfering with the duties of the 
judicial branch.65 
 The practice of legislative divorce was prominent in the western territories.  
For example, the record of session laws for Washington shows three cases in 1858 
and one in 1859, followed by fifteen in 1860, seventeen in 1861, fifteen in 1862, and 
sixteen in 1863.  Kansas had a similar trend, with one divorce petition was granted by 
the assembly in 1857, three in 1858, eight in 1859.  In 1860 the number jumped to 
forty-three; one scholar notes this may have been because it was the last chance 
before the constitutional prohibition of 1859 went into effect.66 New state 
governments kept up the practice of granting divorces through the legislature.  The 
practice continued until it was expressly prohibited by state constitutions in the mid-
nineteenth century.67      
 While the primary example used here is divorces, the judicial nature of special 
legislation was also a concern for municipal acts.  If there was a general statute on the 
books, the state legislature could pass special legislation which would grant privileges 
                                                
64 Howard (1904), p 97. 
65 Pollack (1917), p 10. 
66 Howard (1904), p 98. 
67 Ireland (2004), p 289, 295-296. Pollack notes thatin some cases state legislatures stopped granting 
legislative divorces, for example in Michigan in 1837 and in Minnesota in 1856 (p. 96-97). 
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to a given municipality that may not be allowed or accessible under the general 
legislation.   
2.6.3 The Principal-Agent Problem 
 
 The practice of special legislation introduces a potential problem of 
misaligned interests.  The citizens of the municipality have certain preferences for the 
type of government they want and the goods and services they want provided.  
However, in order to structure their government and obtain authority for the provision 
of goods and services, the citizens must appeal for special legislation before th  state 
legislature.  The citizens are dependent on the actions of their representative to the 
legislature and, ultimately, the actions of the entire state to carry out their preferred 
plans.  If the legislator or the state decision is based on things other than the welfar
of the municipality, then the special legislation that the municipality wants may not 
be obtained.  The agency problem occurs because the self-interested choices of the 
legislator or state do not coincide with the municipality’s preferences.   
 
2.6.3.1      The Municipal Legislator as the Agent 
 
 Legislative courtesy called for the state legislature to go along with requests 
for special legislation made by delegates from the particular city.  As Kimball (1922) 
notes, it was the tradition of state legislatures to take the advice of the members of the 
majority party who happen to come from the particular city affected.  This deference 
to the city delegates was not often an issue for the city, as the city delegate’s actions 
usually coincided with the city’s preferences.  However, sometimes the city 
delegate’s objective was to maximize something other than the welfare of the city.  
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While his utility may have been based in part on the city’s interests, his utility also 
took into account his own political and private welfare. 
 State legislators had to worry about reelection and were sometimes involved 
in corrupt enterprises.  Special legislation allowed them to grant privileges to further 
their alternate goals.  Special interests understood the potential of special legisl tion, 
and recognized that their local delegate was an “alternative channel for action, a 
means for circumventing the city officials.”68  Ireland emphasized that this “czar” had 
“absolute and undisputed power to control all legislation affecting his locality.”69  If 
the municipal government could not pass a certain measure or adopt a certain project, 
the state legislator could make it happen.  Any group with a specific project related to 
city issues had only to persuade the city legislator to introduce the measure; with that, 
the measure would become law, no matter how many people in the city may be 
against it.70  The power was not always abused; in fact, recent scholars have 
documented that city legislators usually proposed special legislation that was in the 
city’s best interests.71  However, there are still plenty of cases where the legislators 
abused the system for their own benefit.   
 A common form of abuse was using special legislation to award franchises.  
Sometimes the legislator would receive bribes or kickbacks as a payment for granting 
these privileges.72  In Providence, Rhode Island, for example, special legislation was 
passed to award franchises to the utilities, even though the city itself was again t it.73  
                                                
68 Teaford, Special Legislation, (1979), p 212. 
69 Ireland (2004), p. 274. 
70 Wilcox (1906), p 317. 
71 See Teaford (1984), Burns (1994), and Monkonnen (1988). 
72 People complained that as a result of favored franchises, their taxes were higher than they had to be.  
Griffith (1976), p. 36. 
73 Griffith, 1870-1900 (1974), p 217. 
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Special legislation was also used for amendments to the city charter, salary increases, 
and taxing privileges.74  The delegates from New York City often betrayed the 
constituents they were elected to represent.  Reinsch (1907) describes one packag of 
special legislation in 1892, when the delegates helped pass the election inspector’s 
bill, the Foley excise bill, and the Central Park speeding bill, which favored the 
sporting interests at the expense of the greater constituency.   
 Projects requiring special legislation were sometimes not sought out by the
legislator, but were brought to the table by powerful local interests.75  Reinsch points 
out that the political boss and his machine operated through state legislators in order 
to gain privileges.  The state legislator complied in order to have that political 
machine on his side come time for re-election.  Even without a party boss pulling the 
strings, it made political sense for legislators to introduce special legslation.  It was a 
way to signal to their constituents that they were getting business done at the st te 
capital.76     
 
2.6.3.2      The State as the Agent 
 
 Special legislation was also passed when the state’s preferences, represented 
either by the governor or the legislature considered as a whole, were not aligned w th 
the preferences of the municipality.  For example, in 1861, the state legislature of 
                                                
74 The legislators who represented Chicago passed this assortment of special legislation without getting 
input from or giving warning to the city residents.  Ireland (2004), p 283. 
75   A committee of the NY Constitutional Convention f 1872-1873 that studied the problem of special 
legislation concluded that “the local pressure brought to bear upon members by selfish and interested 
parties [to enact such legislation] is enormous and often irresistible.” Ireland (2004), p 275. 
76 A reporter for The Louisville Commercial (1886), after interviewing members of the Kentucky 
legislature, concluded that “most of the members from the back countries depended largely on the 
passage of these local and private bills for their influence at home.” Cited in Ireland (2004), p 275. 
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Missouri took control of the police away from St. Louis.  The legislature formed a 
Board of Police under control of the state; however, financing the budget was still the 
responsibility of St. Louis.77  In 1891, the city of Minneapolis tried to get a charter 
proposal passed by special legislation.  The Democratic house and senate passed the 
city’s proposed charter.  However, the Republican governor vetoed the charter, saying 
it was “wiser to submit this proposed charter to the people of the city for their 
approval or disapproval.”78  Griffith (1974) lists other instances of state interference.  
For example, the date of municipal election in St. Paul was changed three times in 
four years by the state.  In New Jersey, the state legislature gerrymandered the ward 
boundaries in cities in order to control their political composition.  The New York 
state legislature yielded to Vanderbilt when he proposed a contract where he would 
be paid four million dollars by the city to improve the NY Central tracks on Park 
Avenue. These acts went against the legislative practice at the time, which was to
defer to the local delegation to decide local matters.   
 
2.6.4 The Practice of Logrolling 
 
 In order for a local delegate to get special legislation passed, he had to 
assemble a coalition who would vote for his project.  The members of the coalition 
would not benefit directly from the proposed special legislation, as it pertained only 
to the locality of the legislator proposing it.  However, the members of the coalition 
would receive a commitment from the legislator to vote on their individual special 
                                                
77 Griffith (1976), p 36. 
78 Teaford, Special Legislation (1979), p 210. 
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legislation in the future.79  Ireland (2004) points out that legislators supported others’ 
special legislation even without a guarantee for future support because they did not 
want to risk ostracism. The practice of legislative courtesy, or logrolling, was what 
allowed for the system of special legislation to carry on.   
 Political theory is interested in understanding under what conditions logrolling 
can work.  Initial research determined that there was a certain size coalition,  
“minimum winning coalition” (MWC), that would be able to sustain a logroll.80  
Weingast (1979) pointed out that most empirical examples of logrolling did not match
the theoretical prediction of a MWC, and actual logrolls had large, often universal, 
coalitions.  He showed that politicians had an incentive to form a universalistic 
coalition because they all needed to show legislative results to their constitue cy and 
they were all worried about being left out of the coalition.  Carrubba and Volden 
(2000) develop a baseline logrolling model that considers how different factors affect 
the probability of sustaining a cooperative logroll.  They show that cooperation 
becomes more difficult as the voting rules require a higher approval rate, the size of
the legislature increases, the more frequent the elections are, the probability of 
reelection decreases and the cost/benefit ratio of the legislation increases.   
 Historians have put forward a few explanations for why special legislation 
was harder to maintain as the 19th century progressed.  Teaford argues that the 
inability of city officials to control the legislative process was the basic cause of the 
                                                
79 Members of the legislature realized that some day the might like to have a local bills passed, and so 
there was normally no opposition to what might well b  a corrupt transaction.  Griffith, 1870-1900 
(1974), p 215. 
80 Majority will form a MWC of the smallest possible size ((N+1)/2) in order to have the biggest 
benefits for the members of the coalition.  From Weingast (1987), p 131-133.  Originally from 
Buchanan and Tullock (1962) and Riker (1962).   
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municipal reform movement.  Wilcox (1896) mentions that municipal reform became 
more important when the political complexion of the legislature differed from a 
particular locality.  While these problems may have caused unrest within the 
municipalities, this would not necessarily cause a change in the practice of sp cial 
legislation.  As long as the state legislators had working coalitions to pass s ecial 
laws, legislators had no incentive to relinquish that power.  An alternative explanation 
for why special legislation was no longer sustainable is that legislators could no 
longer keep up a cooperative logroll in order to get special laws passed.  Without a 
mechanism for getting special legislation adopted, there would be reason for 
legislators to pursue alternative methods of getting what they wanted and neede.   
 
2.6.5 Apportionment Issues 
 
 Two factors that affect the ability to sustain a cooperative logroll are changes 
in the size of the legislature and changes in the voting rule.  As there are more 
legislators, it becomes harder to guarantee that everyone will refrain from defecting.  
As the voting rule requires more people to approve the legislation, it becomes harder 
to establish a larger coalition where everyone gets their particular special legislation 
passed.  In the nineteenth century, there were dramatic changes in the size and 
composition of state legislatures.  Constitutional provisions relating to apportionment 
directly affected both the number of legislators and the distribution of legislators 
across the state.  Because of these changes to the makeup of the legislature, it mad  it 
harder to assemble a minimum necessary coalition. 
 38 
 
 Since the late eighteenth century, citizens of the United States have 
experimented with the best method of representation in their state governments.  
There are two basic types of representation: geographic and proportional.  A 
geographic system of representation allocates legislators based on territ rial units, 
such as counties, town, townships, or villages.  A proportional system allocates 
legislators by districts.  Districts are designed to contain roughly the same number of 
people.  In contrast, under the geographic system, one legislator might represent a 
county of one thousand residents while another legislator might represent a county of 
ten thousand residents.  Before the American Revolution, all colonies had 
geographically based systems of representation.81  By the early 19th century, some 
states began to amend their form of representation.  Small states with relat vely 
evenly distributed population continued with the traditional form of geographic 
representation.  For example, in Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont and 
Connecticut, the lower house determined representation by units of political 
government.82  States with larger land expanses and more widely dispersed 
population found that the geographic representation was inadequate to properly 
represent the mix of interests in the state.  These larger states moved early on toward 
proportional representation in the state legislature.   
 In the mid to late nineteenth century, the population grew in both the rural 
areas and in the large urban centers.  The form of representation was fixed in the short 
run, as constitutions determined how delegates were allocated.  Assume that a state 
                                                
81 Zagarri (1987), p 47. 
82 Specifically, in Vermont each town and city ward gets one member.  In other states the Senate is 
represented by geographic units (New Jersey, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Maryland).  Each 
county in New Jersey and South Carolina gets one seator.  Reinsch (1907), p 197-198. 
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legislature was fixed in size and allowed for one representative from each town with 
the remainder assigned based on population.  As population moved into the rural, 
formerly unpopulated areas, newly settled towns sent representatives to the state 
legislature.  The bulk of the state legislature would be comprised of the required 
representatives from each town; few seats would be allocated based on population.  
As people moved into the rural areas of states, the rural areas were automatically 
allocated representatives.  As a result, large urban areas became relativ ly under-
represented in the legislature.  The resulting under-representation affected the 
political dynamic within the legislature.  The state legislature changed from having 
the majority of representation coming from cities to one where rural counties a d 
townships dominated. 
 While there was resistance to this shift in power by the urban interests, they 
were not able to do much about it.  State constitutions had established a system of 
apportionment, based on a system of geographic representation.  Through this set 
allocation mechanism, the rural interests gained control of the legislature when 
additional seats were given to rural areas experiencing population growth.  Once rural 
legislators controlled the legislature, they did not want to relinquish any power.  In 
order to guarantee that rural interests would not lose power to population-driven 
apportionment, some states revised their constitutions to institutionalize the practice 
of apportionment based on political subdivisions.83   For example, in 1851, the 
constitution of Ohio guaranteed a legislative seat to each county with at least a h lf 
                                                
83 The policy of “local unit” representation in at least one house continued, or developed, in other states 
even without constitutional revision.  Dixon (1968), p 82.  Henretta (1991), p 66, says that this was 
often driven by Republican politicians (often rural-b sed) working with Progressive reformers to 




ratio.84  In 1903, Ohio went a step further, and with the Hanna amendment guaranteed 
each county, regardless of population, a seat. Pennsylvania had adopted a similar 
constitution amendment in 1873, guaranteeing each county a seat in the lower house.  
An additional amendment in 1901 placed a population cap on apportionment, 
stipulating that no more than one-sixth of the senators could come from any city or 
county.  Table 1 shows that changes were made within the thirteen original states 
during the nineteenth century.  Dixon (1968) documents that constitutional 
amendments to limit the role of population in apportionment became more common 
across the United States in the decades following 1890.85 
                                                
84 A half ratio requires half of state average population per seat.  Dixon (1968), p 83. 
85 Dixon (1968), p 83, believes this increase may have been spurred on because rural areas were losing 
population.   In 1910, the urban population overtook the rural population for the first time.   
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3 Endogenous Institutional Change: The State-Municipal 
 Relationship  
  
 The previous chapter introduced special legislation, general legislation and 
home rule as different constitutional arrangements states use to structure their state-
municipal relationship.  The first state constitutions of the original colonies formally 
implemented the tradition of enacting special laws for municipalities as need  arose.  
The previous chapter addressed four potential problems with maintaining special 
legislation.  The amount of special legislation for municipalities could become a large 
enough burden to induce the state legislature to decrease their caseload by changing 
the legislative process.  Certain special legislation should have been addrssed by the 
court system rather than handled by the state legislature.  The principal-agent problem 
was another threat to maintaining special legislation as state legislators or the state 
itself might have a different optimal set of policies than what the individual municipal 
government might think is best.  Finally, municipal legislators had to maintain a 
logroll of votes needed to pass each member of the coalition’s special legislation.  
The stability of the logroll could be threatened by changes in the size or makeup of 
the legislature.  In states where special legislation did not pose these probl ms, then 
the legislature could continue with special legislation as a stable outcome.   
 Most states, however, experienced problems with special legislation.  As a 
result, states adopted new constitutional provisions which altered the state-municipal 
relationship.   This chapter addresses why states might have chosen these different 
constitutional arrangements.  Changes to constitutions reflect new conditions which 
prompt governments to reframe the state-municipal relationship.  But these changs 
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must also be politically viable in order to be adopted.  Power is unlikely to be freely 
ceded from states to municipalities.  State legislators will hesitate to give up the 
privilege of special legislation unless it benefits them somehow, or unless they hav  
lost the ability to continue passing special legislation for their locality.   
 Table 2 outlines the options states pursued in structuring the state-municipal 
framework and the reasons which contributed to states pursuing certain options.  
States varied in the options chosen because of the differences in the political 
environment and ability to continue passing special legislation.  Despite these 
potential differences, if states pursued different institutional structures, they did so in 
the sequential order presented in Table 2.  While home rule is seen as the final choice 
made by many states, it should not be seen as the undeniably best choice for states to 
make.  States had different optimal solutions depending on the municipal preferences 
and political environment within each state. 
  
 
3.1 Prohibition of Special Legislation for Specific Purposes 
 
 Most states became aware that legislatures were regularly making judgments 
on questions that were already addressed in state laws and statutes.  These judicial 
decisions should have been made by the state courts instead.  The prime example of 
questionable special legislation was legislative divorces for individuals.  State
legislatures also granted special legislation for corporations and local g vernments 
which ran counter to the content of established laws.  The appeal for special 
legislation ranged from corporations seeking amendments to charters for the righ  to 
lay railroad tracks to municipalities creating certain elected or appointed offices. 
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 A solution to this problem was to include constitutional prohibitions of special 
legislation to target inappropriate legislative interference.  In solving the issue of 
judicial decision-making, states were also reducing the legislative cas load.  
Individuals, businesses, and municipalities could no longer seek out a preferred law 
through the legislature.  All parties were held to the same state statute.  A r quest for 
a deviation from these statues was redirected from the legislature to the court system.
 The prohibition of certain types of special legislation was a politically feasible 
outcome in many states.  State legislators were often willing to pass these 
determinations back to the courts, who really should have been deciding the merits of 
each individual case in the court system.  From the mid 19th century until the early 
20th century, the most common prohibitions on special legislation were for changing 
the names of persons; granting divorces; changing the law of descent; providing for 
the sale of real estate belonging to minors; remitting fines, penalties or forfeitures; 
regulating the rate of interest; regulating the jurisdiction and duties of ju tices of the 
peace an constables; providing for changing the venue in civil and criminal cases; 
summoning and empanelling grand and petit juries and providing for their 
compensation; locating or changing county seats; for laying out, opening and working 
on highways; vacating roads, town plats, streets, alleys and public squares; providing 
for supporting common schools, and for the preservation of school funds; and 
providing for the opening and conducting elections of State, county or township 
officers and designating the places of voting.86  State legislators lost (or gave up) the 
ability to grant these individual privileges which deviated from the laws on record.    
                                                
86 The exact date range is from 1851-1916.  North Carolina was the last state to dramatically change its 
constitution with respect to the prohibition of special legislation.  Each of the categories included ha
20 or more states include it their constitutional prohibitions. 
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The transfer of responsibility back to the court system also reduced the legislative 
burden on the state legislature and helped solve the numbers problem.    
 As mentioned in Chapter 2, by 1916 thirty-seven states had passed some form 
of prohibition of special legislation.  Forty-three out of fifty states now have some 
form of constitutional clause that prohibits special legislation.87  While most states 
have transferred many powers back to the courts, states often retained the power of 
special legislation on important matters, such as municipal business.  To date, only 18
states specifically prohibit special legislation on matters regulating county and 
township business.  In 1911, New Mexico was the last state to include this prohibition 
on special legislation for counties and towns in its constitution.  Special legislation for 
municipalities was not as likely to be prohibited because municipalities are very 
different from other organizations, such as private corporations or churches.  While 
businesses and churches may be relatively similar, municipalities vary widely.  In 
addition, special legislation for municipalities is a valuable right which state
legislators are hesitant to give up.  However, when municipal business continues to be 
handled via special legislation, then the legislature is still making judicial, not 
legislative, decisions in certain cases and the numbers problem still exists.
 
 
                                                
87 Of the seven states that don’t have any constitutional provision prohibiting special legislation, two 
are the most recent (Alaska and Hawaii) and the othr five are original colonies (Connecticut, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Virginia).  There are differences between the older 
and newer states on many dimensions.  The important one in discussing the state-local relationship is 
the difference in the history of municipalities within the state.  The New England states  had town 
meetings to govern their localities, not formal organized municipal corporations with recognized 
charters.   In Alaska and Hawaii, there wasn’t a need to include prohibitions of special legislation.  The 
initial constitutions of these states were very liberal in devolving control to other levels of government, 
so special legislation was not the avenue for seeking local changes.  Additionally, states may have 




3.2 General Legislation with Special Legislation 
 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, out of the thirty-seven states that passed any 
prohibition on special legislation by 1916, twenty-seven of them simultaneously 
mandated general legislation.  The inclusion of general legislation and the prohibition 
of certain types of special legislation did not preclude the existence of special 
legislation, however.  The coexistence of both special and general legislation w s the 
solution in many states.88  For example, with respect to municipalities, allowing both 
general and special incorporation gave municipalities two choices for obtaining or 
altering a charter.   
 The inclusion of general legislation solved the numbers problem by providing 
municipalities open access to specified institutional structures.  General legislation 
provided a uniform law for some of the tasks that could be generalized to meet the 
needs of an entire class, such as incorporation and organization of municipalities.  
Municipalities who wanted the ability to incorporate without having to go through the 
state legislature, or municipalities who wanted a basic organizational structure, could 
govern using the established general laws.  Meanwhile, the continuation of special 
legislation allowed the state legislature to tailor laws for certain municipalities.  
Municipalities with unorthodox needs might not be well served by general laws, and 
would be better served by a unique special law.  For example, a municipality may 
require an atypical organizational structure because of its size, local industries, 
geographic location, or the preferences of its citizens.  Even with the continuation of 
                                                
88 By the mid 20th century, of the 30 states that prohibited special laws for municipalities, 21 of them 
also called for the organization of municipalities by general laws.  However, this number could 
understate the actual number of states that had both general and special legislation.  State legislatures 
may have implemented general laws under their own accord. 
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special legislation, when states provide general legislation, the number of 
municipalities requiring special legislation is reduced, thus alleviating the numbers 
problem to some extent. 
 The existence of both general and special legislation must be suitable to the 
state legislators.  Otherwise, legislators would have created a different institutional 
setup, and the combination of general and special legislation would not have been a 
stable outcome.  The outcome was often politically realistic, as legislators recognized 
that the benefits from having general legislation with the option of special lg s ation 
often exceeded the costs.  State legislators preferred to retain the option of assing 
special legislation, as it gave additional freedom for them to meet any specific 
demands of their constituency when needed.  The ability to pass special laws for your 
own locality was a valued privilege of each legislator.  As long as the logroll f votes 
needed to pass special legislation was maintained, special legislation was the 
preferred policy.  At the same time, legislators were open to allowing ge eral 
legislation.  The loss of control over the incorporation and organization of general 
municipalities was offset by the time gained by not having to manage those mundane 
legislative tasks.   
 
General Legislation with Extensive Classification 
 One way to combine general and special legislation merits closer attention.  
Some states prohibited special legislation altogether, but allowed narrowly defined 
classes of municipalities.  If classes are restricted so as to include only one 
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municipality, then general legislation for would the class would act as special 
legislation for the one municipality in the class.   
 For example, in 1851, Ohio included a clause in their new state constitution 
which mandated that the “General Assembly shall provide for the organization of 
cities, and incorporated villages by general laws, and restrict their power of taxation, 
assessment, borrowing money, contracting debts, and loaning their credit, so as to 
prevent the abuse of such power.”89  The Ohio state legislature passed a general law 
the next year which divided cities of the state into two classes.  Cities wih more than 
20,000 people represented the first class, and cities from 5,000 to 20,000 constituted 
the second class.  Other municipalities were considered incorporated villages.90  Over 
time, additional classes of cities were created.  By the beginning of the twentieth 
century, there were eleven classes, eight of which had only one municipality in the 
class.91  General legislation for one of these eight classes would effectively be special 
legislation for the individual city.  This use of general legislation as special l gislation 
in Ohio started in 1856.  The state legislature changed the organization of Cleveland 
by passing a general law for cities of the first class with less than 80,000 in 
population as of the last federal census.92  In the same year, there was a general act 
concerning the tax limit for cities of more than 100,000 people, which targeted 
Cincinnati.   
                                                
89 1851 Constitution of Ohio, Article XIII, Section 6.  In this same constitutions, Article XIII, Section 1 
says that the General Assembly shall pass no special act conferring special corporate powers.  This wa
interpreted to mean that the General Assembly was forbidden to pass any special laws for individual 
cities (Kimball (1922), p 381 and Wilcox (1896), p 63). 
90 Wilcox (1896), p 64. 
91 Table 3 shows the classification of cities in Ohio as of 1894.   
92 Wilcox (1896), p 67. 
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 In 1902, the Ohio supreme court ruled that the intent of the constitutional 
provision mandating general legislation was not being upheld with the legislature 
creating narrowly defined classes.  The supreme court declared that “the present 
classification cannot be regarded as based upon differences in population, or upon 
any other real or supposed differences in local requirements.  Its real basis is found in 
the differing views or interests of those who promote legislation for the diffrent 
municipalities of the state.” 93  In its decision, the supreme court of Ohio ordered the 
legislature to enact a new municipal code which would be uniformly applied to all 
cities with more than 5,000 people, which at the time numbered around seventy.94  
Because of this state supreme court ruling, Ohio became a pure general legisl tion 
state, not a state with both general and special legislation.  The next section describes 
why states might choose to adopt a framework of pure general legislation and under 
what conditions this is a stable outcome.  As will be shown, the strict general 
legislation imposed by the courts in Ohio was not suitable, and Ohio was forced to 
make further changes to its constitution. 
 
 
3.3 Strict General Legislation  
 
 Consider a state with an extreme form of general legislation which mandates 
all municipalities to be in a single class.  In this case of general legislation, there 
would be a uniform system of governance for all municipalities in the state.  Without 
the ability to tailor legislation for individual municipalities, all members of the class 
are treated equally and are held to the same structure.  In practice, the degree of 
                                                
93 State vs Jones, 66 Ohio St 453, cited by Kimball (1922) p 381. 
94 Pollack (1917),  p 28. 
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“strictness” of the general legislation varied with the number and fineness of the 
classes.  As was the case when general and special legislation coexisted, the exclusive 
use of general legislation solved the problems of judicial decision-making and the 
numbers game.  In addition, the strict form of general legislation was an answer to the 
problem of legislators not being able to maintain a logroll to pass special legislation.   
 The ability to maintain a coalition of legislators was essential to passing 
special legislation.   To reach a majority, a proposed special law for a municipality 
required the support of legislators outside of the municipality.  Since all localities 
were in the same predicament, legislators could form coalitions to trade votes for each 
others’ special legislation.  As states changed the way the state legislature was 
apportioned, the stability of coalitions was threatened.  Two features of legislative 
apportionment interact.  First, as the size of the legislature increases, cooperation 
becomes more difficult because the size of any majority coalition increases.  Second, 
as the fraction of the legislature from rural areas increases, the number of potential 
partners who can be bundled into a logroll to pass special legislation for 
municipalities decreases, making it harder to maintain a minimum necessary 
coalition.  As legislatures increased in size and tilted toward more rural 
constituencies, the ability of municipal legislators to pass special legislation for their 
constituencies was eroded.  General legislation provided them the opportunity to 
preserve some control over how municipalities would be governed.      
 In this framework, in order for a state to choose to transition to an 
environment with only general legislation, it must meet two requirements.  First, there 
must be a breakdown in the ability of legislators to pass special legislation for their 
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municipalities.  All else equal, legislators always prefer the option of tail red special 
legislation over the uniform structure of general legislation.   Second, general 
legislation must be suitable for all members of the class.  In other words, general 
legislation will only work if the municipalities within a given class are similar enough 
to each other.  If municipalities are sufficiently different, then a uniform governance 
structure is likely to be restrictive and ill-suited to handle a diverse set of problems.  
When municipalities are sufficiently heterogeneous, states may choose to decentralize 
control through home rule.  This option will be explored in the next section.  Home 
rule also has its costs, however.  By implementing home rule, legislators give the 
court system discretion to interpret the grant of autonomy.  If the benefits of retaining 
control over municipal legislation exceeded the costs of having suboptimal legislation 
by class, then legislators might keep general legislation instead of introducing home 
rule. 
 Strict general legislation was rarely a good fit for states.  General legislation 
restricted the legislators from being able to meet unusual needs of municipalities.  
Legislators could no longer tailor legislation for unexpected circumstances or grant 
the largest metropolitan area power to provide modern public goods requiring new 
governance tools.  For example, there were problems after the state supreme court of 
Ohio imposed strict general legislation for municipalities.  Legislators, as well as 
municipalities, lost the ability to obtain individualized legislation through general 
legislation by class.  When this practice was stopped by the court, the same laws that 
applied to Ashtabula also applied to Cleveland.  With such wide differences in the 
municipalities in the mandated class (all cities greater than 5,000 population), a strict 
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general law was not a stable outcome.  Neither small cities nor large cities were 
satisfied with the singular set of laws. 
 
 
3.4 General Legislation with Home Rule 
 
 The problem with strict general legislation is that the set of laws by class m y 
not be the best fit for all municipalities in the class.  A grant of home rule gave 
municipalities which were not well served by general legislation the option of 
adopting their own charter.  Municipalities who were content with the general law 
would remain subject to the general law.   
 The same problems which were solved using general legislation could be 
solved by general legislation plus the option of home rule.  This combination solved 
the numbers problem, the issue of judicial decision-making, and the problem of not 
being able to maintain the logroll.  The adoption of home rule as an alternative to 
general legislation solved the problem of heterogeneity across municipalities.  If 
municipalities were not similar within a class, then general legislation by class was 
not ideal.  Home rule gave municipalities the ability to once again have individualzed 
legislation.  However, instead of this individualized legislation being determin d by 
the legislature, it would now be determined by the municipality itself.   
 Compared to the case of strict general legislation, municipalities are better off 
having the option of home rule if needed.  However, in order for home rule to be a 
stable outcome, it must be politically viable as well.  Municipal legislators re willing 
to cede their chartering power to municipalities if they have already effectively lost 
the ability to pass municipal legislation at the state level.  Legislators want to be 
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reelected.  If they cannot pass legislation for their municipality at the state level, it’s 
best to give control to their constituents instead.  The movement from special to strict 
general legislation was driven by the declining ability of municipal legis ators to 
maintain a coalition to pass special legislation.  The movement to general 
incorporation with home rule resulted from the loss of a coalition combined with 
heterogeneous municipalities, which provided an environment where home rule is a 
viable solution. 
3.5 Are Outcomes Socially Optimal? 
 
 The options of special legislation, general legislation, and home rule are 
possible ways for states to organize the state-municipal relationship.  Under certain
conditions, these options are also politically viable.   However, while one of these 
solutions may represent an equilibrium for a state, it is not necessarily socially 
optimal.   
 One of the potential problems associated with special legislation is the 
principal-agent issue.  Consider the case where the municipality is the principal ad 
its legislator is the agent.  The municipality may have difficulty in making sure its 
legislator carries out an agenda that is best for the municipality.  The legislator’s 
optimization problem may differ from the municipality, as the agent might also be 
concerned with reelection or keeping other influential groups appeased.  The same 
concern arises if we consider the state acting in aggregate as the agent.  The s ate may 
have different opinion about what is best for the municipality, and may pursue 
policies that run counter to the municipality’s actual preferences.   
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 If the principal-agent problem exists, it is unlikely to be solved by any state-
level legislative changes.  By definition, the principal-agent problem exists because 
the agent is pursuing policies that run counter to the principal’s optimal agenda.  In 
this example, the legislator is unlikely to relinquish this power, because there is 
obvious gain to him from adopting policies counter to what the municipal prefers.  
Thus, if there does exist a principal-agent problem, any legislative framwork is 
unlikely to be socially optimal.   
 
3.6 Regional Differentiation 
 
 States have chosen to pursue different combinations of special legislation, 
general legislation and home rule over time.  Factors influencing their decision range 
from demographic changes to shifts in political power to the historical patterns of 
local governance in the state.   Some factors, such as the settlement patter and 
resulting governance structure, are shared by all states within a region.95  F r 
example, the initial form of local government in New England was different from the 
South and also the West.  In New England, towns were the predominant form of local 
government.  As Snider points out, towns were created as a function of how the land 
was settled.  Settlement was formed in compact communities, usually centered 
around a church.96  In contrast, states like Virginia and Maryland were settled based 
on the economic unit of the plantation.  In these states and others in the south, local 
                                                
95 Richardson (1984) examines the relationship between th  settlement patterns and school systems.  
He finds regional diversity in school governance, based on whether the state and local school officials 
are elected or appointed.  Richardson relates methods of school governance to established practices in 
municipal governance, and explains how municipal governance is related to how the region was 
settled. 
96 Snider (1957), p 51 and Richardson (1984), p 189.  
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matters were often handled by the plantation owners, with formal government 
provision of public goods being provided by counties.  The different forms of local 
government had implications for how the states constructed a constitutional 
framework for local governance.  If we compare states without regard to regions, we 
may overlook important differences. 
 To illustrate the potential problem by looking simultaneously at states in 
different regions, consider Ohio and Arizona, states that both passed home rule 
legislation in 1912.  The motivation for home rule was different in these states, some 
of it due not just to differences in the states, but differences in the regions they are 
located in.  Ohio, established in 1803, was a Land Ordinance state.  The Midwest 
region was settled by farmers moving from the original colonies.  Early settler  in 
these relatively densely populated states often brought with them ideas about how 
local government should be organized.  From the beginning, there was interest in how 
the new states of the Midwest should organize their system of local governments, and 
the prescriptions were often based on settlers’ previous experiences with local 
government in New England or in the Mid-Atlantic.  The Southwest as an entire 
region was settled very differently than then Midwest.  As Bridges points out in 
Morning Glories, the cities of the Southwest were reform cities from early on.  The 
reformers were “new elites” who had moved recently out West and were not 
burdened by formal political machines or the third party system.97  Because of the 
regional differences in settlement, the mechanism by which home rule was adopted in 
                                                
97 Bridges (1997) points out that the southwest was a l tecomer to national politics.  The new states of 
the southwest did not have well established politica  parties, and nothing resembling a political 
machine.  As a result, the reform movement was less about targeting the entrenched politicians (as it 
was in the Northeast) and more about targeting the institutional structure, p 54-55. 
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Arizona in 1912 was very different than the process of adoption in Ohio.  Arizona 
included home rule in its first constitution, a function of the reformists who had 
recently settled there.  Ohio adopted home rule over one hundred years after it 
became a state.  Home rule in Ohio was function of citizens who were interested in 
establishing a formal state-municipal relationship, but required experimentation o 
find a common system that worked for everyone.  Because of regional differences in 
factors such as the pattern of settlement, Ohio and Arizona are not the best 
comparison state for each other.  The best comparison group is likely a state’s clos st 
neighbors. 
 By looking at each region individually, we control for shared characteristics 
and mitigate the inherent differences we see across regions in the United States.  
Some regions as a whole have been more active in pursuing certain constitutional 
changes than others.  However, differences remain in what states do within a region.  
The following discussion gives a sense of the similarities and differences of the state-
municipal relationship within each region.  Assignment to region was based on the 
pattern of settlement, timing of statehood, and geographic location. 
 
3.6.1 Original Colonies and Cessions 
Delaware (1787), Pennsylvania (1787), New Jersey (1787), Georgia (1788), 
Connecticut (1788), Massachusetts (1788), Maryland (1788), South Carolina (1788), 
New Hampshire (1788), Virginia (1788), New York (1788), North Carolina (1789), 
Rhode Island (1790), Vermont (1791) [from NY and NH], Kentucky (1792) [from 
VA], Tennessee (1796) [from NC], Maine (1820) [from MA], West Virginia (1863) 
[from VA] 
 
 This group includes the thirteen original colonies and states formed directly 
from them.  These states are different from others in the Union by virtue of their 
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colonial history.  Local government legislation in the colonies was established 
piecemeal as the demand arose.  Municipal charters were granted by the colonial
governor and were often commercially oriented.98  In the mid 1700s, the municipal 
corporation evolved from a commercial operation to a formal recognition of a 
residential community.  At the time when the United States was founded, there were 
many municipal charters given by special decree as well as local government customs 
and procedures that were generally accepted practices.99  Thus, original constitutions 
in these states often remained silent on local governments and allowed for the 
continuation of established governance structures and corporations.  Citizens assumed 
that in the small towns of New England and the villages of New York, business could 
proceed as usual.  This tacit relationship between the state and local government was 
not a problem in the late 18th and early 19th centuries.  As Weiner writes, “until the 
Civil War, the municipalities had not become the rich source of spoils that they have 
been since.”100  
 The implicit decentralization of local power resulted in problems with 
constitutionally formalizing the state-local relationship.  Of the eighteen states in this 
group, only five have adopted constitutional home rule provisions for municipalities 
by 2009.  Maryland granted Baltimore city and county home rule authority in 1914, 
later granting home rule to all municipalities in 1954.  In 1949, the legislature of 
Pennsylvania gave all cities with more than ten thousand residents the option for a 
home rule charter.  West Virginia allowed home rule for cities with more than two 
                                                
98 Viteritti (1990), p 224. 
99 Some were specific statutes, others were just recognized by the governor and general assemblies of 
individual states. 
100 Weiner (1937), p 559. 
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thousand residents in 1936, and Rhode Island opened up the option for every city and 
town in 1951.  In 1953, Tennessee granted home rule to any municipality.  The lack 
of home rule adoption should not be taken as an indication of lack of interest or need.  
Rather, in some cases there were too many entrenched interests, and states could not 
pass home rule even after decades of trying. 
 We can explore the varied solutions for creating a constitutional relationship 
between state and local governments by considering separate clusters of states (New 
England, South, and Mid-Atlantic) within the same region.  While some regions 
pursued a wider variety of options, in all regions states made institutional choices 
over time in the order presented in Table 2.  First consider the New England states.  
Constitutions in these states were silent on all matters of local governments until he 
late 19th century, and only in the 1960s did they adopt constitutional mandates of 
general legislation for cities.  Some states did adopt general legislation for private 
corporations in the late 19th and early 20th century, but these measures explicitly 
excluded municipalities from the call for general laws.  In 1877, Connecticut 
prohibited municipal aid to private corporations.  This was the only measure referring 
to local governments until 1965, when the state called for the organization of cities by 
general law.  Similarly, New Hampshire had no measures until 1877 when the state 
prohibited municipal aid to private corporations, and then in 1966 mandated general 
laws for the organization of cities. Maine did not address the issues of local 
governments until they passed general incorporation legislation, which excluded 
municipalities, in 1875 and imposed municipal debt limits three years later. Rhode 
Island was also slow in changing its constitution, adopting general incorporation 
 58 
 
measures in 1892, then changing nothing until 1951.  And, while not in the New 
England region, Delaware, like other New England states, has only adopted general
incorporation, excluding municipal corporations, which was passed in 1897.   
 The second group within this region is the Southern states who were part of 
the Confederacy and wrote new Reconstruction constitutions following the Civil War. 
The Civil War and reconstruction were an exogenous shock to the constitutional 
process that allowed these states to reconsider the state-local relationship.  Before the 
Civil War, neither North Carolina nor South Carolina had a constitutional provision 
with respect to local governments.  In their 1868 constitutions, both states called for 
general incorporation laws and the restriction of debt and taxation of municipal 
corporations.  South Carolina began prohibiting types of special legislation in 1896, 
including no special act for municipal corporations.  In 1916, North Carolina 
extended general incorporation to municipalities and incorporated additional areas of 
prohibitions on special legislation.  The 1868 constitution of Georgia only mentioned 
that the General Assembly may grant the power of taxation to county authorities and 
municipal corporations.  The state of Georgia has remained silent since then on any 
matters concerning the incorporation and organization of local governments.  In 1870, 
Tennessee passed a new constitution which states that only general laws were to be 
passed, specifically mentioning that corporations should be provided under general 
law.  The Tennessee constitution does not specify whether municipal corporations are 
included or excluded from this general provision.  Tennessee did not include any 




 The third group in this region is comprised of the states in the Mid-Atlantic.  
Within this group of states we find the most struggles in the process of adopting the 
most suitable state-municipal framework.  In 1846, New York was one of the first 
states to prohibit special legislation for private corporations.  Over the next fifty 
years, New York passed a municipal debt limit and prohibited other special laws in 
1874 and included general laws for the organization of cities in 1894.  Maryland 
prohibited an assortment of special legislation starting with its 1864 constitution101, 
which also provided for the organization of cities by general laws.  The Pennsylva ia 
constitution of 1874 addressed the state-local relationship at length, including 
prohibition of special legislation for the incorporation and regulation of the affairs o 
municipalities, municipal debt limits, and the provision of general laws for the 
organization of local governments.  In 1875, New Jersey adopted numerous 
prohibitions on special legislation, including the regulation of the affairs of towns and 
counties, in addition to passing its legendary liberal general incorporation 
legislation.102  In its initial constitution of 1863, West Virginia had nothing with 
respect to local governments.  But by 1872, the state incorporated a variety of 
prohibitions on special legislation, including regulating the affairs of local 
governments, as well as imposing limits on municipal debt and general laws for the 
organization and incorporation of municipalities. While lacking any constitutional 
rules for local governments until 1891, Kentucky then started defining the state-loc l 
                                                
101 Maryland included prohibitions of special legislation for individuals, corporations, elections, 
schools, highways, and the rate of interest. 
102  In New Jersey, corporations were now allowed to be formed no matter the residency of the 
incorporators or the primary place of business, and they had diverse options for their internal 
governance structure.  Starting in 1875, and through a series of acts from 1888 to 1896, New Jersey 
gave private corporations additional economic flexibility.   
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relationship.  Included in the 1891 constitution was the organization of municipalities 
by general laws and municipal debt and taxation limits. 
 An interesting element of this Mid-Atlantic region is that home rule was 
pursued early on in New York and Pennsylvania, but failed to gain footing.  In the 
1870s, both states appointed commissions to consider plans for reforming the 
municipal system, as they had large and mid-size cities that saw the opportunities 
home rule would provide.103  However, the recommended measures to decentralize 
control to local governments failed to pass the state legislatures.  The institution was 
not universally appealing to the varied political interests.  Even after New York 
declared it had home rule in 1924, it was only in name.  Cities could still not charter 
themselves, and were forced to go through the state legislature to change principal 
elements of their charters such as their form of organization.  McBain explains the 
implications of these attempts, noting that they give “a large measure of freedom 
from positive interference but almost no measure of opportunity for constructive local 
action.”104  States in the Mid-Atlantic region toed the line between centralized and 
decentralized control of municipalities.  While states in this region saw the potential 
efficiency gains from granting municipalities greater choices through home rule, the 
power was not readily transferred from the state to the municipalities.  
 
 
3.6.2 The Old Northwest 
Ohio (1803), Indiana (1816), Illinois (1818), Michigan (1837), Iowa (1846), 
Wisconsin (1848), Minnesota (1858) 
 
                                                
103 Oberholtzer (1893), p 94. 
104 McBain (1915), p 10. 
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 The Land Ordinance of 1785 and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 allowed 
for the creation of new states in the area north of the Ohio River and east of 
Mississippi River.  Within these boundaries, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan and 
Wisconsin were created.  The ordinance provided a path to statehood for territories 
not part of the original colonies.  The territory had a common form of settlement.  
Land was surveyed into 6 mile square townships and then divided into 36 sections to 
be sold at public auction.  Minnesota and Iowa were part of the Wisconsin Territory.  
While not part of the initial Northwest Territory, the states were formed by a similar 
land grant and in a consecutive time period.  All were created as public land states, 
which meant that the states were created out of the federal government’s public 
domain.  The federal government also passed enabling acts, which authorized the 
inhabitants of the former territories to form a constitution and a state government.  
After drafting a state constitution, Congress passed an act stating that the territory had 
formally become a state.105 The new constitutions of these public land states often 
drew on other states’ constitutions, especially those where the citizens had previously 
lived.  In the case of the Old Northwest, settlers were often from New England and 
the Mid-Atlantic.  Starting with Ohio, these new constitutions incorporated elements 
from their previous experiences and also reflected the new identity of the territory.   
 Three of the seven states in this group adopted home rule legislation in their 
state constitutions by the early 20th century.  Minnesota granted home rule to any city 
or village in 1896, followed by Michigan in 1908 and Ohio in 1912.  These three 
                                                
105 For example, Jefferson signed the Ohio Enabling act on April 20, 1802.  The Ohio constitutional 
convention met in November 1802.  Ohio presented thir newly written constitution to Congress in 
December.  Congress formally passed an act on February 19, 1803 “stating that the citizens of Ohio 
had adopted a constitution in accordance with the 1802 Enabling Act and the said state had become 
one of the United States of America.” <http://www.ohiohistorycentral.org/entry.php?rec=523> 
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states passed some of the most generous home rule in the country as there were no 
population restrictions.  In all three states the municipal home rule charter d to be 
consistent with and subject to the laws of each state.  One noticeable difference 
among the states was that constitutional home rule in Michigan was not self-
executing.  The constitution enabled home rule to exist, but general laws had to be 
passed by the state legislature to determine how municipalities could enact a home 
rule charter.  This initial act was passed by the Michigan state legislature in 1909.  
The Minnesota and Ohio provisions were self-executing, and, thus, the home rule 
provisions in these constitutions were more extensive, laying out the role of the board 
of freeholders in drafting the charter and defining how a charter could be approved 
and amended.106  Wisconsin passed constitutional home rule legislation in 1933107, 
Iowa in 1968, Illinois in 1970 while Indiana passed a law in 1980 granting limited 
home rule privileges.   
 The late adoption of home rule legislation does not mean that Wisconsin, 
Iowa, Illinois and Indiana were overlooking local governments.  These states mad  
substantive constitutional changes between 1848 and 1871 to more clearly define the 
state-local relationship.  In 1851, Indiana was the first Midwest state to have 
comprehensive constitutional changes with respect to municipalities, and the first to 
prohibit special laws across a wide range of issues. The state provided for general
                                                
106 Minnesota required four-sevenths to pass, Ohio requi d a majority. 
107 There was a type of constitutional home rule amendment passed in 1924, however it only gives 
power to determine “local affairs and government, subject to…enactments of the legislature…as shall 
with uniformity affect every city or every village” (Article XI, Section 3).  This amendment only 
applied to cities and villages, not towns.  However, the League of Wisconsin Municipalities has 
pointed out that “the courts have recognized that because almost every municipal activity has some 
statewide effect, matters that are local affairs may also be matters of statewide concern,” and thus true 




incorporation, instead of special legislation, for both public and private corporations.  
Iowa began reforming state-local relations in 1857, prohibiting special legislation for 
the incorporation of cities and towns while mandating general laws for the 
organization of corporations.108  Illinois, in its new constitution of 1870, followed the 
lead of Indiana and Iowa and prohibited special legislation for all corporations nd, as 
a replacement, provided general laws under which both public and private 
corporations could be organized.  Illinois specifically prohibited special legisation 
for regulating county and township affairs and changing or amending the chartr of 
any municipality.  In 1848, Wisconsin adopted general legislation for corporations 
without banking privileges in addition to calling for one system of town government, 
as “uniform as practicable.”109  In 1871, Wisconsin amended its constitution to also 
prohibit special legislation for the incorporation of municipalities and the amendment 
of their charters.  The striking observation is that within these four states, no 
additional constitutional changes were made with respect to municipalities until 
Wisconsin in 1924, Iowa in 1968, Illinois in 1970, and Indiana in 1984.  While these 
four states did not adopt home rule early on, they still followed the progression of 
first prohibiting special legislation and then incorporating general legislation for 
municipalities. 
 During the same period from 1850-1881, Minnesota, Michigan and Ohio were 
relatively quiet with respect to constitutional changes for local governments.  
Michigan adopted a new constitution in 1850, including a general incorporation 
provision, but specifically excluding municipal corporations.  The following year, 
                                                
108 1857 Constitution of Iowa, Article VIII, Section 1 doesn’t identify whether the general law only 
applies to private corporations, or if it also extends to municipal corporations. 
109 1848 Constitution of Wisconsin. 
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Ohio also wrote a new constitution which required general incorporation and 
additionally provided for general laws for cities and villages. Minnesota wrote a new 
constitution in 1857, but excluded municipalities from its prohibition of special acts 
of incorporation.   
 While almost all of the Midwestern states provided general incorporation laws 
for private corporations,110 they differed with respect to when they began prohibiting 
special legislation for municipalities.  Initial legislation prohibited special acts of 
incorporation, with the exception of municipalities -- Iowa (1846), Illinois (1848), 
Wisconsin (1848), and Minnesota (1857).  The prohibition on special legislation was 
extended to municipalities by Michigan (1850), Indiana (1851), Iowa (1857), Illinois 
(1870), and Minnesota (1881).  The first states to extend this prohibition to 
municipalities, Michigan and Indiana, were the two states that simultaneously 
prohibited special laws for private corporations. 
 The constitutional histories of Indiana, Iowa, Illinois, and Wisconsin, suggest 
that these states that did not pass home rule early in the 20th century on were able to 
establish a state-local relationship that found balance in uniform constitutional 
regulation for local governments.  Home rule was not the early solution in these four 
states.  By 1881, these states had imposed municipal tax and debt limits and 
prohibited special legislation for municipal incorporation. In contrast, the states that 
were earlier home rule adopters did not find a solution with general constitutional 
provisions for municipalities. For some reason, general laws for the organization of 
cities were not sufficient in Minnesota, Michigan and Ohio.  These states seemed to 
                                                
110 Minnesota never had an explicit grant.  The other states all passed constitutional provisions between 
1846 and 1851: Iowa (1846), Illinois (1848), Wisconsin (1848), Michigan (1850), Indiana (1851), 
Ohio (1851).   
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have used home rule as a supplementary institution to meet the heterogeneous needs 
of their municipalities.  
 
 
3.6.3 The Old Southwest 
Louisiana (1812), Mississippi (1817), Alabama (1819), Missouri (1821), Arkansas 
(1836), Florida (1845), Texas (1845) 
 
 Like the Old Northwest, the Old Southwest was also comprised of public land 
states.111  Similar to their northern counterparts, these states also had the opportunity 
to draft their initial state constitutions.  The citizens of the Old Southwest also drew 
on their experiences from their original home states, usually the southern group of the 
original colonies.  As noted before, the constitutions of the original southern states 
had very little to say with respect to municipalities, most likely due to the fact th t 
municipal governments were not as important as county governments in the south.  
This type of institutional arrangement (or lack thereof) persisted in the new 
constitutions of the Old Southwest.   
 The example of home rule illustrates the difference between the Old 
Southwest and the Old Northwest.  Missouri was first state in the country to pass 
home rule, when in 1875 it granted cities with populations of more than one hundred 
thousand that power.  However, the only other state in the region to ever grant home 
rule was Louisiana in 1974.  Lack of home rule was just one aspect of the differences 
in the state-municipal framework; the Old Southwest also differed in when they 
prohibited special laws and implemented general legislation.  Despite the fact that 
                                                




these states were less likely to pass home rule, the prohibition of special legisl tion 
still always came before or with the mandate of general legislation for municipalities. 
 Prior to the Civil War, only a handful of southern states addressed local 
government issues in their constitutions.  Louisiana, in 1812, called for public 
election of municipal officers.  In 1839, Florida authorized counties and towns to 
impose taxes for county and corporation purposes.  Additionally, these two states 
were the only ones in this group to specify how corporations were to be organized.  
Corporations were not to be passed by special act in Florida, starting in 1839, unless 
two thirds of each house agreed.  The state began mandating general laws for 
incorporation in 1839.  First, these laws only protected churches, but in 1861 the 
mandates were extended to towns, literary, scientific, benevolent, and military 
institutions.  In 1845, Louisiana called for general incorporation laws for all 
corporations, except banking, and prohibited special acts of incorporation, except for 
political or municipal entities.  It is not surprising that Florida and Louisiana had a 
very different constitutional structure, as the states had very different colonial 
histories.112  In 1865, the constitution of Missouri prohibited special legislation for 
individuals, special incorporation for private corporations, special incorporation for 
everything but large cities, as well as special legislation relating to taxation and public 
officers.   
 Reconstruction constitutions were drastically different.  Alabama (1867) and 
Arkansas (1868) set municipal property tax limits of 2% in addition to calling for the 
organization of cities by general law.  Six years later, Arkansas added a municipal 
                                                
112 Both states under Spanish rule prior to being admitted as states.  Spain had created a system of large 
parishes for ecclesiastical administration; Louisiana kept the termination of parishes as their 
designation of a county.  James (1921), p 104. 
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debt limit of 3 mills on the value of taxable property, while Alabama added municipal 
debt limits according to population in 1901.  The only other state to place 
constitutional restrictions on municipal finances was the tax limit imposed by 
Louisiana in Louisiana 1878.  The 1868 constitution of Mississippi lacked any 
measures to define the state-local relationship.  But, its 1890 constitution introduced 
provisions that made it comparable to other states in the country, containing a call for 
general incorporation, the organization of cities by general laws, and many 




California (1850), Oregon (1859), Nevada (1864) 
 
 These Western states were settled early and were admitted before the end of 
the Civil War.  All three states had home rule by 1924.  In 1879, California granted 
home rule to cities with more than one hundred thousand residents; in 1892 the state 
extended the privilege to municipalities with more than thirty-five hundred resident .  
In 1906, Oregon allowed home rule in any municipality, and Nevada gave the same 
decentralized control in 1924.  The home rule clause in the Californian constitution, 
described in detail earlier, incorporated specific provisions on charter commission, 
adoption, and amendment process.  Oregon and Nevada had different clauses, with 
each constitution entrusting the state legislature with providing the exact path to home 
rule.  Oregon simply said that every municipality has the “power to enact and amend 
their municipal charter…but such municipality shall…be subject to the provisions of 
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the local option law of the state of Oregon.”113  Nevada had non-self executing home 
rule, with the constitutional grant providing the state legislature with the authority to 
pass a home rule act.  
 In their first state constitutions, both Oregon and Nevada included 
prohibitions of special legislation for individuals; corporations; rights, privileges and 
duties; legal proceedings; highways and public grounds; taxation; and elections.  In 
1879, the new constitution of California included prohibitions in these same 
categories.   The California and Nevada constitutions both prohibited special 
legislation for municipalities and called for general laws for the organization of 
municipalities.  Oregon’s constitution did neither, providing such provision only for 
private corporations, not public ones such as municipalities. 
 
 
3.6.5 West Central 
Kansas (1861), Nebraska (1867), Colorado (1876) 
 
 This group of states in the middle of the country all entered the Union in the 
1860s and 1870s. 114  Colorado was the last state admitted to the United States until a 
large group of states entered in 1889.  These decades were defined by the Civil War.  
Despite earlier tension and controversy in the Kansas and Nebraska Territories115, all 
three states were admitted as free states.  Even though slavery was not permitted in 
Kansas, the difference in attitudes and controversy over the topic of slavery may have 
influenced the structure of their initial constitution. 
                                                
113 1859 Constitution of Oregon, 1906 Amendment, Article XI, Section 2. 
114 Other states to be admitted in this time frame were Nevada and West Virginia. 
115 The Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 repealed the Missouri Compromise and allowed the people of 
the territories to decide for themselves whether slavery would be allowed.   
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 Colorado and Nebraska adopted home rule provisions in 1912, with Colorado 
extending the privilege to any municipality with more than two thousand residents 
and Nebraska allowing all municipalities with more than five thousand residents the 
opportunity.  Both were self-executing and contained the traditional list of 
requirements, including specifications of how a charter was to be drafted, voted on 
and amended.  Kansas did not pass a home rule amendment until 1960, finally 
granting all municipalities the right to adopt and amend a home rule charter. 
 All three states have always included a call for general incorporation lws and 
for organization of cities by general laws.  However, there is a marked diff rence 
among the states with respect to the constitutional prohibition of special legislation.  
Nebraska and Colorado include many explicit areas where special legislation c nnot 
be enacted including judicial, municipal, corporate, and individual law.  Kansas, on 
the other hand, simply says all cases where a general law can be made applicable, no 
special law shall be enacted.116  While other states include a similar clause, it is 
usually supported by specific areas where special laws are prohibited, pre mpting any 
subjective decision about whether a general law could be made applicable or not.  
The hesitation by Kansas with respect to home rule and special legislation reinf rced 
centralized control, and may have resulted from concerns of the varied political 
interests within the state.  
 
 
3.6.6 Northern Territory 
North Dakota (1889), South Dakota (1889), Montana (1889), Washington (1889), 
Idaho (1890), Wyoming (1890), Utah (1896) 
                                                




 This group of states was admitted to the Union within an eight year period, 
and all were located in the North-Northwestern part of the country.  While there ar  
social and economic differences across these states, including important issues such 
as religion and agriculture, they all entered the Union in the same era.  All of these 
states drafted new constitutions in a period when local governments in neighboring 
states and out east were taking a more prominent role in providing public goods.  
While they all drew on the constitutions of existing states, they ended up structuring 
their new constitutions in different ways. 
 Washington was the only state to incorporate home rule in their initial state 
constitution.  Its constitutional convention, held in 1889, drew on the constitution of 
California.117  Convention members saw the success of home rule in certain cities in 
California and wanted to preserve it when drafting their new constitution.  
Washington’s provision allowed any city containing more than twenty thousand 
residents the opportunity to enact a home rule charter.  Small changes were mad  
from the California text; most notably, amendments could be made as often as 
proposed and only a majority was required to pass them.  No other state in this group 
adopted home rule legislation until South Dakota (1963) and North Dakota (1966).118  
The two states had quite different home rule clauses.  South Dakota looks very 
conventional, specifying how a home rule charter would be drafted, voted on and 
amended.  North Dakota, on the other hand, had a non-self enforcing home rule 
provision, and, thus, the constitutional text is limited.  The one thing the Dakotas had 
                                                
117 Oberholtzer (1893), p 92. 




in common was that they both state that home rule municipalities have “any power or 
function which the legislative assembly has power to devolve upon a non-home rule 
city or village.”119 
 A common element across all states in this group is the extensiveness of the 
prohibitions on special legislation, which rival any other state in the Union.  These 
constitutions were written at a time when concern with corruption and special 
interests within sub-national governments was rising in importance.  This group of 
states took bold measures to prevent special interests from overtaking their newly 
created polities.  Special legislation was prohibited in areas such as the judicial
system, local governments, government officials, grants of incorporation, public 
schooling, and chartering or licensing ferries or tolls.  Even the boundaries they set 
with respect to municipalities are specific.  For example, all states but Idaho have 
municipal debt limits, and all states call for the organization of cities by general law.   
 
 
3.6.7 Southwestern latecomers 
Oklahoma (1907), Arizona (1912), New Mexico (1912) 
 
 Arizona and Oklahoma included home rule in their initial constitutions.  
Arizona granted it to municipalities with more than thirty-five hundred residents and 
Oklahoma to municipalities with more than two thousand.  New Mexico did not have 
home rule until 1970 when they allowed any municipality the option of adopting and 
amending their own charter.  In all other respects, the three initial constitutions of 
these states appear similar.  All have explicit prohibitions on certain types of 
                                                
119 1889 Constitution of North Dakota, 1966 Amendment, Ar icle VI, Section 130.  Similar phrasing 
found in 1889 Constitution of South Dakota, 1963 Amendment, Article X, Section 5. 
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legislation and establish municipal debt limits.  The difference is that Oklahoma d es 
not establish general incorporation legislation.  New Mexico does not explicitly 
provide general laws for the organization of municipalities120; however it does 
prohibit special legislation for the incorporation of municipalities and the amendment 
of their existing charters.   
 
 
3.6.8 Last States in the Union 
Alaska (1959), Hawaii (1959) 
 
 The last two states to enter the Union are Alaska and Hawaii.  The 
constitutional framework in these states should not be seen as the optimal solution 
just because they are the most recent and could learn from other states’ mistakes.  The 
constitutions of Alaska and Hawaii represent solutions for how states structure the 
state-local relationship in the new federally-dominated governance structure. 
 The initial constitutions of Alaska and Hawaii included only two features in 
relation to special legislation, general legislation, and local governments.  Bo h 
granted home rule for municipalities and called for the organization of cities by 
general law.  These states apparently did not think it essential to constitutionally 
protect individuals, private and public corporations from uncontrollable special 




                                                
120 New Mexico just provides for the organization of crporations by general law.  1911 Constitution, 
of New Mexico, Article XI Section 13. 
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3.6.9 Observed Regional Trends 
 
 As the eight individual regional narratives show, there is great variation in the 
constitutional histories both within regions and across regions.  Table 4 tracks when 
each state passed special legislation for corporations, general legisl tion for 
corporations, special legislation for other purposes121, broad calls for general 
legislation122, special legislation for municipalities, general legislation for 
municipalities, and constitutional home rule.   
 One important pattern appears in the regions where states entered the Union 
later, specifically the West, Central, Northern Territory, Southwest and the Last 
regions.  In this group of states, most states address all three categories (corporations, 
general, and municipalities) at the same time.  Also, most states in this group prohibit 
special legislation and call for general legislation in their states concurre tly.  
Because there is no variation across categories, and all categories were addressed in 
the first constitution, it is hard to tell why these states incorporated these m asures 
into their constitutions.  The most likely reason is that states could see what others 
had been doing over the previous one hundred years.  Learning through this 
laboratory of federalism, states chose the best set of institutions given their 
preferences.  One important state that differs from this pattern of universally 
addressing all categories at the same time is California.  California is also the oldest 
state in this group, with its first constitution written in 1849.  The original California 
                                                
121 I include all of Binney’s (1894) categories, except for corporations or municipalities, in this 
category. Examples include individuals, highways, elections, officials, the interest rate, and legal 
proceedings.   
122 I use Binney’s definition of a broad general restriction, which include provisions such as “No 
special law shall be enacted….in cases which are provided for by a general law,” “No local or special 
act,” or “In all other cases where a general law can be made applicable, all laws shall be general and of 
uniform operation.” See Binney (1894), p 174. 
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constitution prohibited special legislation and called for general laws for corporations.  
In the next constitution, written in 1879, California extended the prohibition of 
special laws to cover many other categories, including municipalities.  The pattern of 
addressing private corporations first and municipalities and other issues later i not 
just seen in California.  This pattern links California to other states particulaly in the 
Old Northwest. 
 States in the Old Northwest did not solve everything at once.  In this region, 
measures for corporations were often included in constitutions before anything was 
done for municipalities and other special issues.  At a later point in time, anywhere 
from eleven to fifty-nine years later, states prohibited special laws or mandated 
general laws for municipalities and other categories.  The exceptions are Ohio and 
Indiana which adopted provisions for corporations and municipalities at the same 
time.  The story of states in the Old Northwest and California indicates that 
corporations and municipalities posed separate problems for the state legislature and 
were thus addressed at separate times.  The timing of the constitutional legisl tion for 
corporations and municipalities indicates a similar trend from special to general 
legislation.  The temporal pattern is consistent with the framework presented in Table 
2.  But the measurable gap in when the constitutional changes were made suggests 
these were probably two very different organizational structures which were 
undergoing changes at different points in history. 
 The idea that private corporations and municipalities are two distinct 
organization structures that were addressed in constitutions at separate points in time 
is especially evident in the oldest states, those in the Old Southwest and the Original 
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Colonies.  The sequential pattern of corporations first and municipalities second is 
still evident in these regions.  Most states address the issue of corporate law sometime 
in the nineteenth century.  However, wide variation is seen with when and how states 
in these two regions address municipalities and other special issues.  As discusse 
before, there are reasons which can help explain differences in states wi h respect to 
how they handle local governments.  It is still interesting, however, that these oldest
states in the Union differ so much in how they handled (or ignored) issues of 
municipal special legislation as well as broader issues of special laws. 
 
3.7 Constitutional Changes within Region: A Case Study of the
 Midwest 
 
 While there are general trends across regions, the detail for why specific states 
adopted particular changes is uncovered by looking within region.  By controlling for 
the shared characteristics, it is easier to recognize demographic or political changes 
that may result in constitutional changes. 
 In the Midwest, three states adopted home rule early (Minnesota, Michigan, 
and Ohio) while the other four (Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, and Wisconsin) chose not to 
adopt home rule until later in the 20th century.  This chapter has considered conditions 
under which special legislation, general legislation or home rule is a more likely 
outcome.   In taking a closer look at the states which did not adopt home rule early 
on, there are two striking similarities: (1) all prohibited special legislation for 
municipalities by 1871, and (2) none included a constitutional provision calling for 
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general legislation.123  There may have been general laws which were established by 
the state legislature, but general laws for the organization of municipalities was never 
mandated by the constitution.  These four states solved their issues with special 
legislation by constitutionally prohibiting special laws for municipalities.  The lack of 
early home rule indicates that either it was not an economically optimal solution or t 
was not politically possible to adopt such a measure.   
 The variation in states’ choices within the Midwest can provide an 
opportunity to see if the history if consistent with the theory.  The theoretical 
argument of why a state is more likely to adopt home rule is dependent on the 
appearance of problems with implementing special and general legislation.  By 
identifying when these potential problems actually arose in states, we can check to 
see if these states changed their constitutions in the way theory would suggest.    
 One component of maintaining special legislation was the logroll.  Without 
the ability to sustain a coalition of votes, legislators cannot be assured that their 
special incorporation proposals will pass.  The ability to maintain a logroll can be 
affected both by increased in the size of the legislature and also changes in the 
composition of the legislature.  In the last half of the nineteenth century, changes in 
apportionment affected both of these dimensions.  Constitutional changes were made 
by states to increase the number of legislators.  Changes were also made to the way 
legislative seats were allocated, with states moving to a system where geographic 
units, such as counties, were all guaranteed a representative.  This change from a 
                                                
123 In 1848, Wisconsin included a measure calling for a “nearly uniform” system of town government. 
In Wisconsin, towns are distinctly different from cities and villages.  1848 Constitution of Wisconsin, 
Article IV, Section 23.  In Wisconsin, cities and villages are incorporated areas, whereas towns are the 




population based system of representation to one which also incorporated a 
geographic component increased the representation of rural voters in state legislatur s 
and reduced the representation of urban voters and municipalities. 
 The changes in number of seats and methods of apportionment for the seven 
states in the Midwest are summarized in Table 5.  The number of representatives and 
senators is often not a specific number, as seats were signed based on population or 
the number of geographic units, both of which varied in number over time.  The 
method of apportionment is categorized in Table 5 as either “By Pop”, “Pop by Unit”, 
or “By Unit”.  If there is nothing recorded under apportionment, the constitution was 
not clear on how the state apportioned seats.  The category of “By Pop” represents 
apportionment based solely on population.  After a census was taken or an alternative 
enumeration was completed, senate and representative districts would be drawn based 
on population.  Seats would then be allocated to those senate and representative 
districts.  The category of “Pop by Unit” is similar in that it allocates s ats based on 
population, but instead of drawing new districts, seats are apportioned based on 
counties.  In this case, the role of the geographic units partially factors int 
apportionment because seats can not be split across counties.  The last category of 
“By Unit” indicates that geographic units, in this case counties, are guaranteed at least 
one seat.   
 As can be seen in Table 5, the number of states legislators increased over 
time.  The number of legislators was often based on population; as population 
increased, the total number of legislators increased.  Constitutional changes which 
increased the number may have been a proportional response to ongoing population 
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increases rather than a response for political reasons.  The constitutional changes 
which switched apportionment from a population basis to one where each county was 
guaranteed a seat was more likely a political response.  Representation based on 
geographic units was a way for rural areas to preserve power in the legislature if they 
were losing seats to the growing urban population.  Three states made this switch to 
guaranteeing representation for each county: Ohio in 1903, Iowa in 1904 and 
Michigan in 1909.  Figures 3-5 show the timing of these institutional changes in 
relation to the change in the rural population.  All three of these provisions which 
preserved representation from rural areas were implemented just as the rural 
population stopped growing. 
 The three states which significantly overhauled the method of apportionment 
did so as the growth in rural population stagnated, and rural legislators faced the 
prospect of losing power within the legislature.  By preserving power through 
apportionment by counties, rural legislators took away seats that urban legislators 
would have otherwise had.  The loss of potential seats for urban legislators meant that 
it would be harder to maintain a coalition of like-minded urban legislators to help 
pass through each others’ proposed special legislation.  As discussed earlier, with the 
loss of a coalition to pass special legislation, legislatures had two options.  If 
municipalities were relatively similar, general legislation might be able to fit the 
homogeneous needs.  However, if municipalities varied widely, it made sense to 
decentralize control and allow municipal governments the ability to self-govern.  The 
three states here make up a very small sample of states with a potential logrolling 
problem.  However, simple statistics suggest that there are noticeable differ nces 
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between the states.  Table 6 shows the variances of municipal-level variables taken 
from the 1902 census, the census immediately preceding the changes in 
apportionment.   The variables included are those that are important in defining a 
municipality and its needs.124  For all but one variable, Iowa has the lowest variance 
across its municipalities.  The observation that Michigan and Ohio have more varied 
municipalities would suggest that these two states would have been more likely to 
adopt home rule for municipalities.  This was in fact the case, with Michigan adopting 
home rule in 1909 and Ohio passing it in 1912.   Iowa, with its more similar 
municipalities, maintained general legislation for municipalities until the late 20th 




 Tracking changes in constitutions allow us to observe when specific 
institutions were adopted by several states in a similar way, or if institutions were 
adopted in response to certain prior legislation.  Detecting patterns is informative, but 
alone can not tell the story of why institutional change occurred when it did.  
Additional historical details can add depth to the constitutional history.  The observed 
pattern between decreases in rural population, changes in apportionment laws, and the 
advent of constitutional home rule is striking.  However, this analysis is just for a 
handful of states, and cannot necessarily be representative of other regions.  There 
still needs to be a well understood universal rationale for why constitutional changes 
happened across the states.   
                                                
124 These variables will be explained in more detail in the next chapter on the empirical analysis of 
home rule adoption. 
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 In the next section I look exclusively at one type of constitutional change: the 
adoption of home rule.  The sample of municipalities covers 27 states, including all 
states west of the Mississippi River and the Midwestern states.125  This sample 
includes all twelve states that adopted home rule during the initial stage of the h me 
rule movement.126  By not using the other twenty-three states, I am not including any 
states from the East or the South.  The 27 states in the sample still introduce a wide 
range of regional differences.  I try to control for these inherent regionally-based 
differences by normalizing municipal-level data by state averages.   
                                                
125 I did not collect data on the original colonies and the southern states, as there was no home rule 
activity in these regions during this time period.  In 1922, Pennsylvania adopted a home rule 
amendment, but the state legislature never enacted the necessary enabling legislation.  In 1936, West 
Virginia adopted home rule, followed by New York in 1938.  No other state in the east or south 
adopted home rule until Rhode Island in 1951.   States in the east and south have very distinct local 
government histories which make them inappropriate as comparison groups. 
126 Missouri (1875), California (1879), Washington (1889), Minnesota (1896), Oregon (1906), 




4 Home Rule 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 Between 1875 and 1912, twelve states adopted constitutional home rule for 
municipalities.  The adoption of home rule legislation allowed municipalities the 
option of writing their own charters and the ability to independently determine their 
desired structure and functions.  The state-level choice to adopt home rule was not an 
exogenous decision; it was determined by underlying social, economic and political 
changes in each individual state.  While the state decision to adopt home rule is 
influenced by many factors, this paper explores one possible mechanism.  I use a
fiscal federalism framework to test whether municipal preferences for home rule have 
an effect on the state adoption of home rule.   
 During this period, home rule was a right granted to municipalities in the state 
constitution and implemented by the state legislature.127  In a home rule state, each 
municipality decides whether or not to draft its own unique home rule charter.  
Municipalities have the default option of adopting a standard organizational form 
provided under general state legislation.  If we assume the state legislature reflects 
local preferences, states with more heterogeneity across municipalities may have a 
greater desire or need for home rule by municipal governments and should be more 
likely to adopt home rule.  States that have more homogeneity across local 
governments are less likely to adopt home rule because localities are satisfi d w th a 
                                                
127 Later in the 20th century, some states adopted statutory home rule inst ad of incorporating home 
rule into their state constitutions.  Statutory home rule provisions, like general legislation for 
municipalities, are statutes of the state legislature and subject to amendment or revocation.  From here 




uniform general law for municipalities.128  I test the hypothesis by using a unique 
municipal-level dataset to estimate a latent preference for home rule for each 
municipality and then compare the dispersion of these preferences across states.  The 
results consistently show that states with more heterogeneous municipal-level 
preferences for home rule adopted constitutional home rule at the state level.  
 The institution of home rule first appeared during a quite lively period for 
local governments.   Local governments in the late 19th and early 20th centuries took 
on increased roles and responsibilities.  According to Holcombe and Lacombe (2004), 
in 1820 local government expenditures were just 13.5% of total government 
expenditures.  By 1902, that number was 58.8%, and reached its peak in 1913 at 64%.  
Wallis (2000) highlights the growing importance of local government relativ  to state 
and local governments; in 1840 per capita local government revenues were about 
40% higher than state revenues, but by 1900 they were 260% higher.  Both Holcombe 
and Lacombe and Wallis present these statistics to motivate further exploration into 
why and how local governments were growing relative to the other levels of 
government.  Historians have long noted the significant demographic, economic and 
social changes in the late 19th century.  Part of the growth in local level governments 
can be attributed to changes like the rapid urbanization of cities.  But, that change 
alone does not characterize the expansion of local governments.  Over the 20th
century, the population became increasingly urban, yet local governments were 
surpassed by the federal government.  An alternative explanation can be found in the 
                                                
128 I want to emphasize the distinction between heterog neity across governments and heterogeneity 
within a government.  This paper identifies heterogneity across municipalities within a state.  I will 




fundamental changes in the state provisions for local governments.  The adoption of 
home rule was one such change.  The grant of home rule impacts the way municipal 
governments choose an efficient structure and the optimal set of public goods.  While 
the use of home rule will cause change, its arrival also reflects change.  The advent of 
home rule points to changes in demand for additional autonomy during this dynamic 
period of municipal history.   
 Writing ten years after the adoption of the home rule amendment, Charles P. 
Hall described the difference home rule had made for municipalities in Minnesota.  
He recognized its limitations, specifically that municipalities were still creatures of 
the state and could not supersede the general state laws.  However, he boldly claimed
that:  
Already the small municipalities are finding themselves better governed than 
before; the spirit of freedom, long confined, becomes a light in the community 
life: while other cities, less progressive, go lumbering on, under out-grown 
legislative grants.  No municipality, though it be small in numbers, is deprived 
of the home rule privilege: thinking men and understanding voters there must 
be; but, with these present, the benefit may be secured.129   
 
Similar observations were made in other states.  While scholars recognize the drastic 
changes municipal governments were able to make through home rule, few have tried 
to place home rule within the context of legislative change.130  With only twelve of 
forty-eight states adopting home rule in this era, it is evident home rule was only one 
of many viable solutions for how states structured a system of local government.  
                                                
129 Hall (1906), p 7. 
130 Griffith, 1900-1920 (1974), p 126-128, used a previous study which had ranked 36 cities on various 
measures of functional achievements. Ranking the cities by quarter, Griffith found that of the cities in 
the top quarter, 7 out of 9 cities were home rule charter cities; of the nine cities in the bottom quarter, 
only one had a home rule charter.  This terse comparison leads us to believe home rule had some effect 
on the performance of governments.  More recently, Turnbull and Geon (2006) directly evaluate the 
impact of the institution of home rule on county government.   
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This paper helps answer the question of why home rule was a sensible institution for 
certain state governments to adopt. 
 
4.2 Background 
4.2.1 Evolution of Municipal Legislation 
 
 State governments opened up access to both political and economic 
organizations in the 19th century.  There are clear parallels between state level 
constitutional changes regarding private corporations and the less well understood 
changes instituted for public corporations.131  As mentioned in Chapter 2, initially, all 
corporations (public or private) were chartered through special legislation.  In tandem 
with directly solving state-level debt problems, general incorporation laws for private 
firms enacted by many states in the 1840s were an economic solution to the political 
problem of corruption and special interests.132  State governments were taking steps 
to remove special interests and the predisposition for corruption by establishing 
“general incorporation acts” that created a one-size-fits-all corporation available to 
everyone through an administrative process.  While the political issues of special
interests and corruption were resolved through general legislation, these general laws 
constrained the internal structure of private corporations.  In the 1880s and later, 
states began to loosen the restrictions on private corporate structure through te 
                                                
131 Public corporations include municipal governments, county governments, school districts, and 
special districts. 
132 See Wallis (2005). 
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passage of liberal general incorporation.133  The liberal acts allowed corporations a 
great deal more freedom.   
 The initial need for municipal general legislation stemmed from similar 
problems of special interests and political manipulation.  Large cities were targeted 
with undue special legislation passed by state legislatures.  Sometimes the state, 
burdened by state level debt restrictions imposed in the 1840s, turned to 
municipalities to shoulder the burden of internal improvements and investments, 
passing unfunded (or simply unfair) and intrusive mandates.  General legislation 
protected municipalities from unwanted abuse by state-level politics, and also 
provided a uniform structure under which all local governments could operate and 
easily gain access to the corporate form.  In 1848, the constitution of Wisconsin 
called for “one system of town and county government.”134  As described in Chapter 
2, numerous states followed, including constitutional articles calling for 
municipalities to be incorporated and organized under general laws. 
 However, as in the case of private corporations, the one-size-fits-all rubric of 
general legislation was not suitable for all public corporations.  In some states, a 
Pareto-improving solution was to have general legislation available for those well 
served by it, and to give municipalities the option of independently chartering 
themselves.  The resolution retained the political security afforded by general 
legislation and provided the freedom of organization to those who needed it most.  
This powerful grant of autonomy is the result of the home rule movement of the 
                                                
133 Corporations were now allowed to be formed no matter the residency of the incorporators or the 
primary place of business, and they had diverse options for their internal governance structure.  The 
first mover was New Jersey; starting in 1875, and through a series of acts from 1888 to 1896, New 
Jersey gave private corporations additional economic flexibility.  See Butler (1985) and Wallis (2006). 
134 1848 Constitution of Wisconsin, Article IV, Section 23. 
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Progressive Era.  The initial wave of constitutional home rule in the United States 
stretches from 1875 to 1912, a period in which twelve states adopted home rule.  
Weiner (1937) uses World War I to mark a turning point in the history of home 
rule.135  Home rule was not an end in itself, but a means to good government.  The 
fervent reform mentality and pursuit of more efficient government waned in theyears 
following the War. Wisconsin (1933) and West Virginia (1936) were the next two 
states to adopt home rule.136  These later states started a trend of less complex and 
more liberal grants of home rule to municipalities which intensified in the 1960s and 
1970s.   
4.2.2 Institution of Home Rule 
 
 While the term home rule does not have a uniform and exact legal definition, 
the idea implies the transfer of specified government powers from state to local 
governments.  The concept is parallel to devolution, often used to describe 
decentralization of power in other countries and historical periods.  While devolution 
encompasses a wide range of transferred powers and responsibilities across different 
types of government structures, the home rule movement in the United States can be 
described narrowly.  Home rule in the United States appeared in state constituti, 
granting municipalities the authority to frame and adopt their own charters. 
 Historical accounts suggest that the home rule movement was motivated by 
the desire of local governments to become more autonomous from the state 
                                                
135 Weiner (1937), p 561. 
136 Krane, Rigos, and Hill (2001) report that Nevada aopted home rule in 1924 and Arkansas in 1926.  
However, in Nevada the apparent constitutional grant of home rule was overruled when legislation was 
passed allowing the state legislature to create and change municipal charters.  The cited home rule 
amendment in the 1926 Arkansas constitution is instead a limitation on municipal legislative and 
taxing power.   
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legislature.  Progressive historians document how cities yearned for economi  
individualism and separation from state interference.  Howe (1905) argues that 
municipalities needed freedom from “the jockeying measures of party bosses, the 
attempted passage of franchise grabs by the legislature, the interference by the state 
with the police and fire departments, [and] the burden of securing relief from excise 
and financial problems” and should “be as free from the state as the state is as fr e 
from the nation at large.”137 
 However, the appeal of home rule was not limited to the concept of freedom 
from the burden of state control.  The advantage of home rule is that it allows a local
government to become more efficient and better suited to meet the demands of its 
constituents.  Rapid urbanization required cities to provide new public services, but 
they were often constrained by the governance structure under general lgisl tion and 
needed to have a flexible charter through which they could promote internal 
reorganization.  Fox (1977) notes that the “best that a city of the 1880s could hope for 
in the way of efficient service provision was economical handling of its purchases 
and supplies of labor,” as the city was not able to supervise labor and projects like 
private firms.138  Freedom from the state legislature was important, especially for 
large metropolitan cities which were being handed extreme and unfunded mandates 
by the state legislature.  However, home rule was sought by municipalities of all izes 
as way to gain control over local affairs. 
 Home rule granted each municipality the ability to independently draft its own 
charter. A home rule charter is a constitution for the municipality, a formal 
                                                
137 Howe (1905), p 161-162.   
138 Fox (1977), p 90-91. 
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recognition of local self-determination and a framework for government that persists 
over time.  A charter generally grants power in five areas: (1) the powers incident to 
all corporations; (2) power to levy taxes; (3) power to appropriate and spend money; 
(4) power to perform certain services; and (5) power to enact and enforce local polie 
ordinances.139  A municipal government, by means of its own electorate, could now 
determine how the government would be run and who would run it.   
 Adoption of a home rule charter allows for substantial structural changes.  In 
Michigan, municipalities under general law were restricted to operate as  weak 
mayor-council government.  By adopting a home rule charter, municipalities could 
decide to change the structure to a commission or even a city-manger form of 
government.  Home rule charters enabled municipalities to impose limitations on the 
government that were more stringent than state laws.  Some home rule municipalities 
chose to place tax or debt limitations upon themselves above and beyond those 
imposed by the state.  Municipalities also used home rule charters to expand the range 
of local powers and functions, often as a means to facilitate ownership and operation 
of utilities.  Home rule charters provided citizens with the use of the initiative, 
referendum and recall.  Access to the initiative played an important role in home rule 
municipalities in Minnesota, for example, with respect to the adoption of liquor laws.   
 Municipalities also pursued home rule as a means to increase accountability in 
local government.  Municipalities in the late 19th century lacked executive power, 
and the blame for failed public works projects was often shifted up to the state 
                                                
139 Kimball (1922), p 376, which refers to the classification by Goodnow and Bates in Municipal 
Government and to work by Dillon. 
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government instead of being dealt with at a local level.140  Home rule redirected the 
responsibility for governance: blame could not be passed back up to the state 
legislature.  Responsibility rested squarely on the shoulders of the local officials.  
Municipal governments were held accountable to their citizens both through the 
power of recall and through possible rulings made by state courts.   
 While home rule may not be as avant-garde now as it was in the early 20th 
century, it is an institution worthy of a deeper understanding by those interested in 
how local governments operate.  In 2001, Krane, Rigos and Hill reported on the status 
of home rule in America.  While the authors note that home rule is an "antique" idea, 
they contend that home rule has a bearing on policy decisions and can directly 
influence six areas of state-local relations: service provision, policy tools, interstate 
variation, trends shaping local governments, federalism, and democracy.141 
 Briffault (2004) documents cases where home rule remains part of the current 
policy debate.  Home rule has played an important role in policies ranging from local 
tobacco and firearm regulation, gay and lesbian rights, campaign finance reform and 
living wage laws.142  The living wage movement contends that by increasing wages 
paid by firms that do business with local governments or receive benefits from local 
governments, a community can combat poverty and promote urban economic 
development.  Such a policy could not necessarily be passed at the state level, given 
the likely contentious debate about the potential consequences of the policy on the 
community, employers and employees.  Thus, living wage policies will only be 
                                                
140 Patton (1969). 
141 Krane, et al. (2001), p 3. 
142 Home rule provides a mechanism by which choice of government organization and operation can 
affect policy.  In general, the link between governmental structure and policy choice has been 
established in papers such as Lineberry and Fowler (1967). 
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pursued by individual communities that are homogeneous enough to share an interest 
in a living wage ordinance. Harvey (2003) found that 83 cities had adopted a living 
wage ordinance by means of their home rule charter and associated authority over 
their own policies.  While the living wage movement is just one example of policy 
differentiation available under home rule, a general analysis of home rule will h lp 
define the relationship between state and local governments.  Home rule can have a
impact on the future role of local governments in America's federalist system, as local 
governments continue to be responsible for providing communities with basic service 
provision and satisfying local needs.   
 
4.3 Endogenous Policy Determination 
 
 The analysis of home rule presents a unique opportunity to investigate the 
endogenous determination of government structure. Often, empirical research either 
takes government structure as given or assumes that institutional change and policy 
determination are exogenous. Hero (1986) notes the abundance of research that 
focuses on the policy and electoral consequences of different urban governmental 
structures, but which fails to investigate what leads to the adoption of those particular 
structures. By overlooking how institutions and governance are endogenously 
determined, past research has sometimes ignored valuable information that can elp 
explain why and how outcomes evolve. As Nice (1983) noted, municipal government 
is shaped by state governments as well as overarching legal, political, cultural and 
historical influences.   
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 Strumpf and Oberholzer-Gee (2002) tackle the issue of identifying what 
contributes to state-level decisions.   They construct a positive theory of endogenous 
policy determination to empirically test a central hypothesis of fiscal federalism: that 
heterogeneous preferences lead to decentralized decision making.  The authors look at 
the state level decision to decentralize liquor control to the county level or to maintain 
a centralized, state-level liquor policy.  Their hypothesis is that where there is wide 
variation in liquor preference (wet versus dry) across counties, states are more likely 
to decentralize control.  The empirical analysis consists of two stages.  In the first 
stage, county preferences for liquor control are estimated based on those states where 
decentralized decision of the policy variable was allowed.  Then using the estimation 
results, they simulate what counties currently under a centralized policywould have 
done had they instead been under a decentralized decision-making structure.   
 The innovation of Strumpf and Oberholzer-Gee’s approach is the recognition 
that state-level decisions rely on the distribution of preferences across the local 
governments.  As described by Besley and Coate (2003), choices with respect to 
decentralized decision-making are not only based on differences in spillovers and 
other externalities of centralization, but also on the differences in tastesfor public 
goods.  The second stage of the Strumpf and Oberholzer-Gee analysis compares the 
predictions across decentralized and centralized states.  If a majority of the counties in 
a state are similar, then the state legislature is likely to find common grou d through 
general legislation.  However, even if the majority is similar, if the minority is 
sufficiently different from the majority, then they may be able to "buy" the vot s of 
the majority in order to decentralize control through the state legislature.  St umpf and 
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Oberholzer-Gee compare preferences within a state by measuring the variance of 
preferences and the strength of preferences to capture the heterogeneity and minority 




 The adoption of home rule at the state level must be influenced by the demand 
for home rule at the municipal level.  All else equal, states where municipalities want 
home rule will be more likely to adopt home rule than those states where 
municipalities do not have an interest in the institution.  Demand for home rule is 
greater when the optimal governance structure for a municipality diverges father 
from the structure provided under general legislation.  A statewide demand for home 
rule happens when heterogeneity in the optimal governance structure for each 
municipality can not be accommodated by a uniform policy under general legislation.  
This need is described as “strong” local preference for home rule, measured both by 
the magnitude and variation of municipal home rule preference. 
 In order to compare the municipal preferences in home rule states with those 
in non-home rule states, a measure of municipal taste for home rule must be 
developed.  I use data from states that granted home rule to estimate the determinan s 
of the choice by municipalities of whether or not to adopt a home rule charter.  In 
most states, less than half of the municipalities adopted a home rule charter when 
given the opportunity, 143 so there is considerable variation to exploit.  The estimates 
are used to generate a latent taste for home rule for each municipality in the sample.  
                                                
143 McBain (1916), p 114-117. 
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We can use the coefficients to predict a latent preference for municipalites in non-
home rule states that were never granted the option of home rule. The key hypothesis 
to test is whether municipalities in home rule states have greater heterogen ity in the 
estimated latent preference for home rule. 
 While the initial purpose of the municipal-level estimation is to create a 
measure for local home rule preference, the estimation also analyzes the forces 
driving the pursuit of self-governance through home rule chartering.  As discussed 
earlier, municipalities in the late 19th and early 20th centuries increased their provision 
of goods and services to citizens.  Management of increased spending policies and 
expanded revenue collection could be aided by writing and adopting a tailored a 
home rule charter.  Thriving municipalities that had reasons to utilize home rule 
chartering are identified by three main characteristics: size, growth and investment in 
infrastructure.  Municipality size indicates economies of scale in the provision of 
public goods, which can be expanded under a home rule charter.144  Municipalities 
experiencing rapid growth may look to a home rule charter for flexibility to 
accommodate changing needs.  Finally, because home rule charters allow for 
additional control over the establishment and operation of public utilities, we expect 
home rule charters to be utilized by municipalities which heavily invest in 
infrastructure.  Size, growth and infrastructure investment are the three cor  
characteristics of probable home rule municipalities.  Other factors possibly 
contributing to home rule adoption include the degree of homogeneity within a 
                                                




municipality, the professionalization of management, the demand for modernization, 
and the pursuit of more efficient local governments.   
 Municipalities with more internal homogeneity are characterized by 
populations having similar race or nativity or being of the same political party.  
Theoretically, the degree of homogeneity within a municipality has an ambiguous 
effect.  Models of political participation predict that homogeneous governments 
might be more likely to adopt a home rule charter.  Alternatively, collective choice 
problems may lead heterogeneous communities to adopt home rule charters in order 
to place more stringent controls on the municipal governments so as to constrain the 
“tyranny of the majority”.   
 Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) predict greater political participation in areas 
that are more homogeneous with respect to either race or income.  Greater political 
participation in a homogeneous community often results in policy choices which 
reinforce and provide stability for the preferences of the homogeneous group.   
 Alternatively, heterogeneous communities may be more likely to seek home 
rule.  Buchanan and Tullock (1962) argue that heterogeneous communities seek to 
impose restrictive collective decision-making rules.  For example, home rule charters 
allowed municipalities to impose more stringent tax and debt limitations than the sta e 
required.  Thus, heterogeneous communities might seek out home rule as a means to 
guarantee protection from negative collective decisions concerning the provision of 
public goods. 
Additionally, municipalities faced with a heterogeneous population might be 
less likely to adopt home rule charters in order to remain protected by the state rather 
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than left to their own autonomous control.  The point is particularly relevant in the 
case of home rule during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.  As Patton (1969) 
points out, parts of the old South were hesitant to use home rule charters because 
home rule would sever the protection local governments received from state 
government with respect to race relations.   
 There are alternative views which explain why size, growth, and infrastructure 
may affect the likelihood of adopting a home rule charter.   For one, the growth of the 
modern business enterprise and the corresponding professionalization of private firm 
management sparked a parallel movement in the reform of municipal government.  
As firms reorganized internally for efficiency, leading professionals saw the same 
opportunity to reform government.  The commission and council-manager forms of 
government were an application of successful structural business reforms, and were 
often accessible only by the use of a home rule charter.  In addition, changing 
economic outcomes affected the demand for modern goods and services.  People not 
only demanded different consumer goods, but also demanded improved public goods 
such as water, roads, public transportation, electricity and parks.  A municipality th t 
wants to modernize its public services may choose to pursue a home rule charter in 
order to expand its governmental functions.   
 Lastly, a municipality is more likely to pursue home rule if operation under 
general legislation is not optimal.  General legislation is a uniform institution, created 
by the state legislature as the optimal structure for a representative municipality.  If a 
given municipality is different from its peers within the state, it is unlikely that 
general legislation is the optimal choice.  In order to capture within-state 
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heterogeneity we can compare local-level demographic and municipal government 
data to the state averages.   
4.5 The Data 
 
 As mentioned in Section 3.8, the sample of municipalities covers 27 states, 
including all states west of the Mississippi River and the Midwestern states.  The 
sample includes all twelve states that adopted home rule during the initial stage of the 
home rule movement.  For each municipality in these home rule states, I found the 
year of its first home rule charter, if it ever chose to adopt one.  Complete information 
on the adoption of home rule charters is not available for Oregon, so municipalities in 
the state are dropped from the analysis.   
 The year a municipality adopts a home rule charter is used as an indication of 
the local preference for the state-level grant of home rule.  The analysis only 
considers data on municipal home rule chartering up to 1935, for two reasons.  First, 
it is important to have a restricted period of time when considering how local 
preferences induce a state-level decision.  By imposing a cutoff, the analysis assumes 
a municipality in Minnesota that adopted its first home rule charter in the last haf of
the 20th century did not have a strong preference for home rule in 1896; otherwise, the 
municipality would have adopted home rule soon after the state grant of home rule.  
Second, conditions changed dramatically after the New Deal reforms began.  The 
federal government enacted Social Security and other public welfare programs and 
changed the relationships among the federal, state and local governments.  Also, in
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1934 the federal government passed the Municipal Debt Adjustment Act.  These 
changes affected the motivation for adoption of local home rule.145 
 I have collected municipal-level data from the Decennial Census of the Unit d 
States to construct five cross-sectional datasets from the 1890, 1902, 1913, 1922 and 
1932 censuses.  The Wealth, Debt and Taxation (WDT) series provides municipal-
level data on population, debt, assessed valuation and ad valorem taxation.146  
Population data from the WDT tables was supplemented by municipal-level data 
from the general Census population tables. Since municipal level demographic 
characteristics are not published for this time period, county-level data was used to 
measure the native born population (ICPSR 2896) and congressional election results 
(ICPSR 8611).  A measure for political competition was constructed by calculating a 
county-level Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) based on the voting shares for three 
parties (Democratic, Republic, or Other).  The HHI accounts for the level of political 
concentration; an HHI of .33 indicates that the three parties received equal votes in 
the election, while an HHI of 1 indicates that one party received all of the votes.  
Thus, counties with a higher HHI are assumed to be more politically homogeneous.   
 The 1890 and 1902 WDT series endeavored to get information from all 
municipalities.  While the data include information from municipalities of all sizes, 
extra effort was made by surveyors to obtain data from municipalities with 1,000 
people or more.  Starting in 1913, the WDT only provides information on 
                                                
145 After the 1930s there were significant changes in the form of constitutional provisions for home 
rule.  See section 2.5. 
146 Starting in 1870 and continuing until 1942, governme tal data were published as Wealth, Debt, and 
Taxation.  From 1942-1957, instead of a decennial census, annual data was collected on state and local 




municipalities of 2,500 people or more.   In order to maintain a consistent sample 
across time, only municipalities present in all datasets or that enter in some year after 
1890 and remain through 1932 are included in the panel data analysis.   
4.6 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 The full sample of municipalities in 1890 differs from the balanced panel 
sample of municipalities (see Table 7).  The balanced panel is, by construction, 
composed of larger municipalities.  On average, the balanced panel cities have higher 
population growth, more municipal debt and sinking fund assets, and a higher share 
of native-born citizens.  The panel data sample provides additional information 
through the time series nature of the data, but is not representative of the entire 
population of municipalities in these states.  To adjust for this bias, results for both 
the cross-sectional data from 1890 and the panel data are presented.147  In addition, I 
present statistics for samples for each econometric method employed below: one for 
probit and linear probability estimation and one for duration estimation.  Two states 
used in the duration analysis cannot be used in the probit and linear probability 
analysis on the 1890 data because there is no within-state variation in home rule 
chartering.  When using the panel data, some municipalities are excluded from the 
duration estimation.  For instance, if a municipality that adopted a home rule chart r 
in 1914 only has WDT data beginning in 1922, it will not be included in the duration 
data but can be included in the probit and linear probability analysis.  Thus, there are 
                                                
147 The analysis was also run on all cross-sectional data from 1902, 1913, 1922 and 1932.  The 1902 
results are similar to the 1890 cross-sectional results, while the 1913, 1922 and 1932 cross-sections are 
similar to the results using the panel data.   
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four different samples: 1890 data for probit estimation, 1890 data for duration 
estimation, panel data for probit estimation, and panel data for duration estimation.   
 Tables 6 and 7 report summary statistics of municipal and county-level 
characteristics for each of the four samples described above. Table 7 compares 
municipalities in states that adopted home rule to municipalities in states th  did not.  
Across the eight variables presented, significant differences in the average 
characteristics of municipalities across samples occur about half the time.  Consider 
the 1890 sample used in the probit model.  The average municipality in home rule 
states is located in a county that votes more Democratic than the average municipality 
in states that did not adopt home rule.  There is, however, no statistically significant 
difference in the population growth of municipalities by home rule status.  
Interestingly, the variance of city characteristics is almost always significantly 
different between municipalities in home rule states and those in non-home rule 
states.  The higher variance of the municipal characteristics is not always found in 
home rule states as theoretically predicted.  One should keep in mind that looking at 
characteristics of a single variable abstracts from within-state heterogeneity and fails 
to account for general differences across the states.  Nevertheless, the significant 
differences in variation of municipal characteristics suggest that heterog neity issues 
can be explored more fully in an econometric analysis.      
 Table 8 includes data only on municipalities in states that adopted home rule.  
Each dataset is separated into municipalities that adopted home rule and 
municipalities that chose to remain under general legislation.  The differences 
between the 1890 sample and panel data samples are evident in variables such as the 
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average population and municipal debt per capita.  Across all cuts of the data, general 
legislation municipalities are different from municipalities that adopt home rule 
charters, as seen in the statistically significant difference in means for most variables.  
These differences between municipalities that adopted home rule and those that chose 
to remain under general legislation will identify the municipal-level preference for 
home rule in the following analysis.148   
 
4.7 Econometric Method 
 
 The empirical strategy models the choice by municipalities to adopt or not 
adopt a home rule charter.  The first stage is estimated using municipalities in states 
with home rule.  We observe municipalities in the estimation sample beginning in the 
year in which the state adopts home rule, when all municipalities were under general
legislation, until the year a municipality adopts a home rule charter.149  In the second 
stage, the estimated coefficients from the home rule states are applied to 
municipalities from all states to predict a latent preference for home rule. Then 
predictions for municipalities in home rule states are compared with those in non-
home rule states to understand how heterogeneity in preferences affects the state-level 
decision of whether or not to pass home rule legislation.  Let me stress at the 
beginning: all the results are robust to the choice of empirical specification and the 
                                                
148 The use of local level variables is essential to predicting to use of home rule, as there doesn’t seem 
to be a strong geographic component.  For example, Figures 6 and 7 shows which municipalities 
adopted home rule in Michigan and Texas.  In these examples, there does not seem to be a 
concentration of home rule in specific areas of the state.  Similar patterns of municipal take-up of hme 
rule are seen in the other states. 
149 The empirical analyses are limited to modeling the single transition to a home rule charter.  I do not 
observe any municipalities that transition back to being a general legislation municipality, although 
there are cases of this happening in later time periods.   
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use of either the cross-sectional or panel data.  The consistent results underscore the 
strong conclusion that home rule states have more heterogeneous municipalities.    
 As mentioned in Section 4.4, three variables are the crux of the specification: 
size, growth, and infrastructure.  These three factors are important in determining 
which public goods are provided at the municipal level, and, by extension, how those 
public goods are provided.  These decisions play directly into the adoption of a home 
rule charter, which allows the municipality more control over its own governance.   
The effects of size are proxied by population, growth by population growth, and 
infrastructure by municipal gross debt less sinking fund.150  Other covariates include 
the percent of native born citizens in the county, the county political HHI based on 
congressional elections, the percent of Democratic votes cast in congressional 
elections, the percent of votes cast for the non-Republican or non-Democratic 
candidate in congressional elections, and the level of the municipal sinking fund 
assets.    
 It is also necessary to control for differences in the within-state variation 
across municipalities in a state.  We can assume that general legislation i set by the 
state legislature to accommodate the needs of the average municipality within the 
state.  It could be the case that for any municipality, the greater the difference from an 
average municipality within the state, the less likely general legislation will be the 
efficient solution for that particular municipality and the more likely it would be to 
adopt a home rule charter.  This comparison is useful for variables with variation 
across states and within states.  For example, we expect that a municipality with rapid 
                                                
150 Gross debt is the sum of bonded and floating debt.  From this total, the level of sinking fund assets 




population growth is more likely to pursue a home rule charter to meet its changing 
needs.  This level effect will be captured by including population growth as an 
independent variable.  However, if we consider California which has higher 
population growth than Michigan, a common measure of population growth across all 
states will not account for the inherent differences within states.   Michigan may have 
heterogeneity of population growth across municipalities within the state, where in 
California all municipalities might have a relatively high population growth.  We 
want to be able to identify those municipalities in Michigan which have a rate of 
growth different from the average.  The specification issue is addressed by creating 
new variables based on already included covariates, calculated as 2)( vv− , where v  
is the state mean.  This set of measures is included to help control for within stae 
heterogeneity. 
 State fixed effects control for any shared, omitted, and unobserved variables 
within a state, specifically variables that induce the adoption of home rule such as 
innovativeness or propensity for political involvement and legislative change.  
Strumpf and Oberholzer-Gee (2002) show that state effects are necessary to obtain 
consistent coefficient estimates.  When calculating predictions on the out-of-sample 
municipalities in non-home rule states, I take the average of the state fixed ffects in 
the estimated model.151  I assume that states which adopted home rule are not 
implicitly different from states that did not adopt home rule.  In my case, the driving 
force behind the adoption of home rule is the variation across municipalities within 
the state, not differences across states.  However, there could be differences across 
                                                
151 This follows the method used by Strumpf and Oberholzer-Gee (2002), p 17. 
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states that make certain states more likely to adopt any new institution.  If this were 
the case, unobserved state effects will be higher for home rule states (innovators) th n 
they would be for non-home rule states.  Thus, by using an average of the higher, 
home rule state fixed effects, predictions for the latent taste for home rule for 
municipalities in non home rule states will be biased upwards.   
 In the panel data specifications, I include a set of time fixed effects.  The 
probability of adopting of adopting home rule may vary for exogenous reasons over 
time, and time-specific effects allow for that possibility.  Additional complexities 
arise when using time effects in the duration model.  These are discussed later. 
 We can represent a local government's decision to adopt a home rule charter 
by using the following basic specification: 
 
icssscsiscsicsics uSVVZXt ++−++= δφγβ
2
,
* )(  [1] 
where tics
* is a latent variable for degree of home rule preference in municipality i, 
located in county c in state s; Xics is a vector of characteristics of the municipality 
(population, population growth, debt, sinking fund), Zcs are the characteristics 
measured at the county level (political variables, native born population), and Ss are 
state fixed effects.  The variables in V compare each city to the average of all cities in 
its state and are measured either at the municipal or county level; these variables are 
chosen because they have a high variance both within and across states.152  The V 
terms capture the effect of heterogeneous characteristics within states, while the level 
effects of the characteristics are controlled for in Xics and Zcs.  We do not directly 
observe the magnitude of the home rule preference, only the choice of whether the 
                                                
152 The three variables that I choose to include for this within-state measure of variance are population 
growth, percent native born, and gross debt less sinking fund per capita. 
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local government did in fact take up the home rule charter opportunity when offered.  
The variable tics takes on one of two values, indicating whether or not the specific 
local government enacted a home rule charter by 1935.  It is assumed that the 
decision by each municipality is independent, and is not a reactionary or defensive 
response to the choices of its peer group.   
 While there are limitations to this simplified model of home rule adoption, the 
goal is to get unbiased predictions of the underlying municipal preference for home 
rule.  If some of the assumptions are not valid, then the model will be imprecisely 
estimated, and this will affect our ability to interpret these results as motivating 
factors of the home rule movement.  However, the point of the analysis is not to be 
precise about explaining the adoption of home rule, but to estimate municipal taste for 
home rule.   If the estimates are unbiased, it will still be possible to capture the 
relative heterogeneity of preferences within and across states. 
 
4.8 Probit and Linear Probability Estimates 
 
 Table 9 presents estimates of Equation [1] using probit and linear probability 
models on both the cross section of 1890 data and the balanced panel dataset, without 
state or region fixed effects, with state fixed effects, and with region effects.  Results 
without state fixed effects and with region effects, while potentially biased, are 
included to support the overall results we see in the regressions with state fixed 
effects. 
 The preferred probit model, shown in columns (2) and (8), confirms that three 
important factors in predicting the adoption of a home rule charter are population, 
 105 
 
population growth, and gross debt less sinking fund per capita.  The a priori 
predictions of these variables are supported; all positively affect the probability of 
adopting a home rule charter.   
 The magnitude of the coefficients suggests economically important effects.  
The coefficients for the probit model are the marginal effects evaluated at the mean.  
The results in column (2) indicate that a one standard eviation increase in the per 
capita gross debt less sinking fund for a municipality with a current level of $7.04 per 
capita increases the probability of adopting a home rule charter by 6.22%.   
 The linear probability model suffers from a heteroscedastic error term that 
depends on the estimated coefficients; in addition, he model does not necessarily 
yield predictions that are probabilities, i.e., arein the range [0,1].  Nonetheless, the 
linear probability results are still unbiased and can be compared to the probit model 
results.   The results of the linear probability model are shown in columns (4)-(6) and 
(10)-(12), and confirm the patterns shown in the probit analysis.  Like the probit 
results, the coefficients are economically meaningful and statistically significant.  For 
example, when running the model on the 1890 data, a one standard deviation increase 
in the per capita gross debt less sinking fund per capita increases the probability of 
adopting a home rule charter by 4.7%.   
 Individually, variables other than population, population growth and gross 
debt less sinking fund per capita are not robustly significant across the specifications.  
They are, however, jointly significant.  Tests of jint significance are conducted for 
the group of political variables and, separately, for the group of variables that 
measure the difference between the municipality and the average municipality in its 
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state.  The null hypothesis that these groups of variables have coefficients equal to 
zero is almost always rejected at the 95% level.  The one exception is the group of 
political variables in the linear probability model run on the 1890 data, for which the 
significance level of rejecting the null hypothesis i  93%. 
 
4.9 Duration Estimates 
 
 Instead of representing the local level choice for h me rule using a binary 
indicator of whether or not the municipality adopted a home rule charter anytime 
before 1935, we can use information on when the municipality passed such a charter.  
Utilizing the duration aspect of the data, ti (time until passing a home rule charter), is 
advantageous for two reasons.  First, it incorporates the speed of adoption into the 
intensity of preference for home rule.  Second, it allows us to deal with censored 
observations, those municipalities that did not pass a home rule before 1935 but may 
do so sometime in the future.   









),( θ  [2] 
which describes the joint probability of the distribution of the sample as a function of 
the individual duration lengths, ti and a set of parameters θ. The basic likelihood 
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 to account for censored observations, where 1=id  indicates that the spell is 
uncensored.  Here, ),( θtf  is the density function which is the product of the hazard 
function, ),( θλ t , and the survivor function, ),( θtS .     
 Parametric models vary based on the implied shape of the hazard function.  
The most commonly used distributions for adoption tmes are the Weibull and the 
exponential distributions. 153  The exponential distribution results in a constant hazard 
over time, where the Weibull allows for either a monotonically increasing or 
decreasing hazard.154  We might expect that the probability that a municipality adopts 
home rule, given that it has not yet done so, decreases as time goes on.  The Weibull 
allows for a decreasing hazard rate.  The use of the exponential or Weibull 
distribution results in a proportional hazard model when explanatory variables are 
introduced.  The proportional hazard model is defined by a hazard function which can 
be separated into a baseline hazard,0λ , that is shared by all municipalities and a factor 
φ  that proportionally incorporates explanatory variables that do not depend on 
duration, but which can vary over time.     
 ( ) )(),(,,, 00 txxt λβφλβλ =  [4] 
The vector of x’s in the duration model are the same as those used in the probit and 
linear probability estimations.   
                                                
153 Temple (1996), p 1009 and Greene (2003), p 794. 
154 The log-normal distribution allows for a bell shaped hazard function; the log-logistic, in addition t 
the bell-shape, also allows for a strictly decreasing hazard function.  The Gompertz distribution allows 
for a monotonically decreasing hazard function.  I have inspected the baseline hazard function (without 
covariates) for each distributional form.  All appear to estimate a decreasing baseline hazard, 
reinforcing my initial choice of the Weibull distribution (see Figure 8).  The estimated coefficients 
using the Weibull distribution are robust to the alternative specifications of distributional form.  As an 
additional check, the shape parameter in the log-logistic and log-normal models is not significantly 
different from 1, indicating the absence of an underlying bell-shaped hazard function.   
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 A limitation of the parametric duration model is tha  it implies a particular 
shape of the hazard function and imposes a specific relationship between the 
covariates and the hazard function.  An incorrect distribution of the hazard function 
would result in biased results. Figure 9 presents graphs of the non-parametric 
smoothed hazard functions based on the Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard function.  
The graph presents the raw hazard in the absence of covariates.  A log-rank test of the 
equality of survivor functions across states strongly rejects the null hypothesis that 
they are the same.  While the non-monotonic raw hazard calls into question the 
choice of the Weibull distribution, it appears the introduction of covariates controls 
for aspects inducing the non-monotonicity and alleviates concerns about the use of 
the Weibull distribution.   
 Table 10 reports estimates, assuming the Weibull distribution155, of the time 
conditional probability of adopting a home rule charter once it is made available to a 
municipality.  The reported estimates are hazard ratios.  If the hazard ratio is greater 
than one, then the covariate has a positive effect on the probability of the municipality 
adopting a home rule charter, and if it is less than one then increases in the variable 
have a negative effect on the adoption of a home rule charter.   
 The results offer support for the hypothesis that municipal-level 
characteristics are related to the propensity to adopt a home rule charter.  Consistent 
patterns across samples and regressions include the positive and significant effect of 
the crucial variables -- population, population growth, and gross debt less sinking 
                                                
155 Estimates of p, the duration dependence parameter, are always significantly different than 1.  This 
rejects the use of the exponential distribution in favor of the Weibull distribution.  Using the 1890 data, 
there is a significant negative duration dependence, while the panel data yields a positive duration 
dependence after controlling for the covariates.  This is likely due to the non-random sample resulting 
in only large municipalities in the panel dataset. 
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fund per capita-- on the probability of adopting home rule.  Similar to the probit and 
linear probability results, the duration results suggest it is important to include 
variables which compare a municipality to the averag  municipality in its state, as 
well as the set of political variables.  The variables in these groups are often not 
individually significant, but are jointly significant at the 1% level and, thus, are 
important controls.   
 Columns (1) and (4) omit state and region fixed effects, columns (2) and (5) 
include state fixed effects, and columns (3) and (6) include region effects.  The 
argument for focusing on the specification with state fixed effects remains valid for 
the duration model, but the results are qualitatively the same across specifications.
 The use of time dummy variables in the duration model allows for the 
flexibility of a piecewise hazard rate, where the baseline hazard rate can change over 
time.  A priori, it is more appropriate to model the decision of to adopt a home rule 
charter as being independent of historical time.   A version of the duration model that 
includes these time dummy variables is presented in column (7).  The estimates, 
while less significant, reflect the same patterns shown previously.   
 I have also run a semi-parametric Cox proportional hazard model to check the 
robustness of my parametric model results.  In the semi-parametric model, the 
restrictions are only on the functional form of thecovariates, not the distribution of 
failure times.156  The concern is the presence of a large number of censored data 
observations.  The parametric form imposes a form on the distribution of failure times 
                                                
156 Some researchers hesitate to use the semi-parametric odel when there are tied ending times, an 
issue I have in my data as many municipalities adopt a home rule charter in the same year.  Stata 
utilizes the exact partial method in handling ties.  However, the method can produce incorrect 
calculations when risk pools are large and there are many ties (Cleves (2003), p 150).    
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after the last observed time period, in this case 1935. Non-parametric models 
(including the Cox model) do not make assumptions about the form of the hazard for 
the censored observations.  This is a concern when the hazard is estimated on a small 
number of known “failures” and results in a poorly representative hazard.  What we 
are most interested in is the best prediction of the hazard, not necessarily the best 
estimates of the covariates.  However, the covariate coefficients in the Cox model are 
very similar to those from the parametric models.  The absence of changes to the 
fundamental results eases concerns about the appropriateness of the parametric model 
assumptions. 
 
4.10 Comparing Municipalities in Home Rule and Non-Home Rule 
 States 
 
 The central hypothesis is that states with a higher variance in municipal-level 
taste for home rule and states where municipalities have a strong taste for home rule 
are more likely to adopt home rule.  Table 11 summarizes the evidence on the 
predictions drawn from the econometric estimates.  The taste for home rule is 
estimated using the coefficient estimates from the specification that includes state 
fixed effects.  The evidence suggests: (1) home rule states show greater variance in 
the predicted municipal preferences and (2) home rule states have stronger 
preferences for home rule.  The variance of municipal preferences in home rule states 
is always greater than the variance in non-home rule states.   The strength of home 
rule preference is always higher for the municipalities in home rule states. The choice 
of econometric model or the use of cross-sectional r panel data makes no difference.  
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Across all specifications, municipalities in home rule states have more heterogeneous 
tastes for home rule when compared to municipalities n states that did not adopt 
home rule. 
 At a more detailed level, Figures 7-9 present pairs of graphs for each 
econometric estimator.  The graphs plot the kernel density distributions of the 
municipal-level predicted values for home rule states and non-home rule states for 
various specifications.  Figure 10 shows the distribu ions of predicted probabilities of 
adopting a home rule charter implied by the probit estimates.  The comparison reveals 
two things.  First, the distribution of municipalities in home rule states has greater 
weight on the right hand side of the probability distribution, showing that there are 
more municipalities in home rule states with a strong preference for home rule.  
Municipalities in non-home rule states are more concentrated near a value of .1, 
indicating that many municipalities in these states do not have a strong preference for 
home rule.  Second, municipalities in home rule state  have greater variance in their 
predicted probabilities.   
 The graphs in Figure 11 present the distribution of predicted probabilities 
implied by linear probability models.  While the range of predicted probabilities is no 
longer restricted to the interval [0,1], the distributions reinforce the probit model 
results in Figure 10.  Figure 12 uses the hazard moel estimates to predict the 
conditional survival function for each municipality.  The value of one minus the 
predicted survival function yields the probability that a municipality adopts a home 
rule charter before 1935.  The conclusion remains unchanged; again, we see a greater 
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strength of preference and higher variance of preference in home rule states relative 
to non-home rule states.  
 
4.11 Application to Laboratory Federalism 
 
 In 1932, Justice Brandeis referred to the states as laboratories, who could 
independently experiment with social and economic programs without interfering 
with the larger federal government.  Political scientists have explored the issue of 
laboratory federalism, testing the diffusion of inst tutional innovation and the 
determinants of the adoption of institutions across states and time.157  Diffusion 
models often posit an S-shaped cumulative distribution function.158 The shape is 
based on two opposing effects.  First, there could be social pressure which induces 
take-up of the innovation, resulting in positive duration dependence.  Second, there 
can be normal negative duration dependence, seen in many economic applications 
such as unemployment status.  The anecdotal laboratory federalism story can be 
empirically tested by utilizing a hazard model and looking for an underlying bell-
shaped hazard function.   
 In the present analysis of home rule, we can consider institutional diffusion at 
both the local and the state level.  At the local-level, we have estimated the 
probability of a municipality adopting a home rule charter based on a host of 
municipal-level characteristics.  These previous empirical results assume that 
municipalities act independently, and the adoption of home rule is based only on a 
municipality’s own attributes.  However, municipalities that are more inclined to 
                                                
157 Oates (1999), p 1133. 
158 See for example Gray (1973) and Diekmann (1989). 
 113 
 
adopt a home rule charter at some point may adopt a charter earlier if they want to 
emulate the initial adopters.  Thus, the timing of h me rule charter may be driven by 
imitation rather than necessity.  Municipalities that are never likely to adopt because 
of their underlying characteristics remain a part of the decreasing hazard rate.  Thus, 
within a state we might expect to see a bell shaped curve representing the adoption of 
home rule, the increasing part of the curve accounting for the diffusion and early 
duplication of home rule and the decreasing section all wing for the negative duration 
dependence.   
 A semi-parametric Cox model controls for covariates and estimate the 
underlying baseline hazard rate.  In the previous analysis, we avoided using semi-
parametric modeling because it was not the best for obtaining unbiased predictions 
for out-of-sample municipalities.  However, we are int rested in the true hazard based 
on observed data, so semi-parametric modeling is appropriate.  Figure 13 presents the 
smoothed estimated hazard function from the Cox model run on the 1890 data 
evaluated at the mean of all the covariates.  Once controlling for the set of covariates, 
the raw hazard retains a bell-shape.  The graph of t e hazard indicates there is 
something left unexplained that is causing an initial ncrease in the adoption of home 
rule charters.  The residual could be attributable to the laboratory federalism idea of 
early imitation.  At the same time, the initial increase in the hazard could be evidence 
of a learning effect.  It may take a few years for municipalities to understand and 
make full use of home rule chartering, resulting in an initial increase of home rule 
activity as additional municipalities figure out how to make use of the new institution. 
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 There may also be diffusion of the institution of h me rule across states.   For 
example, legislators in the state of Washington copied the text of the California 
constitution word for word because they saw the success of home rule in the large 
cities of California.159  Thus, perhaps home rule was not driven by local need in 
Washington; rather, it was emulation of a successful early adopter by an inherently 
innovative state.  Data were assembled on when each st te adopted home rule, and a 
graph of the raw smoothed hazard function is shown in Figure 14.  Significant 
increasing duration dependence is not shown in the la e 19th and early 20th century, 
but rather begins in the 1950s and continues through the 1970s.  The later home rule 
movement sought a very liberal grant of home rule athority to municipalities, often 
including additional fiscal powers.  The simple raw hazard presented here abstracts 
from the host of variables that contribute to the state adoption of home rule.  Most 
notably, the local-level preference for home rule that was shown to have affected the 
adoption of home rule in the early period is not incorporated.  Without accounting for 
other factors, a naïve interpretation would conclude that much of the adoption of 
home rule could be driven by imitation of early adopters, apparently resulting in 
increasing duration dependence.  However, our prior analysis shows that while the 
adoption of home rule may be affected by national trends, these state-level decisions 




                                                
159 McBain (1915), p 396. 
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 Home rule was an integral institution in the municipal reform movement of 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  States granted home rule so that 
municipalities had the option of self-chartering and the ability to independently 
determine their desired structure and functions.  This paper examines home rule from 
a new perspective.  Fiscal federalism theory predicts that a state grants home rule 
when heterogeneity across municipalities cannot be accommodated under uniform, 
general legislation. 
 The results in this paper confirm the hypothesis that states with more 
heterogeneous municipal-level preference for home rule were more likely to 
incorporate home rule in their constitutions.  A uniq e municipal-level dataset is used 
to generate a latent preference for home rule using probit, linear probability and 
duration estimation.  Predicted municipal-level prefe nces are compared across 
states; they show that states that adopted constitutional home rule had stronger and 
more heterogeneous preferences.  While there are many factors in a state’s decision of 
whether or not to adopt a home rule charter, the evidence presented in this paper 
consistently suggests that municipal preferences within a state played an important 
role in the decision.  This paper provides an empirical explanation of policy 
decentralization and highlights the importance of considering both within state and 
across state heterogeneity in the endogenous determination of institutions.   
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5 School Districts 
5.1 The School District as a Corporate Body 
 
 School districts numbered 130,000 in the 1920s.  By 1952 the number shrank 
to 67,355 and in 2002 there were only 13,522 school districts.  Researchers have 
analyzed the drastic reduction in number of governmts in order to study the 
mechanisms of consolidation and integrations of politica  units.160  Few, however, 
have looked at the mechanisms involved in the creation of these 130,000 districts.  
The aggregate growth in the number of school district  is inherently a function of 
population growth and the Western movement.  However, th  variation in the growth 
of school districts across states can not be simply explained by increased demand.  
School districts were a means to respond to the demand side shift, but states 
responded to increased demand in different ways.  The response differed based on the 
formal established relationship between states and its school districts.   
 The rise of school districts in the United States is not without hypotheses.  
Goldin and Katz, while focused on educational outcomes, point to democracy and 
decentralization as factors in the success of American education.  However, these 
general reasons for the growth in educational activity overall fail to account for 
specific mechanisms which fueled the differential growth across states.  Recently, 
Lindert and Go (2007) used county level data to empirically investigate the reasons 
why the United States became a leader in education instead of other developed 
                                                
160Gordon and Knight (2006) use an econometric framework to model the merger decisions involved 
in this political consolidation. Kenny and Schmidt (1994) look at the period between 1950 and 1980 
and determine the reduction was due to changes in population density, state aid and the political 
influence of teachers’ unions. Alesina, Baqir and Hoxby (2004) use heterogeneity and economies of 
scale to predict the number of political jurisdictions in an area. 
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countries in Europe.  They highlight three reasons: affordability of schooling, local 
autonomy and political voice.  While these reasons seem to fit the profile of supply-
side influences which would vary by state, they instead relate them to how these 
influenced the differential demand, measured by enrollments, for education in the 
United States. 
 While the demand side has been used to explain the driv  for providing 
education, researchers have not investigated how the changing institutional 
environment affects the supply side.  The variation in how education is provided in 
states, and as a result the variation in education outcomes, could be attributable to 
both different preferences for education as well a different abilities to provide that 
education.  Laws for school districts range from the ability to tax and spend, the 
opportunity to change boundaries, and the recognition as a corporate body.  Lindert 
and Go caution that laws relating to schools and school districts should not be used to 
indicate change, as the laws often occur after a practice has already been started (such 
as levying taxes for schools).  While there are a fw maverick communities that chose 
to independently pursue things before legally recognized, it is still the case that the 
adoption of laws will have a marked affect on the organizational abilities of all 
communities and districts.  Any investigation of such institutional changes needs to 
recognize the endogenous nature of school laws, partially eflected by some districts 
acting on laws before they are formally implemented.   
 Accounting for the increase in the number of school districts to 130,000 is not 
the interesting story to explain.  While the aggregat  number is impressive, the story 
of growth cannot be told in aggregate.  Due to different political and economics 
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conditions, school district creation varied across states.  Underlying the process of 
district creation is an evolving set of institutions within the state and local 
environment.  An implication of the historical institu ional changes is that it can 
impact the future likelihood of certain institutional changes.  Thus, consolidation in 
the 20th century could be endogenous to the process by which those districts were 
created in the 19th century.  Furthermore, this endogeneity could impact the way we 
think about the role of school districts on educational outcomes in a contemporary 
framework.  Understanding the origin of school districts can also help us shape the 
bigger picture of the state relationship to all local governments.  School districts were 
often the government responsible for the provision of the initial public good in newly 
settled areas, and this role likely influenced the way future local governments grew 
from these communities. 
 
5.2 Schools Districts as Local Governments  
 
 This thesis considers the changing state-local relationship, specifically looking 
at constitutional changes beginning in the nineteenth century which affected the grant 
of power and autonomy to local governments.  School districts are a piece of the local 
government puzzle.  Understanding how school district  are created and when they 
were created can shed light on how different states initially handled decentralization 
of power to local governments.  
 Kaestle argued that decentralization of power given to local school districts  
depended on the trust of citizens of their state government.  If citizens trusted their 
state-level government, then education was centralized; if citizens distrusted the state, 
 119 
 
then education was decentralized.161  A citizen’s trust in their state government is 
hard to quantify.  However, a citizen would be more lik ly to trust the state 
government if it was composed of legislators who had similar beliefs, preferences and 
goals.  Thus, the degree of homogeneity within a state could serve as a proxy to trust.  
One could think about homogeneity being measured by income distribution, race, or 
the percent of people living in rural areas.  The more homogeneous a state, the less 
the citizens would be worried about the state governm nt imposing unequal tax 
burdens or providing different levels of education t  different localities.  If there was 
a great heterogeneity in preferences, possibly driven by the rural-urban divide, then 
there may be increased resistance to consolidation.  Anecdotal evidence in some 
states in many cases the farmers did not want to becontrolled by city interests, so 
they resisted consolidation and laws which would make consolidation easier. 
 The same type of struggle over differential prefernces can be seen for local 
governments in general.  The home rule movement was spearheaded in the late 19th 
century by municipalities who did not want to be contr lled by dominating rural 
interests in the state legislature.  In that case, greater heterogeneity across urban-rural 
interests led to grants by the state legislature of autonomy to local government.  The 
same could be seen decades earlier with respect to s hool districts; greater 
heterogeneity resulted in more decentralized control by local, independent school 
districts.  For example, Indiana was one of the first states to successfully convert to a 
more centralized township system of school districts in 1852. At the same time, 
unlike many of its neighboring states, Indiana did not seek out home rule powers for 
                                                
161 Kaestle (1983), p 197. 
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its local governments.162  While only one example, the struggle for power across 
rural-urban interests specifically, or heterogeneous preferences generally, influenced 
both the grant of available power to local governmets and the action taken by local 
government to be a more autonomous entity.  Within state heterogeneity across local 
areas motivated decentralization of power to municipalities through home rule; the 
same within state heterogeneity motivated local areas to resist consolidation of school 
districts. 
 
5.3 The Creation of School Districts: Historical Factors 
5.3.1 Importance of Schooling 
 
 Schooling in the United States finds its origins as a Republican ideal.  As 
Tyack describes, the United States did not have perpetual institutions in general in 
place at the time of independence.  There was no structure of hereditary power, nor 
was there an established church, a large standing army, or a strong executive 
bureaucracy to be the foundation of the new governmnt.163  But during the 
foundation of the United States, there was a call for creation of a specific type of 
public institution- the school.  Thomas Jefferson believed in the power of schools to 
help teach children how to be loyal citizens and how t  grow up to be leaders.  While 
there were different political interests in terms of h w the new country should provide 
in general for the common good, the appeal of common schools was that it was a 
universal goal.  As western lands were settled, schooling continued to be of great 
importance, both in terms of attracting settlers out west but also in terms of educating 
                                                
162 Home rule legislation was passed in Indiana in 1980. 
163 Tyack (1991), p 14. 
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those settlers out west about the benefits of a civil society.  While the goal may have 
been universal, the method of implementation was not. 
 
5.3.2 Federal Role: Land Ordinance and School Funds 
 
 The federal government has never assumed a large role with respect to 
education, but its support for education was evident since the Land Ordinance of 
1785.  The act reserved one section of each township for the purpose of providing 
funds for the maintenance of public schools in the township.  Each township as 
surveyed by the United States government was six miles square.  The township was 
divided into thirty-six sections, with section sixteen allotted to the state to generate 
revenues (through sale or rent) for the spending on education.  Tyack identifies this 
grant as the origin of the federal government’s active involvement in promoting 
public schools as a form of internal improvement.164  One question has been whether 
the land grant for education was rooted in the federal government’s desire to have a 
hand in educational policy, or if it was just a way to draw settlers out West.  
Ultimately, it does not matter if it was the federal government wanting to support 
educational attainment in the West or if it was potential settlers demanding 
guaranteed financial help in providing schooling.  Either way land grants were a way 
for education to be an accessible and affordable institution in the newly settled lands. 
 The money coming in from the land grants was funneled into a common 
school fund in every state.  These state funds werecr ated through provisions in the 
state constitution which allocated revenues from federal land sales.  The school funds 
                                                
164 Tyack (1991), p 31. 
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were often supplemented from other sources of income, for example, lottery proceeds 
and marriage licenses.165   Twelve states directed the proceeds they received from the 
sale of federal lands in new states, which ranged from 3-10% of the purchase price, 
into the common school fund.166  The original 13 states also established school funds.  
Virginia’s common school fund was financed initially by the federal government 
repaying the state for expenditures made for the War of 1812.  Ultimately, the 
revenue from the land grants and the common school fund did not contribute much to 
education spending.  Tyack calculates that in the late 19th century they combined for 
about 6% of total school expenditures.167  And, unfortunately, in many cases there 
were no institutional constraints on the school funds to prevent the money from being 
squandered by corrupt officials. 
 
5.3.3 Patterns of Settlement 
 
 Before thinking about how education was provided, it is necessary to think 
about the de facto structure of local government that would underlie new efforts to 
provide schooling.  Richardson’s research focuses on how school governance differs 
across states, and exploits demographic patterns and differences in the initial structure 
of state and local government.  In exploring the variation in the creation of school 
districts, it will be important to keep in mind the basic story of how population 
dispersion and local governance differed across regions.  
 In the south, plantation agriculture generated compact settlements that were 
widely dispersed.  Collective public action was most likely at the county level, where 
                                                
165Cubberley (1927), p 407. 
166 Tyack (1991), p 34. 
167 Tyack (1991), p 35. 
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there was enough concentration of people with politica  power to get things 
coordinated.168  The basic structure of "local" government in the south drastically 
differed from the north and west where county-level ar as were subdivided in smaller 
electoral or educational districts.  A second distinction can be made across states in 
the north.  The original New England colonies differed from the newer states to the 
west by the simple fact that the original colonies were settled organically as settlers 
congregated in new towns.  The Midwestern settlement was a function of the 
surveyed townships and the section boundaries drawn as a result of the process.  
Section number 16, reserved for the provision of schools, quickly gave each township 
its own identity.  Richardson simply defines the difference in local government 
origination: "As New England township life grew up around the church, so western 
localism finds its nucleus in the school system."169  
 
5.4 Laws for Creation of Independent School Districts 
 
 The US Constitution made no provision for education either in terms of a role 
for the federal government or responsibility to thestates.  State governments 
subsequently took on the task of providing education to their populations.  Public land 
grant states were often required to have a pledge to provide education in their newly 
written constitutions.  However, there was no oversight or established body of school 
law.  State legislatures individually determined how their school systems would be 
structured.  States gave authority and autonomy to newly created and recognized 
school districts.  These independent school district  were, and still are, the most 
                                                
168 Richardson, “Settlement Patterns” (1984), p 191. 
169  Richardson, “Settlement Patterns” (1984), p 194. 
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fundamental component of a school system, "a body plitic and corporate…assigned 
a name or number, and possesses certain legal powers…right to make contracts, to 
sue and be sued, and to purchase and hold property for school purposes."170 The 
importance of the corporate status of a school district cannot be understated.  With a 
corporate status, the courts recognized the district  as a separate entity from any 
township, town, city or district formed for other pur oses, even if the boundaries were 
coterminous.  The progress creating these corporate entities and method by which 
school districts could operate differed across state  nd across time. 
 The early colonial states differ from states that were admitted later, as the laws 
enacted in these original states were often a functio  of the practices already on the 
ground at the time.  For example, the colonies of Connecticut and Massachusetts both 
ordered towns to maintain a school.  The development of districts over time is similar 
in these two states.  In 1766 Connecticut authorized parishes to subdivide into school 
districts.  In 1794, the state recognized the separate existence of school districts and 
granted them authority to locate schoolhouses and levy taxes.  However, it was not 
until 1839 that these districts became bodies corporate and granted the power to 
independently manage their schools.  Massachusetts moved a bit earlier by legalizing 
the district system in 1789 and granting full corporate powers to the districts in 1817.  
In other colonies, schools were formed before laws were in place.  Thus, laws which 
empowered townspeople to form districts, such as Vermont in 1782 and New 
Hampshire in 1807, should be seen as legislation which gave public 
acknowledgement to what was already instituted through private motivation.  The 
common thread among these colonial governments and t tes is that education was 
                                                
170 Cubberley (1914), p 182. 
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provided at a local level, and often provided befor it was legally recognized at the 
state level.  As Cubberley notes, the laws of these early states were "closely in 
harmony of the spirit of the time, which demanded loca  self-government and local 
rights wherever possible."171 
 A different education landscape appears in states hat were formed as bundles 
of surveyed townships.  In these types of states where population was growing rapidly 
and new areas were continuously being settled, it was most important to have 
permissive laws for the establishment of a school district.  Indiana, in 1824, allowed 
for the incorporation of the surveyed townships, vested the proceeds from the sale of 
the public school lands, and gave them authority to subdivide into districts.  In Illinois 
creation of school districts within the greater township was a fairly straightforward 
process: "The law provides for the election, in each s hool district, of three persons as 
school directors.  When elected and qualified, they b come a corporation, and have 
perpetual succession.  Their duties are plainly defined by the law, and may be 
performed by a majority of its members."172 The idea was that each little pocket of 
settlers could determine for themselves whether or not to have school, and if so, 
quickly have a means to decide where and how to build the schoolhouse, how long 
the school year should be and how much tax should be evied on the residents of the 
districts.   
 Ease of creation was key in allowing these new communities to have control 
over education, an important public good that they d sired.  Cubberley hypothesizes 
that one of the reasons it made sense to have the original ease of district creation was 
                                                
171 Cubberley (1927), p 148. 
172 Glidden vs. Hopkings, 47 Illinois, 525. 
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that it was not cost prohibitive to do so.  Small communities could tax themselves at a 
fairly low rate to build a modest schoolhouse, hire a r latively cheap teacher and 
provide the basic level of education for their children.  Over time, the costs of the 
inputs to education rose, as did the expectations fr the quantity and quality of 
education provided.  The simple creation of new school districts was an important 
legal structure, which would have implications for the future ability of citizens to 
consolidate school districts. 
 
The Utilization of Permissive Laws 
 
 The growth in the number of school districts in the 19th century can be 
partially attributed to the thousands of communities hat formed independent, one 
room schoolhouses under permissive school district laws.173  These new school 
districts were important not only for expansion of education, but also as a mechanism 
for communities to be established.  Fuller and Cubberley both note how historians 
have not tackled the story of rural school districts because they were often thought to 
be a function of an established community rather than means to for a new local 
government to take root.  However, the school district often provided a concrete, 
persistent body politic where none had existed before.  The roots of the initial rural 
district grew into the bigger idea of a local government.  As Fuller describes, the rural 
school districts were "invaluable laboratories of democracy in which rural Americans 
learned the importance of their vote, how to make lws, and how to govern 
themselves."174  Provision of a common public education required ad ressing issues 
                                                
173 From the beginning of the simple district system, there was an extreme idea of local pride and self-
government, and out of this came a multiplicity of small schools.  Chamberlain (1913), p 309. 
174 Fuller (1982), p 45. 
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such as taxation, contingency funds, length of a school term, and the construction and 
location of buildings.  Even the physical centrality of the schoolhouse played into the 
growth of a local government by providing an accessible meeting place for other 
community business to be discussed. 
 The formation of these new school districts varied by state, but there was a 
general pattern that was a function of the way the land grant states were surveyed.  As 
Cubberley describes the simple process, farmers would settle on their acreage within 
the new township.  A group of three to five families who lived within walking 
distance of each other would jointly decide that they wanted to operate a school for 
their children.  The parents would then take it upon themselves to build the 
schoolhouse and furniture, hire a teacher and decided the boarding-around 
arrangements for the teacher.  The institution of the district allowed for the 
community effort to be legally recognized and mainti  corporate status.  These 
highly localized districts grew exponentially on the frontier, as a district borders were 
defined by the "length of a child’s legs,"175  in other words the size of the district was 
constrained by how far the children could feasibly walk to school.  The importance of 
the rural, often one room school district carried through to the 20th century, as in 
1914, half of the children in the United States were still attending rural schools.176 
 
5.5 The State Organization of School Districts 
 
 Another aspect of the school district creation is the level at which these 
districts were organized.  The degree of centralization or decentralization in school 
                                                
175 Cubberley (1914), p 181. 
176 Cubberley (1914). P 166. 
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district organization has implications for how the district is financed as well as the 
type of education which is provided.  In the early 19th century, the common practice 
was either for states to have a district system or a t wnship system.  The district 
system represents an extremely decentralized creation of school districts, whereas the 
township system allowed for more centralized governance over a larger geographic 
area.  Additional differences among states can be seen in the late 19th and early 20th 
century when some states allowed for additional forms of consolidation.  Some states 
changed their system of school district organization o allow for consolidation at a 
more centralized level, such as the county or metropolitan area.   
  
5.5.1 The District System 
 
 As discussed before, permanent school funds were prsent in most states from 
the early 19th century.  Unfortunately, these school funds were often mismanaged, 
and quickly became depleted.  If local schools could not count on the state school 
fund to help finance the local provision of education, then the funds had to be 
collected by the local community to be spent on the local community.  If a school 
district had to finance itself, it also needed to have the power to levy taxes.  In the 
original colonies, where the notion of school districts first originated, districts derived 
all their powers from the central town body.177  An important evolution with respect 
to school district laws was not only the recognitio of being an independent corporate 
body, but also that the public corporation could initiate fiscal policy.  As Cubberley 
noted, by 1830 to 1835, the district form of organiz tion was everywhere in control 
                                                
177 Cubberley (127), p 147. 
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and at the height of its powers.178  Under these permissive school district laws enacted 
by various states, general taxation of property was permitted by vote. 
 As compulsory attendance laws started to become enact d across states during 
the mid 19th century,179  there had to be a compensating action with respect to 
taxation in order to guarantee that the promise of ducation would be financed.180   
Thus, the permissive nature of taxation turned into compulsory taxation of 
property.181  The fascinating innovation of the district system is that it was a viable 
solution to the requirement by the states of mandatory education, subsequent 
mandatory property taxation, and the grant of power by the state to citizens to 
organize their own independent school districts.  A Fuller notes, free public 
education was not feasible had the farmers not beenconfident that they could still 
control school matters through the district school system.182 
 As time passed, the simplicity of the district system started to show its 
shortcomings; it was not the best solutions for all people and all places.  For one, 
because district taxation was originally based on pr perty taxation, there was a 
burden placed on those households that did not have children, as they would be 
paying for others’ use of the school system.  Other problems, as identified by 
                                                
178 Cubberley (1934), p 235. 
179 The first compulsory attendance law was enacted in Massachusetts in 1852, followed closely by 
New York (1853). In the 1860s both DC and Vermont enacted laws. The 1870s saw many states pass 
such laws: Michigan, New Hampshire, Washington, Connecticut, New Mexico, Nevada, California, 
Kansas, Maine, New Jersey, Wyoming, Ohio, and Wiscon in. The last group of states to pass such 
laws was a group of Southern states from1915-1918: Alabama, Florida, South Carolina, Texas, 
Georgia, Louisiana, and Mississippi. 
180 Fuller documents the move to free public education by the Middle Border states: Iowa was first in 
1846, followed by Wisconsin (1848), Minnesota (1858), Kansas (1861), and Nebraska (1867). In most 
of the older states, the transition to free public education happened in the 1850s: Indiana (1852), Ohio
(1854) and Illinois (1855). 
181 For example, in Indiana a permissive taxation law was passed in 1824, amended in 1836, and 
repealed in 1837. In the 1850s, Indiana residents slowly became required to pay school taxes. 
182 Fuller (1982), p 41. 
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Cubberley, were that rural education was expensive, hortsighted, inconsistent, and 
unprogressive, the taxing unit was too small, and there were an excessive number of 
school officers.  By moving structural and functional control to a higher level of 
government, a school system could not only equalize the burden of providing 
education, but could also provide more equal levels of education across rich and poor 
areas.  It could also operate more efficiently by taking advantage of economies of 
scale in teaching and administration. 
 
5.5.2 The Township System 
 
 The township system was an attempt to revolutionize the piecemeal district 
system by allowing districts to take advantage of ec nomies of scale.  It also gave 
districts the ability to equalize the tax rate over a larger area.  Fuller notes the 
historical reasons for why citizens wanted to move towards a more centralized district 
system: to broaden the tax base, equalize the provision of education across smaller 
districts, eliminate old within district disputes, diminish the proliferation of small 
schools, have improved supervision of schools and also because rural school board 
members were often inefficient.183  As Goldin and Katz have noted in their work, the 
township system also provided the necessary conditis for high schools to be built. 
 The township system saw individual, independent school districts 
relinquishing their corporate power to the township.  The transfer of power from an 
independent school district to a township district could have different structural 
outcomes.  One option was that the independent school district could close their 
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community school and begin transporting their children to a more central township 
school.  An alternate outcome did not involve the loss of the local school; there would 
just be an over-arching school district which would control the structure and function 
of all schools within the new township district.  
 Experimentation with the township system was center d in Indiana, Ohio and 
Iowa in the 1850s.  In Ohio, not much changed functio ally.  Corporate powers were 
indeed transferred to the township, but the subdistrict level still maintained direct 
management over the individual schools.  However, th  township system in Indiana 
and Iowa dramatically changed the educational system, most visibly taking away 
control and decision-making from the local level and centralizing management at the 
township level.184  Farmers in these two states initially resisted loss f control over 
their children’s education, and appealed for a resto ation of the local district system. 
 Iowa ended up allowing communities to return to the prior independent 
district system.  In 1872, the Iowa state legislature changed the law and allowed any 
township to return to the old independent district if a majority of the voters approved.  
Within the first 18 months, 119 of the 1700 Iowa townships had returned to the old 
system.185  Indiana, on the other hand, resisted a full reversal of the township system.  
At the time, Indiana was heralded as having the most efficient rural school system in 
the Midwest.  In retrospect, the move to the township ystem may have had negative 
impacts on the quality of education provided.  The av rage length of school, teachers’ 
wages, and the percentage of the population in school were all below average.  Fuller 
notes that there was a lack of interest in raising local taxes to finance an improved 
                                                
184 In Iowa, in little more than a year’s time, more than 3000 independent school districts were replaced 
with 933 township districts. Fuller (1982), p 115. 
185 Fuller (1982), p 118. 
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educational system, and as a result, the state school system had to rely heavily on 
state-level taxes for support.186  A possible reason was because the township system 
reduced the tax-benefit link in the provision of education.  Citizens were more 
resistant to increased taxes because that money would be distributed across all 




 Researchers have been interested in accounting for the drastic reduction in the 
number of school districts over the 20th century.  The tale of consolidation 
throughout the 20th century has been explained through urbanization and the 
advantages of economies of scale in providing high school education.  What has been 
left relatively undefined is the institutional change necessary in order to allow for 
consolidation.  The consolidation of school districts within a state often started as a 
single case being brought to the state requesting special legislation for 
consolidation.187  The state then made the process of consolidation ccessible to all 
interested districts through the passage of general laws.  
 The story of legal consolidation is historically tied to the petition to transport 
kids to school.  Initially, consolidation was not based on increasing educational 
attainment or improving the quality of schooling, but was motivated by cost savings.  
In the late 19th century, it became less costly (and more feasible) to transport kids to 
a more centralized school than to pay for education at a one-room schoolhouse.188  In 
the original grants by state legislatures, school districts had the power to raise money 
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for the operation of a one-room schoolhouse.  However, the school district did not 
originally have the power to pay for the transportation to centrally-located school 
outside of the local district.  The laws to allow for consolidation of schools began in 
Massachusetts in 1869.  The general law in Massachuetts allowed the following: 
"Any town in this Commonwealth may raise by taxation or otherwise, and 
appropriate money to be expended by the School Committee in their discretion, in 
providing for the conveyance of pupils to and from the public schools."189  As 
Cubberley notes, noticeable changes in Massachusetts began in 1875 as rural 
communities began to close up rural schools and transport pupils to a central school.  
However, consolidation was not a widespread practice until 1890.  Following in the 
steps of Massachusetts, laws were enacted in 25 states from 1894 to 1910 which 
provided for the use of public funds in order to transport students to a consolidated 
school.  
 In 1892, Ohio, like Massachusetts, also saw the advantages of transporting 
children to a central school.  The township of Kingsville was trying to determine 
whether or not to build a new schoolhouse for subdistrict 4.  The problem was that 
there were not many children in subdistrict 4, and it did not make sense to build a new 
schoolhouse if it was not going to serve many students.  A suggestion was made to 
close subdistrict 4 and, alternatively, send the children to the main school in central 
Kingsville.  Both the residents of the subdistrict and those of the central district 
thought it was a good idea.  However, the subdistrict did not have the authority to use 
public education money to transport the children to the central school.190  After two 
                                                
189 Cubberley (1927), p 245. 
190 Fuller (1982), p 228. 
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years, the Ohio state legislature passed a law which allowed for public education 
money to be used for transportation.  At first, the general law was couched in very 
specific terms: it was restricted to a township with a population between 1710 and 
1715 and the county population must be between 43,650 and 46,660.  In 1896 this 
"general" law was extended to apply to three counties.  By 1898 it was made 
accessible to the entire state.191  By the first decade of the twentieth century, states 
across the Middle West were experimenting with consolidation.  In Iowa, twenty-
eight counties pursued consolidation, and in Nebraska twenty-one counties decided to 
try consolidation.  No state utilized the new institutional arrangement with more 
intensity than Indiana.  By 1902, two-thirds of thecounties had consolidated schools.  
Indiana allowed for the proliferation of consolidation because the township system 
was already in operation. 
 After 15 or 20 years, consolidation had noticeably taken hold in some states 
more than others.  Cubberley groups states where "rmarkable results" have been 
achieved and those where little has been accomplished.  Those making use of their 
newfound ability to consolidate (Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio and Texas) 
are those where education was predominantly county or township based.  States 
where district consolidation was harder were those wh re the independent district 
system had firm roots (California, Illinois, Kansas, Nebraska, Missouri, Oregon and 
Wisconsin).  As Cubberley simply concludes, the stronger the district system, the 
smaller has been the success in establishing consolidated schools.192  Thus, when we 
                                                
191 Cubberley (1927), p 246. 
192 Cubberley (1914), p 232. 
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seek to explain the propensity for school districts to consolidate in the 20th century, 
we need to consider what drove the relative strength of he district system in the first 
place. 
 
5.6 Future Empirical Approach  
 
 School district growth has been researched by compiling independent 
regional, state or local accounts, but these stories have not been comprehensively and 
jointly analyzed to uncover an overarching pattern.  In looking to expand the 
statistical research with respect to school district , it is natural to begin with the 
econometric studies of school district consolidation.  The comprehensive study by 
Kenny and Schmidt looks specifically at consolidation n school districts from 1950 
to 1980.  They use county level census and school district data to explain the variation 
in the number of school districts across states and time.  They specifically target two 
sets of explanatory variables: those that represent possible economies of scale in 
schooling and those that proxy for population homogeneity.  The authors use several 
measures to account for potential cost savings with respect to economies of scale: the 
number of rural highway miles per square mile, population density, the ratio of the 
school age population to the local population, and the fraction of the labor force 
involved in farming.  To measure heterogeneity within t e state, and thus the degree 
to which there are varied preferences with respect to schooling, the authors use an 
income ratio measure, which is the difference betwen the third and first quartiles of 
the family income distribution, divided by the second quartile.  Taking advantage of 
economies of scale would result in consolidation and  fewer number of school 
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districts.  Heterogeneity, on the other hand, would indicate a push towards more 
school districts in order to have a better match of pre erences.  The authors find 
support for both hypotheses.  
 A key element that has been missing from the empirical work thus far has 
been controls on the supply side of the market for school districts.  The rich historical 
literature on the exponential growth in the number of school districts, enriched mainly 
by the work of Goldin, has described a fairly intuitive story of increased demand and 
education systems taking advantage of economies of scale.  More recently, Lindert 
and Go tackled these demand side influences by empirically exploring county level 
variation in enrollments.  Researchers have abstracted from supply side of the 
equation, namely, the state laws which could encourage or restrict the growth and 
number of school districts.  This seems like a notable omission; the growth of school 
districts is only possible if the legal environment allows the creation of these bodies 
politic. 
 The next step is to look at the change by states in their school district 
incorporation laws which would directly affect the ability of citizens to form new 
districts.  In undertaking the analysis, it will beimportant to recognize that these 
school district laws are not exogenous events that were enacted by state legislatures.  
It will be important to incorporate the idea that these legislative actions are 
endogenously determined by underlying political, demographic, and social factors in 
each one of the states.  An investigation of these school districts laws, recognizing the 
endogenous nature of such institutional change, could subsequently add more 
information to the study of school district consolidation.  It seems likely that state 
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laws regarding the ease of consolidating school district  would be influenced by the 
historical relationship between the state and its grants to citizens with respect to 
school district incorporation.  If people were given the opportunity to create their own 
school districts with relative ease, then it seems likely that the state would also allow 
such citizens to consolidate under their own accord. 
 One may question why school district laws are important.  As seen from the 
perspective taken by previous researchers, districts are simply created when they are 
needed.  While a true statement, it misses the point that they can only be created if 
they are allowed to be created.  Why did Indiana not see much school district creation 
in the 1850s?  Was it because citizens of Indiana did not have the demand for 
education?  Rather than the demand explanation, it may have been because the state 
of Indiana had changed its laws to have a township ystem instead of a multitude of 
independent school districts.  These institutional details can be identified to help 
explain the differential growth of school districts across states and across time.  
Potentially, they can also help explain states’ differential rate of school district 





 This thesis explores the changing relationship betwe n state and local 
governments in the United States.  By viewing this opic through a fiscal federalism 
and political economy lens, we are able to learn more about why states chose 
different institutional structures for managing local governments.   In addition, this 
thesis adds to the historical account by identifying the variety of options states 
pursued and the myriad reasons that motivated change.  Both the narrative and 
econometric analysis show that outcomes vary depending on economic and political 
conditions within the state.    
 In Chapter 2, I document the different institutional structures states put in 
place for municipal governments.  The options included special legislation, general 
legislation with special legislation, strict general legislation, and the additional option 
of home rule.  The chapter also presented problems with maintaining a system of 
special legislation.  A state would be likely to seek an alternate option when the costs 
of special legislation exceeded the benefits. 
 Chapter 3 provides explanation for why states may have chosen different 
institutional arrangements.  The collected narratives convey that these institutional 
changes were not exogenously imposed on states, nor were they changes that all 
states adopted.  I consider the pattern of these changes, both across time and across 
regions.  Differences in the political and economic conditions triggered action by 
politicians and citizens to change the institutional arrangement.  Overall trends can be 
seen when looking across regions.  Looking within a region, we can see that 
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differences in specific political institutions, such as the rules of apportionment, 
correspond with changes to the state-municipal relationship.  
 In Chapter 4, I take a closer look at one example of institutional change, the 
adoption of home rule.  An empirical analysis shows that states with heterogeneity in 
local preferences were more likely to decentralize control through a constitutional 
home rule provision.  States with more homogeneous local preferences were more 
likely to find general legislation a suitable institu onal framework.  The analysis of 
home rule adoption is an empirical test of policy decentralization.  It provides 
evidence that fiscal federalism ideals are at work in actual policy implementation.   
 This thesis does more than just provide a check of theoretical predictions.  
This work contributes to the understanding of why states have different institutional 
constructs with respect to the state-local relationship.  There is not a universal answer 
for whether a state should use special legislation, ge eral legislation, or home rule to 
serve its municipalities.  In Chapter 5, we see that t ere is also not a universal 
solution to how states dealt with the creation and consolidation of school districts.  
We see that the choice of how to structure a constitution to handle local governments 
depends on the historical structure of local governme ts, the political atmosphere 
within the state legislature, and the variety of localities within a state.  A wide variety 
of localities adds complexity to the state’s problem of solving how to structure the 





Upper House Lower House
Georgia Population Geographic Geographic
Massachusetts Population Geographic Population
New Hampshire Population Population Geographic
New York Population Geographic Geographic
Pennsylvania Population Geographic Geographic
South Carolina Population Geographic Geographic
Connecticut Geographic Geographic Geographic
Delaware Geographic Geographic Geographic
Maryland Geographic Geographic Geographic
New Jersey Geographic Geographic Geographic
North Carolina Geographic Population Geographic
Rhode Island Geographic Geographic Geographic
Virginia Geographic Geographic Geographic
Notes:
Geographic apportionment indicates apportionment by county, parish, town, or city.
Population apportionment indicates apportionment based on number of people, freeholders, or taxable inhabitants.
Apportionment in 1812 is taken from Zagarri (1987), Appendix 4, p158-159.



















Prohibition of Special Legislation X X
Special and General Legislation X X
Strict General Legislation X X X
Decentralized Home Rule X X X X
Reasons for Choice of Framework








Class Grade Population basis
By which 
census
Names of Cities in Class
Population in 
1890
Number of acts 
for class in 1894
First 1 >200,000 1870 Cincinnati 296,908 43
First 2 90,000-200,000 1870 Cleveland 261,353 22
First 3 31,500-90,000 1870 Toledo 81,434 14
First 4 20,000-31,500 Any
Second 1 30,000-31,500 1870 Columbus 88,150 10
Second 2 20,000-30,500 1870 Dayton 61,220 12
Second 3 10,000-20,000 1870 (many cities in class) 25
Second 3a 28,000-33,000 1890 Springfield 31,897 6
Second 3b 16,000-18,000 1890 Hamilton 17,565 8
Second 4 5,000-20,000 1870 (many cities in class) 33
Second 4a 8,330-9,050 1890 Ashtabula 8,538 3
Notes: Data from table in Wilcox p 84.





SL GL SL GL SL GL HR
Delaware 1787 1897 1897
New Jersey 1787 1875 1875 1875 1875 1875
Pennsylvania 1787 1874 1874 1969 1874 1874 1922
Connecticut 1788 1965
Georgia 1788 1865 1945 1865 1865
Maryland 1788 1851 1851 1864 1864 1864 1954
New Hampshire 1788 1966
New York 1788 1846 1846 1874 1874 1874 1894
South Carolina 1788 1896 1868 1896 1896 1896 1896 1973
North Carolina 1789 1868 1868 1916 1971 1916 1916
Rhode Island 1790 1892 1951 1951
Kentucky 1792 1891 1891 1891 1891 1891
Tennessee 1796 1870 1870 1870 1953
Maine 1820 1875 1875 1875
West Virginia 1863 1872 1863 1872 1872 1872 1936 1936
Louisiana 1812 1845 1845 1879 1974 1974
Mississippi 1817 1890 1890 1890 1890
Alabama 1819 1867 1867 1875 1861 1901
Missouri 1821 1865 1865 1865 1865 1875
Arkansas 1836 1868 1868 1874 1868
Florida 1845 1968 1868 1868 1861 1861
Texas 1845 1876 1869 1869 1876 1912
Ohio 1803 1851 1851 1851 1912
Indiana 1816 1851 1851 1851 1851 1851
Illinois 1818 1848 1848 1870 1870 1870 1970
Michigan 1837 1850 1850 1850 1909 1909 1909
Iowa 1846 1846 1846 1857 1857 1857 1968
Wisconsin 1848 1848 1848 1871 1871 1871 1924
Minnesota 1858 1857 1881 1892 1881 1896 1896
California 1850 1849 1849 1879 1879 1879 1879 1879
Oregon 1859 1857 1857 1857 1906
Nevada 1864 1864 1864 1864 1864 1864 1864 1924
Kansas 1861 1859 1859 1859 1859 1960
Nebraska 1867 1866 1866 1875 1875 1875 1866 1912
Colorado 1876 1876 1876 1876 1876 1876 1876 1912
Montana 1889 1889 1889 1889 1889 1889 1922 1973
North Dakota 1889 1889 1889 1889 1889 1889 1889 1966
South Dakota 1889 1889 1889 1889 1889 1889 1889 1963
Washington 1889 1889 1889 1889 1889 1889 1889
Idaho 1890 1889 1889 1889 1889 1889
Wyoming 1890 1889 1889 1889 1889 1889
Utah 1896 1896 1896 1896 1896 1896 1896
Oklahoma 1907 1907 1907 1907 1907 1907
Arizona 1912 1912 1912 1912 1912 1912 1912
New Mexico 1912 1911 1911 1911 1911 1970
Alaska 1959 1959 1959
Hawaii 1959 1959 1959
Notes:  
No constitutions for Massachusetts, Vermont, and Virginia.
Each category (Corporations, General, Municipalities) is divided into prohibitions of special legislation and calls for general laws.
The municipality category also tracks when states adopted constitutional home rule for municipalities.
General legislation in the general category refers to Binney's category on general restrictions such as the state shall pass general laws in all 
cases where it can be made applicable.
Sp cial legislation in the general category refers to prohibitions of special laws for any of Binney's thirteen categories other than corporations 


































































Number Apportionment Number Apportionment
Illinois 1818 27-36 1/3 to 1/2 of number of Reps
1848 75-100 25
1870 Pop by Unit 51 Pop by Unit
1958 177 58
Indiana 1816 25-391 1/3 to 1/2 of number of Reps
1851 <=100 <=50
Iowa 1846 26-392 1/3 to 1/2 of number of Reps
1857 Pop by Unit 1/3 to 1/2 of number of Reps Pop by Unit
1868 <=100 Pop by Unit <50 Pop by Unit
1904 <=108 By Unit 50 By Pop 
1928 Pop by Unit
1968 <=50
Michigan 1835 48-100 By Unit (new Units by Pop) 1/3 of number of Reps
1850 64-100 Pop by Unit 32
1909 By Unit  
1952 <=110 Pop by Unit 34
Minnesota 1857 No more than 1 for every 2000 people By Pop No more than 1 for every 5000 people By Pop 
Ohio 1802 24-363 Pop by Unit 1/3 to 1/2 of number of Reps Pop by Unit
1851 Based on ratio4 Pop by Unit Pop by Unit
1903 By Unit  Pop by Unit
Wisconsin 1848 54-100 By Pop 1/4 to 1/3 of number of Reps
1951 By Pop Pop by Unit
1959 By Pop By Pop 
Source:  Text of state constitutions, obtained from NBER/Maryland State Constitutions Project
Notes:
By Pop means seats are allocated based only on population
Pop by Unit means seats are allocated based both on geographic unit (city and/or county) and population
By Unit means seats are allocated by geographic unit (city or county)
1  Once population of white males over 21 is more than 22,000, then the limit increases up to 100
2  Once population of white inhabitants is more than 750,000, then the range changes to 39-72
3  Once population of white males over 21 is more than 22,000, then the range changes to 36-72.
4  The ratio is equal to population/100.  Every county having half ratio gets 1 Rep, 1 3/4 gets 2 reps, 3 ratio 3 reps, 4 ratio 4 rep, etc.
Representatives Senators
Table 5





Population (in thousands) 133.5 1,385.2 2,616.2
Population Growth 0.1 1.4 0.4
% Other Votes 6.3 5.4 30.1
% Democrat Votes 90.9 93.3 116.8
% Native Born 23.0 188.2 41.5
% Urban 358.3 588.3 450.4
Gross Debt Less Sinking Fund (per capita) 71.7 1,560.2 746.2
Sinking Fund (per capita) 0.1 1.7 5.3
Number of Municipalities 64 72 119
Source: 1902 Census: Wealth, Debt and Taxation.
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Political HHI 0.49 0.50 ** 0.49 0.50 **
(0.115) (0.105) (***) (0.111) (0.105) (*)
% Democrat Votes 45.42 43.71 * 46.90 43.71 ***
(20.21) (21.93) (***) (19.48) (21.93) (***)
% Other Votes 9.93 11.00 8.34 11.00 ***
(14.51) (19.71) (***) (13.78) (19.71) (***)
Population (in thousands) 5.09 3.98 5.30 3.98
(20.49) (30.17) (***) (23.56) (30.17) (***)
Population Growth 0.26 0.29 0.25 0.29
(0.47) (1.22) (***) (0.46) (1.22) (***)
Gross Debt Less Sinking Fund (per capita) 7.04 6.71 6.39 6.71
(15.55) (14.77) (*) (14.53) (14.77)
Sinking Fund (per capita) 0.26 0.12 ** 0.24 0.12 **
(1.96) (0.48) (***) (1.81) (0.48) (***)
% Native born 82.27 84.41 *** 83.95 84.41
(12.79) (11.44) (***) (12.74) (11.44) (***)
















Political HHI 0.53 0.51 ** 0.53 0.51 **
(0.151) (0.129) (***) (0.152) (0.129) (***)
% Democrat Votes 44.03 44.26 43.96 44.26
(22.7) (17.25) (***) (22.7) (17.25) (***)
% Other Votes 15.37 8.94 *** 15.16 8.94 ***
(19.64) (6.95) (***) (20.34) (6.95) (***)
Population (in thousands) 14.06 15.02 12.39 15.02
(41.18) (93.05) (***) (36.62) (93.05) (***)
Population Growth 0.53 0.37 *** 0.59 0.37 ***
(1.12) (0.61) (***) (1.39) (0.61) (***)
Gross Debt Less Sinking Fund (per capita) 21.59 12.46 *** 21.96 12.46 ***
(22.46) (11.79) (***) (29.41) (11.79) (***)
Sinking Fund (per capita) 0.93 0.27 *** 1.00 0.27 ***
(2.19) (0.55) (***) (3.28) (0.55) (***)
% Native born 90.50 89.96 89.33 89.96
(10.06) (7.92) (***) (11.26) (7.92) (***)
Number of Municipalities 618 494 589 494
Notes:
Standard deviations are in parentheses
***, **, * denotes significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively.
Panel data statistics are averaged across municipalities
Home rule states in 1890 analysis are California, Colorado, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Ohio and Texas.
Home rule states in panel data analysis are Arizona, California, Colorado, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas and Washington.
Non-Home rule states are Arkansas, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
Panel Data
Probit Duration



















Political HHI 0.52 0.48 *** 0.52 0.48 ***
(0.15) (0.1) (***) (0.15) (0.1) (***)
% Democrat Votes 51.62 43.32 *** 51.67 45.58 ***
(22.03) (19.12) (***) (21.85) (18.56) (***)
% Other Votes 9.35 10.12 9.12 8.12
(13.99) (14.68) (13.89) (13.75)
Population (in thousands) 14.24 1.99 *** 16.73 2.11 ***
(39.14) (2.63) (***) (48.51) (3.13) (***)
Population Growth 0.39 0.21 *** 0.40 0.21 ***
(0.44) (0.48) (0.44) (0.46)
Gross Debt Less Sinking Fund (per capita) 8.34 6.59 * 8.49 5.81 ***
(12.28) (16.5) (***) (12.39) (15.03) (***)
Sinking Fund (per capita) 0.64 0.13 *** 0.64 0.12 ***
(3.73) (0.64) (***) (3.68) (0.6) (***)
% Native born 78.19 83.65 *** 78.21 85.55 ***
(14.12) (12) (***) (14.04) (11.87) (***)














Political HHI 0.53 0.49 *** 0.53 0.49 ***
(0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (*)
% Democrat Votes 49.08 37.25 *** 49.49 37.26 ***
(23.77) (17.18) (***) (23.86) (17.19) (***)
% Other Votes 12.48 18.73 ** 11.65 18.73 ***
(10.33) (24.84) (***) (11.64) (24.85) (***)
Population (in thousands) 23.76 7.28 *** 20.90 7.29 ***
(59.8) (9.01) (***) (54.93) (9.01) (***)
Population Growth 0.68 0.41 ** 0.83 0.41 ***
(1.14) (1.26) (1.7) (1.27) (***)
Gross Debt Less Sinking Fund (per capita) 27.92 19.08 *** 29.46 19.18 ***
(28.14) (15.12) (***) (40.82) (15.28) (***)
Sinking Fund (per capita) 1.46 0.48 *** 1.69 0.48 ***
(3.04) (0.89) (***) (4.87) (0.89) (***)
% Native born 86.69 93.13 *** 83.43 93.16 ***
(12.03) (7.16) (***) (13.42) (7.15) (***)
Number of Municipalities 276 231 247 231
Notes:
Standard deviations are in parentheses
***, **, * denotes significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively.
Panel data statistics are averaged across municipalities
Home rule states in 1890 analysis are California, Colorado, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Ohio and Texas.
Home rule states in panel data analysis are Arizona, California, Colorado, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas and Washington.
Home rule municipalities adopted a home rule charter by 1935.
Probit Duration






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Population (in thousands) 0.044 0.044 0.046 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.007)*** (0.008)*** (0.007)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Population (in thousands) [squared] -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.00006 -0.00006 -0.00006 -0.000002 -0.000002 -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000004 -0.000004
(0.00002)*** (0.00002)*** (0.00002)*** (0.000008)*** (0.000008)*** (0.000008)*** (0.0000008)** (0.0000008)** (0.0000009)** (0.000002)** (0.000002)** (0.000002)**
Population growth 0.271 0.170 0.247 0.212 0.156 0.199 0.058 0.033 0.044 0.013 -0.006 0.002
(0.048)*** (0.043)*** (0.048)*** (0.039)*** (0.039)*** (0.039)*** (0.013)*** (0.011)*** (0.014)*** (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Different Political Party from State -0.114 -0.035 -0.052 -0.105 -0.056 -0.053 -0.015 -0.010 -0.002 -0.032 -0.022 -0.008
(0.036)*** (0.032) (0.041) (0.029)*** (0.029)* (0.030)* (0.019) (0.018) (0.021) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Political HHI 0.019 -0.228 -0.346 0.175 -0.004 -0.223 0.313 0.052 0.245 0.507 0.143 0.369
(0.177) (0.185) (0.201)* (0.147) (0.199) (0.195) (0.072)*** (0.061) (0.068)*** (0.101)*** (0.124) (0.110)***
% Democrat Votes 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002
(0.001)*** (0.002)** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001) (0.001)*** (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)** (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)**
% Other Votes 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004
(0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
% Native born -0.886 0.003 -0.953 -0.644 0.011 -0.689 -0.803 -0.423 -0.806 -0.859 -0.396 -0.858
(0.153)*** (0.166) (0.163)*** (0.121)*** (0.181) (0.127)*** (0.157)*** (0.118)*** (0.155)*** (0.144)*** (0.154)** (0.141)***
Gross Debt Less Sinking Fund (per capita) 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)** (0.002) (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001) (0.001)** (0.000)** (0.001) (0.001)* (0.001)* (0.001)
Sinking Fund (per capita) 0.016 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.001 0.004 -0.007 -0.004 -0.006 -0.011 -0.010 -0.011
(0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.003)* (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)* (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)*** (0.004)** (0.004)***
Population growth compared to state average [squared] -0.140 -0.070 -0.126 -0.086 -0.058 -0.086 -0.014 -0.011 -0.012 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.035)*** (0.028)** (0.034)*** (0.017)*** (0.016)*** (0.017)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
% Native compared to state average [squared] -0.689 0.194 -0.831 0.354 1.001 0.146 -4.776 -2.499 -4.247 -4.148 -2.827 -4.162
(1.155) (1.036) (1.223) (0.899) (1.038) (0.918) (1.218)*** (0.928)*** (1.140)*** (1.016)*** (0.795)*** (0.808)***
Gross Debt Less Sinking Fund (per capita) compared to state average [squared] -0.00002  -0.00006 -0.00003 -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.000006 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.000005 -0.000003 -0.000003




Observations 925 925 925 925 925 925 1216 1216 1216 1216 1216 1216
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses; panel data standard errors are clustered by municipality
***, **, * denotes significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively.
Marginal effects of the probit estimation are evaluated at the mean of the independent variables.
Sample is all municipalities in home rule states.
Home rule states in 1890 analysis are California, Colorado, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Ohio and Texas.
Home rule states in panel data analysis are Arizona, California, Colorado, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas and Washington.
Y
Y
Table 9: Probit and Linear Probability Estimates
Y
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1890 Data Panel Data
Probit Model (Marginal Effects) Linear Probability Model
Y




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Population (in thousands) 1.024 1.027 1.025 1.009 1.011 1.009 1.010
(0.010)** (0.015)* (0.013)** (0.005)* (0.007) (0.005)* (0.008)
Population (in thousands) [squared] 0.99994 0.99993 0.99994 0.99998 0.99998 0.99998 .99998
(0.00005) (0.00007) (0.00006) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00003)
Population growth 3.811 2.620 4.035 1.474 1.524 1.528 1.432
(0.938)*** (0.625)*** (0.995)*** (0.118)*** (0.127)*** (0.128)*** (0.136)***
Different Political Party from State 0.701 0.830 0.616 0.765 0.848 0.924 0.729
(0.129)* (0.151) (0.122)** (0.138) (0.167) (0.174) (0.156)
Political HHI 2.276 0.178 3.642 14.364 1.422 11.270 0.575
(1.802) (0.176)* (2.978) (6.849)*** (0.822) (5.480)*** (0.416)
% Democrat Votes 1.029 1.022 1.038 1.025 1.003 1.011 1.003
(0.007)*** (0.009)** (0.008)*** (0.004)*** (0.006) (0.005)** (0.007)
% Other Votes 1.026 1.024 1.033 1.008 1.001 1.002 1.016
(0.007)*** (0.010)** (0.008)*** (0.004)* (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)**
% Native born 0.029 0.648 0.097 0.027 0.041 0.016 0.362
(0.019)*** (0.567) (0.069)*** (0.017)*** (0.034)*** (0.010)*** (0.368)
Gross Debt Less Sinking Fund (per capita) 1.027 1.038 1.025 1.010 1.006 1.008 1.008
(0.007)*** (0.011)*** (0.008)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)** (0.002)*** (0.004)**
Sinking Fund (per capita) 1.056 1.046 1.058 1.026 1.029 1.030 1.027
(0.007)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.010)***
Population growth compared to state average [squared] 0.446 0.579 0.435 0.978 0.971 0.975 0.978
(0.116)*** (0.146)** (0.112)*** (0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.008)***
% Native compared to state average [squared] 10.821 324.683 288.878 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.007
(32.924) (1,066.132)* (923.551)* (0.089) (0.000)*** (0.002)** (0.033)
Gross Debt Less Sinking Fund (per capita) compared to state average [squared] 0.9999 0.9997 0.9999 0.99997 0.99998 0.99997 0.99998




Observations 1102 1102 1102 987 987 987 987
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses; panel data standard errors are clustered by municipality
***, **, * denotes significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively.
All specifications assume the Weibull distribution.
Sample is all municipalities in home rule states.
Home rule states in 1890 analysis are California, Colorado, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Ohio and Texas.
Home rule states in panel data analysis are Arizona, California, Colorado, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas and Washington.
1890 Data Panel Data














Probit 1890 0.12 0.06 * 0.08 0.04 *
Panel 0.04 0.01 * 0.03 0.01 *
Linear Probability 1890 0.18 0.12 * 0.06 0.02 *
Panel 0.18 0.09 * 0.02 0.01 *
Duration 1890 0.12 0.09 * 0.03 0.01 *
Panel 0.06 0.04 * 0.03 0.01 *
Note: 
* Denotes significant difference at 1% level
Panel data predictions are constructed as the average for each municipality.
The strength of home rule preference in the linear probability model is measured as the sum of all predictions above the 55th percentile divided by the 
total number of municipalities. The cutoff of is based on the actual number of municipalities adopting home rule by 1935 in the sample.
The preferences in the duration model are calculated as 1 minus the predicted survival probability.  The value represents the probability that the 
municipality adopts a home rule charter by 1935.  The strength of home rule preference in the duration model is measured as the sum of all predictions 
where the probability of adopting a home rule charter is greater than 43 percent. The cutoff is based on the actual number of municipalities adopting 
home rule by 1935 in the sample.
Table 11: Comparison of Home Rule and Non-Home Rule Municipalities
Strength of Home Rule Preference Variance of Home Rule Preference




























































































































































































































Constitutional Convention Initial Constitution Constitutional Amendment
Note: There are thirteen categories of special legislation defined in Binney (1894).  Each observation is a given state in a given year.  The number of 






Adoption of Constitutional Home Rule
1875-1889
Era of Home Rule 1875-1889
1875-1932
Era of Home Rule 1875-1889 1896-1932
1875-1958
Era of Home Rule 1875-1889 1896-1932
1933-1958
1875-1974
























































1903: Each county guaranteed 1 Representative
Figure 4
Iowa










































































































1909: Each county guaranteed 1 Representative
Figure 6: Cities in Minnesota by 1890 Population
Blue: General Law Municipalities
Orange: Home Rule Municipalities
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Figure 7: Cities in Texas by 1890 Population
Blue: General Law Municipalities
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